J-A11044-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYLER GEORGE BURNS : : Appellant : No. 1314 MDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 15, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000955-2023
BEFORE: BECK, J., NEUMAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 11, 2026
Tyler George Burns (“Appellant”) appeals from the denial of his petition
filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
Moreover, Appellant’s counsel, Kristen L. Weisenberger, Esq., has filed a
petition seeking to withdraw her representation of Appellant under Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After careful review, we grant counsel’s
request to withdraw and affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Appellant attempted to purchase expensive jewelry using stolen credit
cards on June 20, 2022, and was charged via information on April 13, 2023
with multiple offenses. Appellant was represented at trial by Attorney Marlin
Markley, Jr. On January 11, 2024, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea
to the charges against him, with the Commonwealth agreeing to an aggregate
sentence of five to ten years of incarceration. J-A11044-26
Attorney Markley requested that sentencing be deferred pending
disposition of Appellant’s charges in Venango County. The trial court
acquiesced to this request, as the Commonwealth had no objection to
imposing this sentence concurrently to the Venango County matters.
Subsequently, on July 2, 2024, Appellant was sentenced in accordance
with his plea agreement to a term of five to ten years of incarceration.
Appellant did not file a motion to withdraw his plea or any other post-sentence
motion, nor did he file an appeal to this Court.1 Thereafter, on June 4, 2025,
Appellant filed a timely pro se petition under the PCRA.
The court appointed Attorney Weisenberger, who filed a supplemental
PCRA petition on July 7, 2025, alleging the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. Specifically, the petition asserted that Appellant suffered from a
mental health condition, was medicated at the time of his plea and sentencing,
did not remember the proceedings, and counsel was accordingly ineffective
for failing to ensure that Appellant’s plea was knowingly and intelligently
entered. The amended petition requested a hearing to explore Appellant’s
condition, counsel’s knowledge of any mental health issues, and whether such
issues impacted his plea.
The PCRA court conducted the requested hearing on August 15, 2025.
Appellant had contended that, while at the jail awaiting trial, he had been
diagnosed as “seriously mentally ill” and given psychiatric medications, which ____________________________________________
1 Appellant did file a motion to return certain of his personal property that was
taken at the time of his arrest
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caused his plea to be unknowing and unintelligent. At the PCRA hearing, the
PCRA court asked Attorney Weisenberger if she had obtained Appellant’s
mental health records from the prison, and counsel stated that she did not
have them. N.T. PCRA, 8/15/25, at 21. Thereafter, the PCRA court denied
Appellant’s petition.
According to PCRA counsel, Appellant was asked after the hearing
whether he wished to appeal the PCRA court’s ruling, and he refused to
answer. Brief for Appellant at 6. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal from
the denial of PCRA relief on September 22, 2025, which appeared to be
untimely. In response, this Court issued a Rule to Show Cause as to why the
appeal should not be quashed as untimely, as a timely notice of appeal must
be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order being appealed. Pa.R.A.P.
903(a).
In response to the Rule, Attorney Weisenberger noted that Appellant’s
pro se notice of appeal contained the hand-written date of September 8, 2025,
and the envelope containing Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal was not kept
in the court file. Response to Rule to Show Cause, 10/23/25, at ¶¶7-8. We
will apply the prisoner mailbox rule under these circumstances and deem the
appeal timely filed. See Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (codifying the prisoner mailbox
rule); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 710 A.2d 76, 78 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(explaining that under the prisoner mailbox rule a pro se notice of appeal is
deemed filed as of the date it is deposited in the prison mail system). See
also Commonwealth v. Hanna, 1302 WDA 2024, 2025 WL 2977563 (Pa.
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Super. filed October 22, 2025) (unpublished memorandum) (whereby this
Court held, when the envelope containing a pro se notice of appeal was
inadvertently missing, that an appellant’s notice of appeal was deemed put
into the prison mail system as of the date handwritten on the notice under the
prisoner mailbox rule).2
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must first address
counsel’s petition to withdraw. Attorney Weisenberger has filed an Anders
brief in this case. However, the proper vehicle for counsel’s withdrawal after
the denial of a PCRA petition is not an Anders brief, but a no-merit letter
under Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)
(collectively, Turner/Finley). Although Anders and Turner/Finley bear
certain similarities in that, in each, counsel is required to independently
examine the certified record and present the appellant’s issues to the
reviewing court, there are also significant differences. See Commonwealth
v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining the differences).
Nonetheless, “because an Anders brief provides greater protection to a
defendant, this Court may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley
letter.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 139 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2014).
We accept Attorney Weisenberger’s brief as filed.
