Com. v. Bumbarger, D.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 22, 2023
• Docket: 1206 MDA 2022
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S06030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DAMEON LYDELL BUMBARGER : : Appellant : No. 1206 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 17, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000586-2018

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: MAY 22, 2023

Appellant Dameon Lydell Bumbarger appeals from the order denying his

timely first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant claims that

the PCRA court erred in concluding that Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243

A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020) did not apply retroactively to the instant case and that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a change of venue. We affirm.

The underlying facts and procedural history of this matter are well

known to the parties. See Trial Ct. Op. & Order, 9/28/18, at 1-3. Briefly, on

April 1, 2018, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Shane Murarik was traveling

eastbound on Route 322 in Centre County when he observed a vehicle that

matched the description listed on an active warrant for Appellant’s arrest. ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. J-S06030-23

After confirming the vehicle’s information in his system, Trooper Murarik

stopped the vehicle in Clearfield County. Following the stop, Trooper Murarik

conducted a search during which he recovered methamphetamine, marijuana,

and two firearms from Appellant’s vehicle. As a result, Appellant was arrested

and charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver

(PWID) and possession of a firearm prohibited.2

Prior to trial, Appellant filed motions to suppress evidence that was

obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his vehicle. In relevant part,

Appellant argued that the police lacked sufficient probable cause or reasonable

suspicion to initiate a traffic stop and that the police violated provisions of the

plain view doctrine. See Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 5/31/18. The

trial court denied Appellant’s pre-trial motions following a hearing. Appellant

subsequently filed a motion for change of venue in which he sought to move

the proceedings from Centre County to Clearfield County, where Appellant’s

vehicle came to a stop. The trial court ultimately denied Appellant’s motion

as untimely.

Following a stipulated non-jury trial on May 20, 2019, the trial court

convicted Appellant of PWID and possession of a firearm prohibited. That

same day, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’

incarceration. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of

sentence and our Supreme Court denied further review on September 22,

____________________________________________

2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), respectively.

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2020. See Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10 (Pa. Super. 2020),

appeal denied, 239 A.3d 20 (Pa. 2020).

Appellant filed the instant timely pro se PCRA petition on April 22, 2021.

Therein, Appellant claimed that the warrantless search of his vehicle violated

his constitutional rights and argued that trial counsel was ineffective. See

Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 4/22/21. The PCRA court appointed PCRA

counsel, who subsequently filed an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s

behalf. Following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s

PCRA petition on May 17, 2022.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and filed a court-ordered

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion

adopting the analysis set forth in its May 17, 2022 opinion and order. See

PCRA Ct. Op., 8/15/22, at 1.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), should not be applied retroactively in this case?

2. Did the [PCRA] court err in finding that Appellant’s prior counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to pursue and litigate the issue of change of venue?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (some formatting altered).

Retroactive Application of Alexander

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred in

rejecting his constitutional claim and concluding that Alexander did not

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retroactively apply to Appellant’s case. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Initially,

Appellant acknowledges that neither the United States Supreme Court nor our

Supreme Court have held that Alexander should be applied retroactively to

cases on collateral review. However, Appellant argues that the “decision in

Alexander cannot by its own terms be classified as a ‘new’ Pennsylvania

constitutional rule.” Id. at 18. In support, Appellant contends that the

Alexander Court “merely reaffirmed the existing Pennsylvania Constitution

standard” that was in place prior to the Court’s decision in Commonwealth

v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality). Id. at 19. Therefore, Appellant

concludes that because “[o]ld constitutional rules always apply retroactively,”

the PCRA court erred in declining to apply Alexander. Id. (citing Whorton

v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2017)).

Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “[W]e

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.”

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation

omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained that “‘[i]n general . . . a case

announces a new rule when it breaks new ground’ or ‘was not dictated by

precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.’”

Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1154 (Pa. 2020) (citation and

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emphasis omitted). “When a decision of the Supreme Court of the United

States results in a new rule, that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending

on direct review.” Commonwealth v. Olson, 218 A.3d 863, 868 (Pa. 2019)

(citations omitted). However, where a conviction is final, a new constitutional

rule may only be applied retroactively if it is a substantive rule or a watershed

rule of criminal procedure. Id. The question of whether a new rule applies

retroactively is a question of law, “as to which our standard of review is de

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the record reflects that Alexander had not yet been decided at

the time that Appellant’s conviction became final on December 21, 2020.3

Further, it is clear that the Alexander Court created a “new” rule by extending

protection under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to include

an exigency requirement for vehicle searches, which was not dictated by

existing precedent. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 416; Reid, 235 A.3d at 1154.

