J-S01011-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA : : Appellant : No. 490 WDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 21, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000942-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA : : Appellant : No. 694 WDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 21, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000182-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: APRIL 13, 2026
Justin James Centra appeals from the order dismissing his petition filed
in accordance with the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.
This matter arises from Appellant’s sexual abuse of his minor daughter
and niece. Once a criminal complaint was filed against him based on the
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01011-26
reports of that misconduct, Appellant proceeded to write multiple letters and
make numerous phone calls to both victims instructing them to tell
investigators that no harm occurred. Consequently, a second criminal
complaint followed, charging Appellant with intimidation of witnesses and
obstruction. The cases were consolidated for a three-day jury trial, at the
conclusion of which Appellant was convicted of attempt to commit aggravated
indecent assault of a child, indecent exposure, and terroristic threats; three
counts each of indecent assault and corruption of a minor; and nineteen
counts each of intimidation of witnesses or victims and intimidation,
retaliation, or obstruction in child abuse cases. After the court found Appellant
to be a sexually violent predator, it sentenced him to an aggregate of eighteen
years and three months to forty-two years in prison.
Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence.
See Commonwealth v. Centra, 307 A.3d 683, 2023 WL 6998402 (Pa.Super.
2023) (non-precedential decision). The PCRA court appointed counsel after
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. An amended PCRA petition
followed, along with a subsequent revised petition, raising twenty-four claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Patrick Lavelle, Esquire. 1 Among
1 The certified record does not show that Appellant sought leave of court to
file a revised amended petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 905. Typically, this results in waiver of any newly added claims. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 437 (Pa. 2014). However, in the revised amended petition Appellant only corrected some of the procedural history, and the issues were (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-2- J-S01011-26
those contentions, Appellant argued that Attorney Lavelle was ineffective for
failing to provide him with discovery prior to trial, and for neglecting to obtain
and present to the jury a copy of an emergency petition for custody and
records from Children, Youth, and Family Services (“CYS”).
The court scheduled a hearing, at which Attorney Lavelle and Appellant
testified. Appellant averred that he was unaware of any of the evidence of
the case prior to trial and felt that he was unprepared to testify in his own
defense. He claimed that the emergency petition for custody would have
established that he was not allowed to be around one of the victims during
the period in question, and the CYS records would have proved that some
allegations of abuse were determined to be unfounded. Attorney Lavelle
confirmed that he provided Appellant with discovery materials at each of their
meetings prior to trial, although he did not give him physical copies. He
further contended that the emergency petition for custody was irrelevant to
this case. As to the CYS reports, he stated that they concerned allegations
made years before the events in question.
Finding that Attorney Lavelle did not provide deficient representation,
the court dismissed the petition by opinion and order. Appellant timely
identical to those in the amended petition. Since Appellant’s claims in both filings remained the same, they are not subject to waiver in this instance. See id. (finding waived only newly added claims in unauthorized amended petitions, but addressing those that were included in the first counseled amended petition).
-3- J-S01011-26
appealed and submitted a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Instead of authoring a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court directed us to its prior
writing dismissing the petition. On appeal, Appellant has confined his issues
to the following:
I. Whether trial counsel was ineffective because he did not provide [Appellant] with any discovery prior to the first day of trial and therefore did not review the discovery with [Appellant] at any time prior to appearing in the courtroom which denied [Appellant] any input in his trial and [Appellant] was not properly prepared.
II. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a copy of an emergency petition for custody filed by [Appellant]’s daughter’s mother. The purpose would have been proof that he was prohibited from seeing his daughter for an extended of [sic] time, which was one of the periods when the abuse was alleged.
III. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain records from [CYS,] which [Appellant] alleged would have helped his case because they concluded that allegations against him were unfounded.
Appellant’s brief at 5 (some capitalization altered).2
The relevant legal principles governing our consideration of these issues
are as follows:
[O]ur standard of review from the [dismissal] of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.
2 Instead of filing a brief in this Court, the Commonwealth submitted a letter
adopting the position of the PCRA court.
-4- J-S01011-26
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(cleaned up). A petitioner bears the burden to prove that the PCRA court
erred, and that he is entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v. Stansbury,
219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019).
Appellant challenges the effectiveness of trial counsel. In that vein:
Counsel is presumed to be effective and it is a petitioner’s burden to overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish three criteria: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) that petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the complained-of action or inaction. The failure to satisfy any one of these criteria is fatal to the claim.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 620-21 (Pa. 2024) (cleaned up).
A contention has arguable merit “where the factual averments, if
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J-S01011-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA : : Appellant : No. 490 WDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 21, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000942-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA : : Appellant : No. 694 WDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 21, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0000182-2021
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: APRIL 13, 2026
Justin James Centra appeals from the order dismissing his petition filed
in accordance with the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm.
