J-S08035-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KALLILE CAMERON : : Appellant : No. 786 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 15, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006104-2022
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 6, 2025
Appellant, Kallile Cameron, appeals the judgment of sentence imposed
by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after the trial court
found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver
and possession of marijuana.1 He challenges the denial of his motion to
suppress physical evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his
convictions, and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.
On June 28, 2022, Officer Bryan Otterbridge of the Philadelphia Police
Narcotics Strike Force was engaged in a narcotics surveillance operation in the
area of the 2200 block of Felton Street in Philadelphia. See N.T. Suppression
____________________________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31), respectively. J-S08035-25
Hearing, 12/12/22, 6-8, 11-12.2 Appellant was on that block selling T-shirts
from a table stand on the west side of the street just south of a parked
Chevrolet Traverse sports utility vehicle (“SUV”). Id. at 22-23. At 4:55 p.m.,
Officer Otterbridge saw Appellant engage in a brief conversation with a
woman, after which Appellant momentarily went into the rear of the nearby
SUV, beyond Officer Otterbridge’s line of sight. Id. at 12. After Appellant
returned to the officer’s view, the officer watched him hand the woman small
objects in exchange for an undetermined amount of money. Id. The woman
then crossed nearby Woodland Avenue and departed on a westbound
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”) trolley. Id. at
12-13. Given her use of the public transportation trolley, the police did not
pursue the woman. Id. at 13.
At 5:30 p.m., Officer Otterbridge watched Appellant engage in a brief
conversation with a different woman, later identified as Kimberly Barron. See
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 12/12/22, 13. Consistent with the prior observed
exchange, Officer Otterbridge watched Appellant enter the nearby SUV,
momentarily out of the officer’s view. Id. After returning to the officer’s view,
Appellant handed Barron small objects in exchange for money. Id. Officer ____________________________________________
2 As addressed infra, we are only able to conduct substantive review of Appellant’s claim challenging the denial of his suppression motion because Appellant raised his remaining claims for the first time on appeal and failed to ensure the presence of the notes of testimony for his trial and sentencing hearing in the certified record for this appeal. Accordingly, we rely exclusively on the testimony from the hearing on the suppression motion for our summary of the facts for this appeal.
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Otterbridge relayed information about Barron to his fellow officers, and one of
the officers stopped her “around the corner on 62 nd Street,” and recovered
three clear-and-black Ziploc packets and one green Ziploc packet, each
containing marijuana, from Barron.3 Id. at 13, 31. The officers issued Barron
a code violation notice and released her. Id. at 13.
At 5:39 p.m., Barron returned to the area of Officer Otterbridge’s
surveillance operation, traveling eastbound on Woodland Avenue while
Appellant was walking southbound on Felton Street. See N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 12/12/22, 13-14. Fearing that the officers would then lose Appellant,
the Narcotics Strike Force officers converged on the 2200 block of Felton
Street and detained Appellant. Id. at 14. Appellant identified himself as
“Lester Harrison” to the officers. Id. at 12.
3 Unlike the rest of the packets recovered in this case, the packets recovered
from Barron were labeled, “legal or not”:
Q. And it turns out what she had on her was a small clear-and- black [Ziploc] packet labeled, quote/unquote legal or not; is that correct?
A. That is a fair statement.
Q. And there was no packaging in this case that had those markings of, quote/unquote, legal or not; is that a fair statement?
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 12/12/22, 31.
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From Appellant’s person, the officers recovered three clear-and-black
Ziploc packets, one clear Ziploc packet, and one clear sandwich bag, all of
which contained marijuana, and eighty-three dollars in cash. See N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 12/12/22, 12. The officers transported the Chevrolet
Traverse SUV to a secure police facility where, at 10:30 p.m. that evening,
they executed a search warrant on the vehicle, identified as “Search Warrant
254141.” Id. at 14, 17. From the center console of the SUV, the police
recovered seven hundred and fifty dollars in cash. Id. at 17. From the rear
of the SUV, the officers recovered twenty clear-and-black Ziploc packets, three
clear Ziploc packets, and four clear sandwich bags, all of which contained
marijuana. Id. at 17-18. From the driver’s side of the SUV, the officers
recovered a .40-caliber Smith and Wesson firearm that was loaded with
nineteen live rounds; the gun was in “stolen status out of Delaware County.”