____________________________________________
2 Under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), non-precedential decisions from this Court filed after
May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value.
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Attorneys seeking to withdraw under Turner/Finley must conduct an
independent review of the record before filing a “no-merit” letter detailing the
nature and extent of counsel’s review, listing each issue the petitioner wishes
to have examined by the Court and explaining why those issues are without
merit. Reed, 107 A.3d at 140. Thereafter, the reviewing court must conduct
its own independent evaluation of the record and agree with counsel’s
determination that the petition is meritless. Id. Counsel must also serve
upon the petitioner a copy of the no-merit letter and application to withdraw,
along with a statement advising the client that they may proceed pro se or
with an independently retained attorney, and may raise any additional points
they deem worthy of the court’s attention beyond those raised in the no-merit
letter. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 124 A.3d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Our review of the record confirms that Attorney Weisenberger has
substantially complied with the requirements for withdrawal. Counsel’s brief
details her review of the certified record, lists the issues Appellant raised in
his pro se PCRA petition, and explains why she concludes the claims lack merit.
Counsel has also filed a separate petition to withdraw as counsel, and
appended to that petition the letter she sent to Appellant explaining his rights
to retain new counsel, to proceed pro se, or to raise any additional points to
this Court. We note that Appellant filed a response to the Anders brief on
February 24, 2026, which we will address in turn. We proceed to our
independent review of the record.
Appellant’s brief sets forth his issue on appeal as follows:
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Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA where Appellant presented sufficient evidence to prove his plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Anders Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
“We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Min, 320 A.3d 727, 730 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(citation omitted). The scope of our review is “limited to the findings of the
PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party at the trial level.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d
426, 438 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). We defer to the factual findings of the
post-conviction court, which was tasked with hearing the evidence and
assessing witness credibility. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959,
979 (Pa. 2023). The PCRA court’s legal determinations, however, are subject
to plenary review. Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa. Super.
2012).
To be entitled to PCRA relief, a petitioner must establish the applicability
of one or more of the enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).
Hanible, 30 A.3d at 438. “A petitioner is eligible for relief under the PCRA if
he pleads and proves … ineffective assistance of counsel[.]” Commonwealth
v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 992–93 (Pa. Super. 2005) (internal citations omitted).
Appellant claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
permitting him to enter a guilty plea that was not knowing, intelligent or
voluntary due to his mental health issues.
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To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant
must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that “(1) the underlying
claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her
action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of
counsel’s action or inaction.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150
(Pa. 2018) (citation omitted). “Counsel is presumed to be effective, and the
burden is on the appellant to prove otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Felix,
303 A.3d 816, 819-20 (Pa. Super. 2023). The failure to satisfy any prong of
the ineffectiveness test will result in rejection of the claim. Id. at 820.
Moreover,
[a] criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea process as well as during trial. The law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty. Instead, the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea. The voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Therefore, allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused [the defendant] to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.
Our law is clear that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, and the decision as to whether to allow a defendant to do so is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. To withdraw a plea after sentencing, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice amounting to “manifest injustice.” A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently. A defendant’s disappointment in the sentence imposed does not constitute “manifest injustice.”
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Id., citing Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa. Super.
2008) (cleaned up). Finally, “[a] person who elects to plead guilty is bound
by the statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may not
later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements
he made at his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 480
(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).
To determine whether a guilty plea was tendered knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently, the trial court should conduct an on-the-record inquiry to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights and the consequences of his plea. Specifically, the court must affirmatively demonstrate [that] the defendant understands (1) the nature of the charges to which he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) his right to trial by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6) that the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the agreement.
Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2016); accord
Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, cmt. On appeal, this Court then evaluates the adequacy of
the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by examining the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea. Id. Finally,
“even though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea colloquy, a plea
of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry
of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full understanding of the nature
and consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided
to enter the plea.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans, 24 A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa.
Super. 2011)(citation omitted).
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Appellant completed a written guilty plea colloquy which is a part of the
record certified on appeal. Within, Appellant was informed of the charges he
was facing and the potential ranges of sentences for those offenses. He was
also instructed that by entering a plea he is giving up the right to a trial by a
jury, and that prior to entering the plea he is presumed to be innocent. See
Guilty Plea Colloquy, 1/11/24. Further, during the plea hearing, the
Commonwealth provided the factual basis for Appellant’s plea. N.T. Guilty
Plea, 1/11/24, at 8. Immediately thereafter, the trial court asked Appellant,
“Did you hear what she said you did?” and “Do you agree that’s what
happened?” and Appellant responded affirmatively to both queries. Id.
