Com. v. Camacho-Rodriguez, E.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Com. v. Camacho-Rodriguez, E.

DecidedSeptember 29, 2016

Docket1712 MDA 2015

StatusUnpublished

This text of Com. v. Camacho-Rodriguez, E. (Com. v. Camacho-Rodriguez, E.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Com. v. Camacho-Rodriguez, E., (Pa. Ct. App. 2016).

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Opinion

J-S56014-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

ERIC DANIEL CAMACHO-RODRIGUEZ,

Appellant No. 1712 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 31, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0006998-2012

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2016

Appellant, Eric Daniel Camacho-Rodriguez, appeals from the judgment

of sentence of life imprisonment, imposed after he was convicted of second

degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b), and related offenses. On appeal,

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction

of second degree murder. We affirm.

Appellant’s convictions stemmed from his participation in an attempted

robbery, during which his co-defendant, Emanuel Rivera, killed Felipe

Bernabe-Martinez. Following a jury trial from June 3, 2013 through June 7,

2013, the jury found Appellant guilty of second degree murder, criminal

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S56014-16

conspiracy to commit robbery, and criminal conspiracy to commit burglary.1

After his sentencing, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial

court denied on August 28, 2013. Appellant subsequently filed a direct

appeal to this Court, which we dismissed on June 10, 2014, because

Appellant’s counsel did not file a brief.

Thereafter, Appellant filed a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)

petition,2 in which he alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, among other

claims. A hearing on Appellant’s PCRA petition took place on September 29,

2015, and the court reinstated Appellant’s appellate rights. Appellant

thereafter filed a notice of appeal and a timely, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. In his appellate brief,

Appellant presents a single issue for our review:

I. Did the trial court err in holding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the verdict of murder in the second degree?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answer omitted).

Initially, we set forth our standard of review:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient ____________________________________________

1 As explained infra, Appellant’s convictions of criminal conspiracy to commit robbery and criminal conspiracy to commit burglary were in connection with a plan to commit a separate home invasion on May 31, 2012, just days after the murder of Bernabe-Martinez. 2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

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evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal

citations omitted).

Appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to his

conviction of second degree murder. Second degree murder is defined by

statute as “[a] criminal homicide … committed while defendant was engaged

as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.” 18 Pa.C.S. §

2502(b). “Perpetration of a felony” is defined as “[t]he act of the defendant

in engaging in or being an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to

commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape,

or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or

kidnapping.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d). Specifically, “[a] person is guilty of

robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he … inflicts serious bodily

injury upon another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(i).

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Additionally, “[a] person is legally accountable for the conduct of

another person when … he is an accomplice of such other person in the

commission of the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(3). The statute sets forth

that “[a] person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an

offense if … with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the

offense, he … aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in

planning or committing it.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c)(1)(ii).

This Court has explained, To establish complicity, mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge of the commission of criminal acts is not sufficient. Nor is flight from the scene of a crime, without more, enough. However, those factors combined, along with other direct or circumstantial evidence may provide a sufficient basis for a conviction, provided the conviction is predicated upon more than mere suspicion or conjecture.

Commonwealth v. Rosetti, 469 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Pa. Super. 1983)

(citations omitted). Moreover, “[a]ccomplice liability may be established

wholly by circumstantial evidence. Only the least degree of concert or

collusion in the commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of

responsibility as an accomplice. No agreement is required, only aid.”

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1102 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

In the case sub judice, the trial court summarized the totality of

evidence presented at Appellant’s jury trial as follows:

[T]he jury found Appellant responsible for the shooting death of Bernabe-Martinez on May 28, 2012, following several days of testimony. In support of the Commonwealth’s case,

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Linda Perez testified that she was sitting on her front porch with a friend, Nick Drayden, across the street from where the murder occurred. Perez and Drayden witnessed two males walking through the park, and the two males confronted and argued with the victim, Bernabe-Martinez. Perez testified that she heard a gunshot and saw the two males running from the scene. Another witness, Karen Ferguson[,] was in the park on May 28, 2012, and testified that she saw a male matching Appellant’s description sitting on a park bench, which was located across the street from Bernabe-Martinez’s home. The jury was free [to] weigh the witnesses[’] credibility and to give their testimony any weight they deemed appropriate during deliberation.

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