This matter arises from Appellant’s sexual abuse of his minor daughter
and niece. Once a criminal complaint was filed against him based on the
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01011-26
reports of that misconduct, Appellant proceeded to write multiple letters and
make numerous phone calls to both victims instructing them to tell
investigators that no harm occurred. Consequently, a second criminal
complaint followed, charging Appellant with intimidation of witnesses and
obstruction. The cases were consolidated for a three-day jury trial, at the
conclusion of which Appellant was convicted of attempt to commit aggravated
indecent assault of a child, indecent exposure, and terroristic threats; three
counts each of indecent assault and corruption of a minor; and nineteen
counts each of intimidation of witnesses or victims and intimidation,
retaliation, or obstruction in child abuse cases. After the court found Appellant
to be a sexually violent predator, it sentenced him to an aggregate of eighteen
years and three months to forty-two years in prison.
Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence.
See Commonwealth v. Centra, 307 A.3d 683, 2023 WL 6998402 (Pa.Super.
2023) (non-precedential decision). The PCRA court appointed counsel after
Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. An amended PCRA petition
followed, along with a subsequent revised petition, raising twenty-four claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Patrick Lavelle, Esquire. 1 Among
1 The certified record does not show that Appellant sought leave of court to
file a revised amended petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 905. Typically, this results in waiver of any newly added claims. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 437 (Pa. 2014). However, in the revised amended petition Appellant only corrected some of the procedural history, and the issues were (Footnote Continued Next Page)
-2- J-S01011-26
those contentions, Appellant argued that Attorney Lavelle was ineffective for
failing to provide him with discovery prior to trial, and for neglecting to obtain
and present to the jury a copy of an emergency petition for custody and
records from Children, Youth, and Family Services (“CYS”).
The court scheduled a hearing, at which Attorney Lavelle and Appellant
testified. Appellant averred that he was unaware of any of the evidence of
the case prior to trial and felt that he was unprepared to testify in his own
defense. He claimed that the emergency petition for custody would have
established that he was not allowed to be around one of the victims during
the period in question, and the CYS records would have proved that some
allegations of abuse were determined to be unfounded. Attorney Lavelle
confirmed that he provided Appellant with discovery materials at each of their
meetings prior to trial, although he did not give him physical copies. He
further contended that the emergency petition for custody was irrelevant to
this case. As to the CYS reports, he stated that they concerned allegations
made years before the events in question.
Finding that Attorney Lavelle did not provide deficient representation,
the court dismissed the petition by opinion and order. Appellant timely
identical to those in the amended petition. Since Appellant’s claims in both filings remained the same, they are not subject to waiver in this instance. See id. (finding waived only newly added claims in unauthorized amended petitions, but addressing those that were included in the first counseled amended petition).
-3- J-S01011-26
appealed and submitted a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Instead of authoring a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court directed us to its prior
writing dismissing the petition. On appeal, Appellant has confined his issues
to the following:
I. Whether trial counsel was ineffective because he did not provide [Appellant] with any discovery prior to the first day of trial and therefore did not review the discovery with [Appellant] at any time prior to appearing in the courtroom which denied [Appellant] any input in his trial and [Appellant] was not properly prepared.
II. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a copy of an emergency petition for custody filed by [Appellant]’s daughter’s mother. The purpose would have been proof that he was prohibited from seeing his daughter for an extended of [sic] time, which was one of the periods when the abuse was alleged.
III. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain records from [CYS,] which [Appellant] alleged would have helped his case because they concluded that allegations against him were unfounded.
Appellant’s brief at 5 (some capitalization altered).2
The relevant legal principles governing our consideration of these issues
are as follows:
[O]ur standard of review from the [dismissal] of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.
2 Instead of filing a brief in this Court, the Commonwealth submitted a letter
adopting the position of the PCRA court.
-4- J-S01011-26
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(cleaned up). A petitioner bears the burden to prove that the PCRA court
erred, and that he is entitled to relief. See Commonwealth v. Stansbury,
219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa.Super. 2019).
Appellant challenges the effectiveness of trial counsel. In that vein:
Counsel is presumed to be effective and it is a petitioner’s burden to overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish three criteria: (1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) that petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the complained-of action or inaction. The failure to satisfy any one of these criteria is fatal to the claim.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 323 A.3d 611, 620-21 (Pa. 2024) (cleaned up).
A contention has arguable merit “where the factual averments, if
accurate, could establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v. Pitt, 313 A.3d
287, 293 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up). As to whether an attorney had a
reasonable basis for a decision or strategy, “a petitioner must prove that an
alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater
than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d
1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (cleaned up). To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner
must establish that “there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s act
or omission, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”
Commonwealth v. Alceus, 315 A.3d 853, 859 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned
up).
-5- J-S01011-26
Initially, we note that Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P.
2119, which provides that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts
as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part–
in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed–the particular point treated
therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed
pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Appellant instead includes all his arguments
in one section and intertwines his contentions. As such, we will address his
claims as one collective challenge to Attorney Lavelle’s efficacy.