Appellant also engaged in a lengthy discussion with his attorney and the
trial court on whether his sentence on this case could be imposed concurrently
with the parole revocation sentence he was about to receive in an unrelated
case as a consequence of his new convictions. Id. at 3-8. Appellant expressed
deep concern about his upcoming parole revocation proceedings, and the
court explained that the Commonwealth requires parolees to serve the back
time owed on the parole sentence first. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5).3 ____________________________________________
3 Even though it was not cited by the trial court, we note that the DOC is statutorily precluded from imposing a sentence of a parolee’s back time concurrently with a sentence on a new offense. The statute provides: If a new sentence is imposed on the offender, the service of the balance of the term originally imposed by a Pennsylvania court shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed in the following cases: (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant’s mental health was also discussed during the PCRA hearing
on August 15, 2025. At this hearing, trial counsel was asked if he was aware
of Appellant’s mental health diagnosis. Specifically:
Q: [by Attorney Weisenberger]: Throughout your representation of [Appellant], did you ever learn of any mental health issues?
A: [by Attorney Markley, trial counsel]: Not until the – the [presentence investigation] mentioned – like, an unsubstantiated schizophrenia.
Q: So he never brought that to your attention earlier?
A: No.
Q: I’m assuming that, throughout your representation, you would have met with him.
A: Yes.
Q: Was he incarcerated or not during that time?
A: He was incarcerated.
Q: Okay. Anything about your representation of him that made you think – a mental health evaluation would have been necessary?
Q: Do you have any difficulty communicating with him?
Q: And you were the attorney that was present for his guilty plea?
(i) If a person is paroled from a State correctional institution and the new sentence imposed on the person is to be served in the State correctional institution.
61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(5)(i). Thus, a parolee’s back time sentence must always be served prior to the sentence on the new conviction which had caused parole to be revoked.
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Q: And was there anything about that proceeding that made you pause or think that he was unclear as to what was happening?
Q: And I think, I probably asked this. And sorry, I haven’t had coffee yet. It’s – he never brought to your attention, nor did any family member bring to your attention, the possibility of either him having difficulty understanding or him having a mental health issue?
A: Correct. No. Did not.
N.T., 8/15/25, at 5-6. During cross-examination, Attorney Markley stated
that Appellant did not tell him during the guilty plea that he did not understand
what was happening. Id. at 9.
Appellant also testified at the PCRA hearing. When asked what mental
health condition he suffered from, Appellant answered: “I suffer from –
unspecified – schizophrenia spectrum – with other – psychotic – with other
unidentified psychotic disorders.” Id. at 11. Appellant states he was first
diagnosed in prison in 2022, and he began treatment with medication and
counseling at that time. Id. When asked about Attorney Markley’s
representation, Appellant testified:
Q. During [Attorney Markley’s] representation, did you ever indicate to him that you had a schizophrenia diagnosis?
A. Yeah. I told him – in person and I – told him in letters – that I wrote to him.
Q. And did the two of you ever discuss how that diagnosis affected you?
A. Never brought it up.
Q. How does that diagnosis affect you?
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A. To the point where like I don’t – like, know what’s going on all the time. Or, like, I get confused – with – voices and everything.
Q. And when you appeared in court – in this, before Her Honor, you had entered a guilty plea. And it was pursuant to a plea agreement. Are you indicating, for the record, that you didn’t understand what was going on during your plea?
A. Yeah. I – I didn’t. I didn’t – I shouldn’t have signed it – I didn’t – didn’t realize what – the – I just – I – I didn’t realize what I was doing.
Id. at 11-12. Appellant further testified that the jail had him involuntarily
committed to a UPMC hospital in 2023.4 Id. at 12. The PCRA court then asked
Appellant directly, “Did you tell [Attorney Markley] you didn’t understand at
all what was happening in your case, that you didn’t know that you agreed to
5 to 10 years? Did you tell him that?” Id. at 16. Appellant responded
affirmatively, and that he didn’t press the issue because he was “just doing
what [he] was told.” Id.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth re-called Attorney Markley to respond to
Appellant’s statements. When asked if Appellant had told him that he did not
understand what was going on due to his mental health issues, Attorney
Markley responded that Appellant sent him a letter a few months after his
case was completed, indicating that he didn’t know he could get mental health
help as a part of his sentence. Id. at 24-25. Attorney Markley reiterated,
however, that he had no reason to question Appellant’s understanding of the
plea, noting that Appellant had been very proactive in his defense, and that
4 The involuntary commitment statute is codified at 50 P.S. § 7302.
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his conversations with Appellant’s Venango County attorneys likewise did not
reveal that they had expressed any hesitation about Appellant’s competency
or ability to understand the proceedings. Id. at 25-26. After this, the PCRA
court denied relief.
