Com. v. Byrd, A.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 29, 2019
Docket468 WDA 2017
StatusPublished

This text of Com. v. Byrd, A. (Com. v. Byrd, A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Com. v. Byrd, A., (Pa. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

J-A30005-18

2019 PA Super 137

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : v. : : AL-TARIQ SHARIF ALI BYRD : : Appellee : No. 468 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order March 20, 2017 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0014138-2016

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KUNSELMAN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

DISSENTING OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.:

FILED: April 29, 2019

I respectfully dissent. I do not believe the record supports the

conclusion that the assistant district attorney, Larry Sachs, engaged in

intentional prosecutorial misconduct such that he intended to prejudice Al-

Tariq Sharif Ali Byrd (Byrd) to the point of a denial of a fair trial.

The learned Majority aptly covers the procedural history of this case. I

add only that upon the trial court’s original declaration of a mistrial, the trial

court specifically declined to designate the conduct at issue as prosecutorial

misconduct.1 See N.T., 12/1/2016, at 26-27 (declaring a mistrial and denying

1 Moments earlier, the trial judge indicated her intent to report Attorney Sachs to the disciplinary board, stating, “I can no longer trust you. I find you to be sneaky. I find you to be able to backdoor people, and you’re not allowed in my courtroom.” Id. (emphasis added). Even assuming arguendo that Attorney Sachs had engaged in conduct that violated the Rules of

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A30005-18

request of Byrd’s standby defense counsel to “attach prejudice to its mistrial

declaration”). Id. at 27. On the date scheduled for the new trial, however,

the trial court began the case by expressing “[its] belief [that] upon reviewing

the case law [the case] cannot be retried….” N.T., 2/13/2017, at 2. At the

Commonwealth’s request, the trial court agreed to review transcripts of three

calls between Byrd and Ms. Wilson introduced by the Commonwealth, and

continued the hearing for another date in order to receive testimony from Ms.

Wilson. Id. at 3-7. At the March 20, 2017 hearing, Ms. Wilson finally testified

under oath, and the trial court changed its ruling to a dismissal with prejudice.

It is that ruling that the Commonwealth asks us to review. “Article I,

§ 10 … bars retrial … when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally

undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.”

Commonwealth v. Adams, 177 A.3d 359, 371(Pa. Super. 2017)

(distinguishing between prosecutorial error that could be corrected in a future

trial versus intentional subversion of the court process, which bars retrial).

Ms. Wilson was a potential character witness for Byrd, identified by Byrd

mid-trial when Byrd, operating pro se, asked for the court’s assistance in

contacting Ms. Wilson to testify as a character witness on his behalf. N.T.,

Professional Conduct, I find it troubling that the trial judge opted to voice her personal feelings about Attorney Sachs on the record. This particularly concerns me since this Court twice has had to take the extraordinary step of ordering the recusal of this particular jurist due to the personal animus she has demonstrated towards the attorneys appearing before her. See Commonwealth v. Bernal, 200 A.3d 995, 1001-03 (Pa. Super. 2018); Commonwealth v. McCauley, 199 A.3d 947, 952-954 (Pa. Super. 2018).

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11/28/2016 – 11/30/2016, at 166-171. Despite the overall tenor of the trial

court’s commentary regarding Attorney Sachs’s actions, I note that the

Commonwealth is not prohibited from contacting and interviewing an

unrepresented third party, even if the third party is a possible defense witness.

For purposes of double jeopardy, the proper focus is on Attorney Sachs’s

intent, not the effect of his words on Ms. Wilson. See Commonwealth v.

Smith, 615 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. 1992) (holding that the double jeopardy clause

of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial “when prosecutorial

misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial”

or “when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to

prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial”) (emphasis

added); Adams, 177 A.3d at 372 (holding that “whether a dismissal is

warranted turns on whether the Commonwealth intended to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial”).

It is unclear whether the trial court appreciated that the focus should

properly be on the prosecutor’s intent, not the victim’s reaction. Although the

trial court found Attorney Sachs’s actions to be “knowing and deliberate and

[] intended to deprive [Appellant] of a fair trial,” in doing so, the trial court

judged his words by Ms. Wilson’s reaction. See Trial Court Opinion, at 13

(focusing on how Attorney Sachs’s actions “left [Ms. Wilson] scared, feeling

threatened[,] and afraid of retaliation against herself and her family by

[Attorney] Sachs”). In fact, at the time it declared a mistrial, the trial court

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candidly stated that it believed “that [it was] the perception of the

witness in this case that matter[ed], and her perception is that [Attorney]

Sachs and/or the [district attorneys’ office] is corrupt, possibly she was afraid

for her life and for her children, and the witness has not appeared.” N.T.,

12/1/2016, at 26 (emphasis added). Yet the trial court does not appear to

consider that Ms. Wilson could have perceived Attorney Sachs’s comments

differently than he intended them. See Commonwealth v. Lafferty, 461

A.2d 1261, 1263 (Pa. Super. 1983) (“Although the effect of the improper

statements was prejudicial, it cannot automatically be concluded that they

were made with that intent, particularly in light of the strength of the

prosecution’s case at the outset.”). The standard requires consideration of

the prosecuting attorney’s intent in making the comments, not simply whether

the receiving person subjectively or even objectively felt threatened by the

comments.

The Majority and the trial court take specific issue with Attorney Sachs’s

questioning of Ms. Wilson “regarding her knowledge of [Byrd]” and his prior

criminal acts, Majority at 14, but I do not think it is unreasonable for the

prosecuting attorney to probe the foundation upon which a character witness’s

intended testimony would be built. They also take issue with Attorney Sachs’s

informing Ms. Wilson of Attorney Sachs’s perception of Byrd’s dangerousness.

However, it stands to reason that the average person would not be surprised

to learn that the prosecuting attorney believed Byrd to be dangerous;

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otherwise, the Commonwealth would not be prosecuting him for firearm-

related crimes and rape.2 Furthermore, Attorney Sachs based his comment

upon Byrd’s prior criminal history.

The Majority and trial court also emphasize Attorney Sachs’s statement

that he knew more about Ms. Wilson than he should. While it is

understandable why Ms. Wilson may have felt alarmed by this statement, this

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Related

Commonwealth v. Smith
615 A.2d 321 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1992)
Commonwealth v. Rightley
617 A.2d 1289 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1992)
Commonwealth v. Adams
177 A.3d 359 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2017)
Commonwealth v. Bernal
200 A.3d 995 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2018)
Commonwealth v. Anderson
38 A.3d 828 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh
91 A.3d 1247 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2014)
Commonwealth v. Lafferty
461 A.2d 1261 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Commonwealth v. McCauley
199 A.3d 947 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2018)

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Bluebook (online)
Com. v. Byrd, A., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/com-v-byrd-a-pasuperct-2019.