Id. at 18.
On October 11, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to suppress physical
evidence in which he alleged that the police “stopped, searched, and arrested
him without probable cause or reasonable suspicion” and the “arrest, search[,]
and seizure of [him] and [the] vehicle w[ere] conducted without a warrant
and in violation of petitioner’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States and his rights under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.” Suppression Motion, 10/11/22, ¶¶ 3, 5.
On December 12, 2022, the suppression court presided over a hearing
on Appellant’s motion. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer
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Otterbridge, whose testimony was consistent with the above summary of the
facts. Prior to the presentation of the live testimony, the parties stipulated to
the admission of a copy of Search Warrant 254141 that lacked signatures for
Officer Otterbridge and an issuing authority. See N.T. Suppression Hearing,
12/12/22, 5-6; Exhibit C-8, Search Warrant 254141 Copy, 6/28/22. With
respect to the absence of signatures on the stipulated copy of the search
warrant, Officer Otterbridge blamed the absence of the signatures on a clerical
error, which occurred during the scanning of documents for exchange in
discovery:
Q. Officer, this has already been moved into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit C-8, so I just have a handful of questions, quickly.
* * *
Was this the search warrant that you completed and submitted to be approved?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And is there -- this copy doesn’t have a search warrant -- a signature, I apologize. Do you know why that would be?
A. We scanned the wrong copy into evidence. In other words, when we get done, this is the copy that’s sent to the District Attorney’s Office for approval of the search warrant. Then we come down and have the magistrate sign and approve the warrant. So basically, we just made a mistake. We scanned the wrong copy into the discovery. We should have scanned the signed copy and not --
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I object. The best evidence rules, I think, require that --
THE COURT: Overruled.
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: -- virtual copy, not the speculation.
Q. Officer, this is the copy that was submitted and later approved by a magistrate?
A. Yes, sir. If you look at the warrant itself, it says, approved by ADA Kate Thompson, and it has the date which is 6/28, and it was approved at 9:17.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 12/12/22, 15-16.
As for his claim that he was stopped, searched, and arrested without
probable cause, Appellant argued that the evidence was lacking to show that
he had been dealing drugs because his observed interactions were consistent
with his efforts to sell T-shirts from a stand, only one presumed buyer was
stopped by the police, and the stopped buyer was found with a packet labeled
differently from all of the other packets recovered in this case. See N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 12/12/22, 42-44. He also argued that the search
warrant for the SUV search was defective because the Commonwealth never
proffered a copy that was signed by an issuing authority. Id. at 44-46.
After holding a decision under advisement, the court denied the
suppression motion on January 17, 2023. See Order (motion to suppress),
1/17/23, 1. The court explained its conclusions of law as follows:
The [c]ourt had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness during his testimony and to [assess] his credibility. The [c]ourt also considered [defense counsel’s] January 6, 2023 email with citations to [case law] and additional argument regarding defendant’s expectation of privacy in in the vehicle. Defendant did have an expectation of privacy in the [Chevrolet] Traverse.
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However, Officer [Otterbridge] observed two transactions which, based on his significant experience, led him to conclude that he had observed two illegal narcotics transactions. Defendant counters that these observations are unreliable because one of the buyers was not apprehended and the other was found to be in possession of packets of marijuana which did not match the packaging of the marijuana confiscated from defendant’s person and vehicle. Although the pack at the times [sic] were similarly clear and black, the defendant’s drugs were not stamped [“]legal or not.[”] This would go to either Officer [Otterbridge’s] observations and/or his credibility. The [c]ourt accepted the officer’s testimony as credible. Similarly, the [c]ourt accepted Officer [Otterbridge’s] explanation as to why the assistant district attorney was in possession of an unsigned copy of the warrant during the motion. It was an honest mistake.
Hearing the totality of the circumstances in a commonsense way and considering the experience of this particular officer, there was sufficient probable cause to believe defendant was engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana, and there’s probable cause for his arrest, search of his person, and the issuance of the warrant to search his vehicle. For these reasons, the defendant’s motion to suppress is denied.
N.T. Suppression Hearing, 1/17/23, 9-10.
