Com. v. Burgeson, R.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :
v. :
: :
RYAN MARTIN BURGESON :
:
Appellant : No. 1350 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-17-CR-0001205-2021
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: July 7, 2023
Appellant, Ryan Martin Burgeson, appeals from the judgment of
sentence of 48 hours’ to 6 months’ incarceration, as well as fines and costs of
prosecution, imposed after he was found guilty, following a non-jury trial, of
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(2), and
careless driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a). Herein, Appellant challenges the trial
court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that there was no
probable cause to support his warrantless arrest. After careful review, we
affirm.
On August 4, 2021, Pennsylvania State Troopers, including Trooper
Tyler Blaniar, responded to a report that a man, later identified as Appellant,
was intoxicated and sitting in his disabled truck in the parking lot of a Pilot
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Travel Center in Dubois, Pennsylvania. See Trial Court Opinion and Order
(TCOO), 5/24/22, at 1. When Trooper Blaniar arrived at the scene, Appellant
told him he had struck a guard rail and damaged his tire as he was traveling
home from a wedding reception. Id. The Trooper noticed that Appellant
smelled of alcohol and had watery, bloodshot eyes. Id. Appellant admitted
he had consumed alcohol prior to driving. He also displayed indications of
impairment during several field sobriety tests. Id. Trooper Blaniar arrested
Appellant and he subsequently consented to a blood draw, which showed that
his blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.159%.
Based on these facts, Appellant was charged with several counts of DUI
and multiple summary traffic offenses. On February 22, 2022, he filed a
pretrial motion to suppress, arguing that Trooper Blaniar did not have
probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, the evidence of his BAC should
be suppressed. A hearing was conducted on April 14, 2022. On May 24,
2022, the trial court issued an Opinion and Order denying Appellant’s motion
to suppress. He proceeded to a non-jury trial on August 18, 2022, at the
conclusion of which the court convicted him of the DUI and careless driving
offenses set forth, supra. On October 10, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant
to the term of incarceration stated above. He filed a timely, post-sentence
motion, which the court denied. He then filed a timely notice of appeal, and
he complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court subsequently
filed a letter stating that it would not be filing any additional opinion in this
case, as the issue set forth in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was
addressed in the court’s Opinion and Order denying his motion to suppress.
Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review: “Whether the [trial]
court erred in denying … Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress his arrest as
being illegal because the arresting officer lacked the requisite probable cause
to suspect that Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol?”
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
To begin, we recognize: An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned
up).
Instantly, Appellant contends that the totality of the circumstances
surrounding his interaction with Trooper Blaniar was insufficient to provide the
Trooper with probable cause to conduct his warrantless arrest. Specifically,
Appellant notes that the video from Trooper Blaniar’s police vehicle, which was
entered into evidence at the suppression hearing, shows that he was “not
swaying, unsure of his footing[,] or otherwise displaying any of the common
characteristics of a person impaired by alcohol.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He
also stresses that, although he showed a few signs of intoxication during the
field sobriety tests, he also was able to successfully complete many aspects
of those tests with no indication of intoxication. See id. at 14-16.
Furthermore, Appellant points out that there were no witnesses to his manner
of driving prior to, or at the time of, the single-vehicle accident in which he
was involved, and he followed all the instructions given by Trooper Blaniar
without issue. Id. at 17, 18. Appellant also minimizes his admission to
drinking alcohol prior to driving, stressing that it was not known when he had
consumed his last drink, and “[a]ny number of things can cause a person to
have bloodshot, watery eyes.” Id. at 19. Thus, Appellant concludes that the
totality of the circumstances was insufficient to provide Trooper Blaniar with
probable cause to arrest him without a warrant.
We disagree. In the trial court’s opinion accompanying its order denying
suppression, it explained:
“Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested. Probable cause justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 996-97 (Pa. Super. 2015) [(citation omitted)]. Thus, for [Appellant’s] warrantless arrest to be valid, the Troopers must have had enough personal knowledge that a reasonable
person would believe [Appellant] was driving or operating his truck “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that [he was] rendered incapable of safely driving….” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
During the hearing on [Appellant’s pre-trial m]otion, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Blaniar. Trooper Blaniar testified that when he approached [Appellant’s] truck, he noticed that the front tire was off and the inspection was expired. He also noticed that the truck’s engine was running, the lights were on, and [Appellant] was in the driver’s seat, alone in the vehicle. While speaking with the Trooper[], [Appellant] reported that he had hit a guardrail and drove into the parking lot without the tire to wait for assistance. [Appellant] also showed the Trooper[] a large scratch on the pavement that was caused by driving his truck on the rim, without the tire.
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