We discern no error in the PCRA court’s rejection of Appellant’s claim
that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental health or
challenge the validity of his plea on that basis. Even accepting that Appellant
suffers from mental illness, the record supports the PCRA court’s
determination that plea counsel had no reason to question Appellant’s
competency or comprehension at the time of the plea. Attorney Markley
testified that Appellant never disclosed a mental health diagnosis, never
indicated that he did not understand the proceedings, and never behaved in
a manner that suggested confusion, incompetence, or an inability to assist in
his defense. N.T., 8/15/25, at 5-6, 9, 24-26. The PCRA court was free to
credit this testimony and reject Appellant’s contrary assertions. Johnson,
supra.
Further, the plea colloquy itself undermines Appellant’s claim. Appellant
completed a written colloquy acknowledging the rights he was waiving, the
charges against him, and the sentencing exposure he faced. During the oral
colloquy, Appellant confirmed his agreement with the Commonwealth’s factual
recitation and actively participated in a substantive discussion with the court
regarding his sentence and how it interacted with his pending parole
consequences.
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Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue an
investigation where nothing in the record would have prompted a reasonable
attorney to do so. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 A.2d 1139, 1150
(Pa. 2005) (counsel is not ineffective where the defendant never informed his
counsel about prior abuse or mental illness and the record did not prompt an
investigation, “trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present
mental health evidence to support Appellant’s theory of self-defense when
there was no such evidence of record”); Commonwealth v. Miller, 987 A.2d
638, 654 (Pa. 2009) (finding that the claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate a witness’s mental health problems lacked arguable merit
because counsel had no reason to suspect that the witness was mentally ill).
Because Appellant failed to establish arguable merit to his claim that counsel
should have questioned his ability to understand the proceedings or the
voluntariness of his plea, this ineffectiveness claim must fail. Felix, supra.
Nonetheless, our review of this matter is not complete because
Appellant has claimed, in his pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief, that
PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to bring his mental health records from
the jail to his PCRA hearing. Appellant’s Response to Attorney’s Anders Brief
and Motion to Withdraw, 2/24/26 (“If Appellant was given a chance to bring
his mental health records as evidence it would have shown Appellant could
not have been fully understanding knowing of his actions”).
Preliminarily, we note that our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021) provided an avenue for PCRA petitioners
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to raise claims related to PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance: “a petitioner
[may] raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at the first opportunity, even if
on appeal.” 261 A.3d at 405. The record demonstrates that his response to
the Anders brief was Appellant’s first opportunity to raise an allegation of
PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. Thus, we will address Appellant’s claim of
PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. However, we recognize that Bradley did not
alter the substantive requirements governing ineffectiveness claims.
Appellant’s claim can be considered a layered claim of ineffective
assistance. Our Court has stated the following with respect to a layered
ineffectiveness claim:
Where a petitioner “alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the three prongs of [the IAC test] relevant to each layer of representation.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa. 2022). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Treiber, 121 A.3d at 445.
Commonwealth v. Shields, 347 A.3d 734, 744–45 (Pa. Super. 2025). If
the petitioner fails to prove any prong of the ineffectiveness test related to
plea counsel, “he will have failed to establish the arguable merit prong of the
layered claim of [PCRA] counsel's ineffectiveness, and the claim fails.”
Commonwealth v. Reyes, 870 A.2d 888, 896 (Pa. 2005).
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Here, we have already concluded that Appellant failed to establish that
plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the entry of
his guilty plea. Specifically, the record supports the PCRA court’s
determination that plea counsel had no knowledge of any mental health
condition, observed no conduct suggesting incompetence or confusion, and
therefore had no reason to pursue further investigation into Appellant’s mental
health status.
Because the underlying claim against plea counsel fails, Appellant
cannot establish prejudice arising from PCRA counsel’s alleged failure to obtain
additional mental health records in support of that same claim. Burkett,
supra. Even assuming such records existed and reflected mental health
treatment, they would not alter the dispositive fact that plea counsel cannot
be deemed ineffective for failing to investigate information of which he had no
knowledge and no reason to suspect. In other words, because plea counsel
was not ineffective, Appellant cannot succeed on his layered claim of PCRA
counsel’s ineffectiveness. Shields, 347 A.3d at 744–45; Reyes, 870 A.2d at
896.
Accordingly, Appellant’s layered claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness
does not entitle him to relief. Moreover, our independent evaluation of the
record has disclosed no additional meritorious issues. We thus will affirm the
denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
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Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 06/11/2026
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