On December 13, 2023, Appellant waived his right to be tried by a jury,
and the trial court found him guilty of the above-referenced offenses. 4 On
February 15, 2024, the court sentenced Appellant to six to twelve months’
imprisonment for the delivery charge and no further penalty for the simple
possession charge. See Order (sentencing), 2/15/24, 1. Appellant did not
4 The court also found him not guilty of carrying firearms by a prohibited person (18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1)(5)), carrying firearms without a license (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1)), and carrying firearms on public streets or public property in Philadelphia (18 Pa.C.S. § 6108). See Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form, 12/13/23, 1-2.
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file any post-sentence motion. He timely filed a notice of appeal. 5 See Notice
of Appeal, 3/7/24, 1.
The trial court ordered Appellant to file a statement of matters
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). See Order (Rule
1925(b)), 3/13/24, 1. Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement, one day
beyond the court’s stated deadline for the filing the statement. See Rule
1925(b) Statement, 4/4/24, 1. In the statement, Appellant identified the
following claim to be addressed by the trial court in its opinion:
The suppression court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence as the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that the search warrant for the defendant’s vehicle was signed by a judicial authority certifying that it had reviewed the warrant for a probable cause determination and therefore, the search warrant was invalid and defective.
Id. (record citations omitted).6
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
1. Whether the suppression court erred by denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress physical evidence when the Commonwealth failed to present evidence that the search ____________________________________________
5 As this appeal was pending, trial counsel requested and was granted leave
of court to withdraw from representation of Appellant. See Superior Court Order, 4/18/24, 1; Counsel Withdrawal Motion, 3/20/24, 1-2. Present counsel was thereafter appointed. See Order (motion for appointment), 5/17/24, 1.
6 As the only issue raised in the Rule 1925(b) statement involved the denial
of the suppression motion, the judge who sat as the trial court filed an opinion requesting the judge who sat as the suppression court to file a supplemental opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/13/24, 1-2. The suppression court thereafter filed an opinion evaluating the claim identified in the Rule 1925(b) statement. See Suppression Court Opinion, 6/4/24, 1-8.
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warrant for [A]ppellant’s vehicle was signed by a judicial authority certifying that it had reviewed the warrant for probable cause, and therefore, whether the search was invalid and defective and the search was unconstitutional[?]
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish each and every element of the crimes for which [A]ppellant was convicted[?]
3. Whether the sentencing court abused [its] discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive sentence that was not based upon the gravity of the violation, the extent of [A]ppellant’s record, his prospect of rehabilitation, nor an assessment of the mitigating and aggravating factors as noted in Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code[?]
Appellant’s Brief, 8.
Before engaging in substantive review, we must address multiple
procedural issues of concern. First, Appellant filed an untimely Rule 1925(b)
statement. The trial court’s Rule 1925 order permitted Appellant to file a
responsive Rule 1925(b) statement within twenty-days, a deadline that would
have elapsed on Wednesday, April 3, 2024. See Order (Rule 1925(b)),
3/13/24, 1. Appellant electronically filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on April
4, 2024, even though the statement was dated by counsel on April 3, 2024.
See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 4/4/24, 1. Generally, the untimely filing of a
court-ordered Rule 1925(b) statement results in the waiver of all issues on
appeal. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213 A.3d 1004, 1010 (Pa. Super.
2019) (noting that the “complete failure to file the [court-ordered Rule]
1925(b) statement … [and the] untimely filing [of a Rule 1925(b) statement]
is per se ineffectiveness because it is without reasonable basis designed to
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effectuate the client’s interest and waives all issues on appeal”) (citation
omitted).
In this instance, we need not remand for a new Rule 1925(b) statement
because the trial court and suppression court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion
addressing the issue raised in Appellant’s untimely Rule 1925(b) statement.
See Commonwealth v. Brown, 145 A.3d 184, 186 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(“where the trial court addresses the issues raised in an untimely Rule 1925(b)
statement, we need not remand but may address the issues on their merits”).
We must further determine which of Appellant’s claims have been
preserved for our review. “[A]ny issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b)
statement will be waived for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Bonnett,
239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii)
(requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement to “concisely identify each error that the
appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be
raised for the judge”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the
Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).
Here, Appellant’s failure to include his challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence in his Rule 1925(b)
statement waives those issues for our review. See Commonwealth v.
Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (to preserve a
discretionary sentencing issue, an appellant must raise the issue in, inter alia,
a Rule 1925(b) statement); Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344
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(Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that, to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement must state
with specificity the element(s) upon which the appellant alleges that the
evidence was insufficient).
