Com. v. Bussey, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 16, 2014
• Docket: 1039 EDA 2013
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A09007-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant

v.

CHARLES BUSSEY

Appellee No. 1039 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Order March 11, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002095-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.

DISSENTING STATEMENT BY JENKINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 16, 2014

I am constrained to respectfully dissent from the learned majority. I

agree with the majority that Appellee failed to establish he had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the vehicle and area searched. I believe, therefore,

that, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Millner, the trial court should have

-94 (Pa.2005)

(finding suppression not proper where defendant had no reasonable

expectation of privacy in car, even though search occurred after defendant

was unlawfully seized).

The majority finds the facts of Millner distinguishable, noting Millner

did not involve a traffic stop, the defendant was not a passenger in the

vehicle, and the police observed the defendant dispose of a weapon inside J-A09007-14

the car. Majority Memorandum at 24. I believe, however, that no legal

distinction exists. Assuming, arguendo, that Appellee Bussey was illegally

arrested, then, in both cases, the defendant was illegally arrested before the

police located the property at issue in a vehicle in which the defendant failed

to establish he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

arrest multiple persons and search a vehicle following a traffic stop because

at least one individual would be unable to show an expectation of privacy in

does not authorize the illegal arrest of multiple persons. It simply requires

that an individual whether legally arrested, illegally arrested, or not

arrested at all have a reasonable expectation of privacy in searched

property or premises as a prerequisite to maintaining a successful

suppression motion. I believe that, pursuant to Millner, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court requires such an analysis.

I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

-2-