Com. v. Carpenter, R.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 8, 2014
Docket1569 EDA 2014
StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Carpenter, R. (Com. v. Carpenter, R.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Carpenter, R., (Pa. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

J-S75042-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

RUSSELL B. CARPENTER,

Appellant No. 1569 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order entered May 2, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010394-2011

BEFORE: ALLEN, LAZARUS, and MUNDY, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2014

Russell B. Carpenter (“Appellant”) appeals from the order denying his

petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

sections 9541-46. We affirm.

The pertinent facts and procedural history have been summarized as

follows:

Following a waiver trial before the Honorable Angelo J. Foglietta, [Appellant] was found guilty of unlawful possession of firearms, firearms not to be carried without a license, and carrying firearms on the public streets in Philadelphia. Jeffrey Azzarano, Esq., represented [Appellant] at trial. Subsequently, [Appellant] obtained new counsel who made an oral motion for extraordinary relief on his behalf, alleging the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. On May 15, 2012, [Appellant’s] oral motion for extraordinary relief was denied, and the trial court proceeded to sentencing. Appellant received an aggregate sentence of three to six years’ imprisonment, followed by three years of probation. J-S75042-14

Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1348 (Pa. Super.

2014), unpublished memorandum at 1-2 (footnote omitted).

Following the denial of post-sentence motions, Appellant filed a timely

appeal to this Court, in which he reiterated his allegations of trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness. We summarized these claims as follows:

Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call any witnesses where trial counsel was under the misimpression that operability of the firearm was an element of the offenses. Appellant also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine the arresting officer about his preliminary hearing testimony, in which he testified that he could not be certain the item he saw [Appellant] discard was really a gun (the gun was never recovered). Appellant also claims that trial counsel should have called an expert witness to testify that police officers routinely mistake toy guns or replicas for real firearms.

As stated above, these claims were raised in post-trial and post-sentence motions, and evidentiary hearings were held, at which trial counsel testified. The trial court disposed of these claims on the merits, and addressed them in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. The trial court acknowledges the general rule in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), that defendants should wait until the collateral review phase to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Trial court opinion, 6/7/13, at 4.) Nonetheless, the trial court urges us to review [Appellant’s] claims now, on direct appeal, pursuant to the so-called “Bomar exception” to the Grant rule. Id.; see Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1115 (2004) (recognizing a limited exception to the Grant deferral rule where there was an extensive record regarding the ineffectiveness claims, including a full hearing where counsel testified, and the trial court ruled upon all claims).

Carpenter, unpublished memorandum at 2-3.

-2- J-S75042-14

Before addressing Appellant’s direct appeal claims of ineffectiveness of

counsel, this Court noted that our Supreme Court had recently revisited its

Bomar holding in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.2d 562 (Pa. 2013).

After thoroughly discussing the high court’s decision, we concluded that

Appellant’s claims did not fit into either exception recognized by our

Supreme Court in Holmes. See Carpenter, unpublished memorandum at

3-6. Thus, this Court was “constrained to affirm the judgment of sentence,

without prejudice to [Appellant’s] right to re-raise his ineffectiveness claims

in a timely PCRA petition.” Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).

On March 17, 2014, Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition, in which

he “re-raised” his claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. On March 25,

2014, the PCRA court issued a rule to show cause upon Appellant, and oral

argument was scheduled for May 2, 2014. On April 23, 2014, the

Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Following argument on May 2, 2014, the PCRA court granted the

Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s petition because Appellant

“failed to provide this Court with any new evidence which would warrant the

granting of PCRA relief.” PCRA Court Opinion, 6/18/14, at 1. Thereafter,

Appellant waived the Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 requirements, and he timely filed the

instant appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue:

-3- J-S75042-14

Did the [PCRA court] err in ruling that [Appellant’s] trial counsel’s failure to call eyewitnesses, experts, or confront the Commonwealth’s lone witness with his preliminary hearing testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

In reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying PCRA relief,

an appellate court is limited to ascertaining whether the record supports the

determination of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). We pay great

deference to the findings of the PCRA court, “but its legal determinations are

subject to our plenary review.” Id. To be entitled to relief under the PCRA,

the petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

the conviction or sentence arose from one or more of the errors enumerated

in section 9543(a)(2) of the PCRA. One such error involves the

ineffectiveness of counsel.

To obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was

ineffective, a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that counsel's ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.

Id. “Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to be constitutionally

adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient

showing by the petitioner.” Id. This requires the petitioner to demonstrate

that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no

-4- J-S75042-14

reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) petitioner

was prejudiced by counsel's act or omission. Id. at 533. A finding of

"prejudice" requires the petitioner to show "that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id.

In assessing a claim of ineffectiveness, when it is clear that appellant

has failed to meet the prejudice prong, the court may dispose of the claim

on that basis alone, without a determination of whether the first two prongs

have been met. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa.

1995). Counsel will not be deemed ineffective if any reasonable basis exists

for counsel's actions. Commonwealth v. Douglas, 645 A.2d 226, 231 (Pa.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Commonwealth v. Johnson
966 A.2d 523 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Commonwealth v. Clark
626 A.2d 154 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1993)
Commonwealth v. Buksa
655 A.2d 576 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Commonwealth v. Layton
307 A.2d 843 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1973)
Commonwealth v. Holguin
385 A.2d 1346 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1978)
Commonwealth v. Collins
545 A.2d 882 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1988)
Commonwealth v. Fitzhugh
520 A.2d 424 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)
Commonwealth v. Williams
640 A.2d 1251 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1994)
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Washington v. Maroney
235 A.2d 349 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1967)
Commonwealth v. Thomas
988 A.2d 669 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Commonwealth v. Rios
920 A.2d 790 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)
Commonwealth v. Kimball
724 A.2d 326 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1999)
Commonwealth v. Owens
312 A.2d 378 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1973)
Commonwealth v. Mabie
359 A.2d 369 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1976)
Commonwealth v. Hall
701 A.2d 190 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1997)
Commonwealth v. Karkaria
625 A.2d 1167 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1993)
Commonwealth v. Williams
936 A.2d 12 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)
Commonwealth v. Douglas
645 A.2d 226 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1994)
Commonwealth v. Pierce
527 A.2d 973 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Com. v. Carpenter, R., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-carpenter-r-pasuperct-2014.