Even if Appellant’s sufficiency and sentencing challenges had been
properly preserved in his Rule 1925(b) statement, those claims would be
waived for an additional reason. There is no indication in the record that
Appellant ordered a transcription of the trial and sentencing proceedings.
Appellant also appears to rely exclusively on the notes of testimony for his
suppression hearing in support of his sufficiency claim and does not reference
the notes of testimony from his trial and sentencing hearing. Moreover, there
is no indication in the record that the absence of the trial and sentencing
transcripts was caused by a breakdown in the judicial process. The notes of
testimony from the trial and the sentencing hearing are critical to our ability
to meaningfully review the second and third issues presented. Appellant’s
failure to ensure that the trial and sentencing proceeding transcripts were
made part of the record for this appeal supports an additional basis for waiver
of the second and third issues. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d
1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) (“[A]ny claims that cannot be resolved in
the absence of the necessary transcript or transcripts must be deemed waived
for the purpose of appellate review.”); Commonwealth v. Little, 879 A.2d
293, 301 (Pa. Super. 2005) (noting that it is an appellant’s duty to “ensure
that the certified record is complete for purposes of review” and “[a]n
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appellant’s failure to provide the reviewing court with a complete certified
record results in the waiver of the claim”) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, our review is limited to the lone issue in Appellant’s Rule
1925(b) statement alleging that the suppression court erred by denying his
suppression motion where the Commonwealth failed to present “evidence that
the search warrant for [his] vehicle was signed by a judicial authority.” See
Rule 1925(b) Statement, 4/4/24, 1. This claim was properly preserved in
Appellant’s suppression motion. See Suppression Motion, 10/11/22, ¶ 5 (“The
arrest, search[,] and seizure of the petitioner and vehicle was conduct without
a warrant and in violation of petitioner’s rights[.]”).
Appellant contends that the “suppression court erred by allowing the
introduction of evidence that was seized upon execution of an unsigned search
warrant.” Appellant’s Brief, 14. In particular, he is referring to the unsigned
copy of the search warrant for the Chevrolet Traverse that the Commonwealth
entered into evidence at his suppression hearing. Id. In the absence of a
signed warrant for the SUV, he argues that the evidence recovered from the
vehicle should have been suppressed for lack of probable cause and exigent
circumstances pursuant to Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa.
2020). See Appellant’s Brief, 15. Although he agrees that Officer
Otterbridge’s testimony observing him engage in what appeared to be
narcotics transaction “may arguably constitute[ ] probable cause,” he
maintains that “there were absolutely no exigent circumstances that could
justify a warrantless search of the vehicle.” Id. Building on that point,
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Appellant additionally argues that a search incident to his arrest did not extend
to the recovery of items from the SUV and that “the doctrine of inevitable
discovery as part of an inventory search of the vehicle d[id] not justify [a]
warrantless search of the vehicle.” Id. at 15-16.
Appellant concludes his argument by assuming that the denial of his
suppression motion was proof that the suppression court incorrectly applied
outdated law prior to Alexander:
Here, the trial court relied on [Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014)], which previously had extended the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement to claims based on the broader protection of the Pennsylvania Constitution. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has unequivocally overturned [Gary] and specifically stated that both probable cause and exigent circumstances must be present to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle. [See Alexander, supra]. Without exigent circumstances and with no articulable basis to justify the warrantless search of the car beyond mere suspicion, the search [wa]s unlawful and the evidence should have been suppressed. The warrantless search violated [A]ppellant’s constitutional rights and the judgment of sentence should be vacated.
Appellant’s Brief, 16.
Appellant’s claim alleges that there was no valid search warrant for the
SUV because no signed search warrant was moved into the evidentiary record
at his suppression hearing. The suppression court found the existence of a
valid search warrant because it made a credibility determination to that effect
based on Officer Otterbridge’s testimony that he had received the approval of
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the search warrant but mistakenly scanned an unsigned copy of it and sent it
to the prosecutor’s office:
[T]his is not a case where the Commonwealth admittedly failed to obtain a warrant that was approved and signed by a magistrate. Rather, Officer [Otterbridge], who prepared the affidavit of probable cause, testified the warrant that was executed had been reviewed and signed by a magistrate. This Court deemed that Officer [Otterbridge] testified credibly and established that the officers searched the vehicle pursuant to a signed warrant, but that they mistakenly provided the District Attorney’s Office an unsigned copy of the warrant as evidence in this case.