Appellant maintains that Attorney Lavelle was ineffective for neglecting
to provide him with discovery materials. He contends that “by failing to
provide him with discovery prior to him testify [sic] at trial, he was denied any
input in his trial and he was not properly prepared for his testimony at trial.”
Appellant’s brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Although trial
counsel met with Appellant at least four times and provided him with evidence
during each meeting, Appellant claims that he wanted to “hear recordings on
which it was alleged that he made intimidating statements.” Id. at 8.
However, he explains, Attorney Lavelle “said he did not think he had the
equipment for him to be able to provide copies of CD’s and recordings of
telephone calls.” Id. Appellant asserts that Attorney Lavelle also failed to
obtain a copy of an emergency petition for custody and records from CYS and
present them at trial. Id. at 14. He states that the emergency petition “would
have been proof that he was prohibited from seeing his daughter for an
-6- J-S01011-26
extended period of time, which was one of the periods in which abuse was
alleged.” Id. Additionally, he argues that the CYS records “could have helped
his case because they concluded that the allegations against him were
unfounded.” Id.
The PCRA court determined that Appellant failed to establish that
Attorney Lavelle was ineffective. It first found that trial counsel “credibly
testified that [Appellant] did in fact see the discovery” where he stated that
he “always brought the entire file with him when he saw [Appellant] and went
over the entire file with [him].” PCRA Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 19. The
court also explained that Appellant “did not demonstrate that the phone call
recordings were used during trial or that there was something in his discovery
that had Attorney Lavelle provided [him] with a physical copy that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 20. Further,
the court concluded that Appellant was adequately prepared to testify where
he was present during the whole trial and heard the questions that were being
asked. Id. at 21. Accordingly, the court opined that “[t]o say [Appellant] had
no clue what the Commonwealth would ask him is not believable.” Id.
Moreover, the court stated, “Attorney Lavelle did inform [Appellant] of the
risks of testifying, the risks associated with cross-examination by competent
counsel, and that the decision to testify was ultimately [Appellant]’s.” Id. at
22.
-7- J-S01011-26
Additionally, the PCRA court maintained that the emergency custody
petition and the records from CYS were irrelevant, and thus Attorney Lavelle
was not ineffective for failing to offer them at trial. Id. at 23. It specified
that Appellant “was unable to establish [their] relevance, and no further
testimony was taken on the issue.” Id. The court also reviewed the
transcripts of the jury trial and confirmed that Appellant had testified to having
custody of his daughter “during the period of time in which the alleged events
occurred.” Id. Finally, the court found that while Appellant averred that this
evidence would have been helpful to his defense, he “failed to demonstrate
how it would have been helpful.” Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
We agree with the PCRA court’s determinations, which are supported by
the record. Attorney Lavelle credibly testified that he met with Appellant for
several hours multiple times before trial, and shared all discovery materials
during each of those meetings. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/6/24, at 44, 48-
49. Nonetheless, when Appellant was asked what evidence at trial was
shocking to him, he responded “[a]ll of it.” Id. at 37. Appellant has neglected
to specify any discovery materials he was missing or how having his own copy
would have altered the outcome of the trial. As to the recorded phone calls,
Attorney Lavelle explained that he did not rely upon them, and Appellant
would have been aware of what he said. Id. at 50. It was also Appellant’s
choice to testify, and he was warned of the risks of doing so. Id. at 49, 52.
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The record is further devoid of evidence as to how Attorney Lavelle was
ineffective for failing to obtain and present the emergency custody petition
and CYS records. Starting with the custody petition, Appellant initially averred
that it would have showed the jury that he was awarded custody of his
daughter. See Revised Amended PCRA Petition, 7/3/24, at ¶ 15.j. However,
at the PCRA hearing, and now on appeal, he claims that this evidence would
demonstrate that he was not allowed to be present with his daughter during
a period that she alleged to have suffered abuse. See N.T. PCRA Hearing,
12/6/24, at 17; Appellant’s brief at 14. It is therefore unclear as to what
purpose the custody petition would have served, and Appellant does not
acknowledge this inconsistency. Nevertheless, the record established
conclusively that Appellant had custody of his daughter during the period in
which she alleged she was sexually abused. See N.T. Jury Trial, 9/30/21, at
124, 166-67. As to the CYS records, Attorney Lavelle explained that they
were irrelevant because he “didn’t see any strategic benefit to approaching a
defense of the charges that were before us by attempting to raise up issues
that were well in the past.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/6/24, at 57. Appellant
failed to establish the purpose of the stale CYS records beyond a bald assertion
that he believed they would have been “tremendously” helpful to his case.
See Appellant’s brief at 15.
Plainly, Appellant’s mere declarations that these pieces of evidence
would have been beneficial to his defense falls short of his burden to establish
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by a preponderance of the evidence any of the three prongs of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. See Thomas, 323 A.3d at 620-21. Accordingly,
we have no reason to conclude that the PCRA court erred, and we thus affirm
its order dismissing the petition.
Order affirmed.
DATE: 4/13/2026
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