Suppression Court Opinion, 6/4/24, 8.
Our standard of review of the denial of a suppression motion is well-
settled. It “is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported from the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d
957, 968-69 (Pa. 2019). “Our review of questions of law is de novo.”
Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 279 A.3d 508, 515 (Pa. 2022). The
scope of review for the denial of a motion to suppress “is to consider only the
evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense
as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the suppression record
as a whole.” Shaffer, 209 A.3d at 969.
In support of his claim, Appellant cites this Court’s decision in
Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 789 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. 2001), for the
proposition that “when a magistrate fails to sign a search warrant, at the time
of the warrant application[,] there was no record determination that probable
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cause existed and no written order to effect [such that] the warrant [was]
never issued, necessitating the suppression of the evidence seized.”
Appellant’s Brief at 14. In that case, a district justice “issued” a search
warrant by filling out the form completely with the exception of failing to sign
the warrant over the line “Signature of Issuing Authority.” Vaughn, 789 A.2d
at 262. This Court affirmed the grant of suppression based on the absence of
the signature, despite testimony from the district justice as to its
determination on probable cause, because we could not conclude that an
unsigned writing could constitute a written order of a court. Id. at 265 (“The
district justice in this case failed to sign the warrant. As a result, at the time
of the warrant application there was no ‘record determination’ that probable
cause existed and no ‘written order’ to that effect.”).
The parties do not dispute that “[e]ach search warrant shall be signed
by the issuing authority[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 205(A). There is also no dispute
that a search of the SUV in police custody in this case required a search
warrant under Alexander because there lacked exigent circumstances for a
search. Here, however, the attesting officer testified that the warrant was
approved and signed by the issuing authority. See N.T. Suppression Hearing,
12/12/22, 16. Vaughn is not dispositive for the instant claim because – unlike
in that case – it is not agreed by the parties that a search warrant was left
unsigned. Vaughn only answered the question of whether an unsigned
search warrant could be treated as a valid search warrant based on extrinsic
evidence of the issuing authority’s finding of probable cause for the warrant.
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That case does not address whether a suppression court can find the existence
of a valid search warrant based on credible police testimony in the absence of
the production of a copy of the signed search warrant.
Appellant utterly fails to address the suppression court’s credibility
determination as to the existence of a signed search warrant. The proper
legal questions that would follow his claim – which he does not evaluate – are
whether a copy of a signed search warrant needed to be moved into the
evidentiary record at the suppression hearing and whether the suppression
court could find the existence of a signed search warrant based on a credibility
determination. Appellant does not address whether the Commonwealth had
a duty to proffer a signed copy of the search warrant at the suppression
hearing. To the extent that the suppression court made the credibility
determination on the existence of an approved search, Appellant fails to point
to any legal authority suggesting that the police testimony, by itself, could not
support the credibility determination.
By arguing that there was no search warrant for the SUV search, without
actually evaluating the suppression court’s ruling and reasoning for concluding
the existence of a search warrant, Appellant fails to properly address the
standard of review for this appeal: he neither discusses whether the record
supported the suppression court’s factual finding concerning the existence of
a valid search warrant nor does he argue that the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts were incorrect. In the absence of a developed argument
addressing the suppression court’s ruling, there is no merit to be gleaned from
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Appellant’s claim, which posits only a non sequitur with respect to the
proceedings below, i.e., that the Commonwealth needed a signed search
warrant to search the vehicle in this case. We will not sua sponte evaluate
the credibility determination made by the suppression court. 7 See
Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
banc) (appellate courts will not develop an argument for the appellant or scour
the record to find evidence to support an argument). Accordingly, we affirm
Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 6/6/2025
7 Even assuming arguendo we could independently evaluate the suppression
court’s credibility determination in the absence of related argument from Appellant, he also presents no discussion from which we could conclude that the absence of a warrant for the vehicle search was actually harmful in the sense that his convictions could not have been sustained in the absence of the admission of the evidence that was recovered as a result of the vehicle search. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 960 (Pa. Super. 2018) (harmless error analysis applied to denial of motion to suppress).
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