However, as noted previously, Appellant does not argue that Alexander

announced a new substantive rule or a watershed rule of criminal procedure.

See Appellant’s Brief at 18. Therefore, because Appellant has failed to

demonstrate an exception to the “general retroactivity bar,” see Olson, 218

A.3d at 868, we have no basis to conclude that the PCRA court erred in

declining to retroactively apply Alexander on collateral review. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Kellam, 42 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 17038902, at *7 (Pa. ____________________________________________

3Our Supreme Court announced its decision in Alexander on December 22, 2020.

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Super. filed Nov. 17, 2022) (unpublished mem.) (holding that there was no

basis upon which to conclude that Alexander applied retroactively to cases

on collateral review where the appellant did not argue that Alexander

announced a new substantive rule or a watershed rule of criminal procedure).

Accordingly, no relief is due.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his second issue, Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to file a timely motion to transfer his case from Centre County to

Clearfield County. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Specifically, Appellant argues that

“[a]ll of the evidence upon which Appellant was convicted was derived from

the search of his vehicle, which occurred in Clearfield County.” Id. at 22.

Appellant further alleges there was no benefit or strategic reason for trial

counsel to fail to file a motion for change of venue. Id. at 23. Finally,

Appellant claims that that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file a

motion for change of venue because it permitted the Commonwealth to forum-

shop and try the case in a county less favorable to Appellant. Id.

As stated above, we employ the de novo standard of review to a PCRA

court’s legal conclusions. Mitchell, 105 A.3d at 1265. A PCRA court’s

credibility determinations, however, are binding on this Court when such

determinations are supported by the record. Id. (citation omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that

“[t]his Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the

record contains any support for those findings” (citation omitted)).

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When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we are

governed by the following standard:

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief. Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for [her] action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they effectuated [her] client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts [s]he may have taken.

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

Here, during the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court heard testimony

from Appellant’s trial counsel, Elizabeth M. Ramos, Esq. Attorney Ramos

explained her reasoning for not initially filing a motion to change venue as

follows:

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So the strategic benefit was, to me, the issue was a really bad one. And I’ve been sort of taught, and I know other attorneys agree, when you have an issue that’s really bad around a bunch of issues that would seem to be good issues, it has the tendency to sort of lose credibility with the Court and it can weigh all of your other good issues down. So the benefit to that was I did not want it to seem like out of all these issues we were reaching, to me those issues had merit, they were good issues, they were issues that were worthy of consideration by the courts. I believe actually if I recall correctly, the [Superior] Court opinion that went up on his suppression issue actually was a precedential opinion. It was one that had merit, it was one that was deserving of time. And for me to throw in an issue that was clearly much, much, much worse than the others would have been to the detriment of the other issues involved.

N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 5/3/22, at 15-16.

Attorney Ramos also testified as to how she determined that Centre

County was the more favorable venue for Appellant as compared to Clearfield

County:

So in experience, I would say that it was much more beneficial. I know certainly in Centre County, had [Appellant] lost on those charges in Centre County, he would have likely received much worse than a five to ten sentence. I have not practiced in Clearfield, so I don’t know what their sentences typically look like. However, I am aware that most individuals do actually not want their cases in Clearfield because Clearfield has a reputation for giv[ing] even worse sentences than Centre would.

Id. at 22-23.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim

as follows:

The [PCRA court] concludes [Appellant] failed to meet the last two prongs of the ineffectiveness test. With regard to the second prong, Attorney Ramos had a reasonable basis for not pursuing the change of venue motion earlier as she testified, she believed

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the change of venue issue lacked merit where she [had] several issues with merit to raise to the [trial] court. As to the final prong, the agreement and sentence were favorable to [Appellant] and he has not succeeded in demonstrating any prejudice to himself in this matter.

PCRA Ct. Op. & Order, 5/17/22, at 5.

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court’s

conclusions. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44. As noted by the PCRA

court, Attorney Ramos testified that she initially declined to file a motion to

change venue because it could potentially affect other, more meritorious pre-

trial motions and that Centre County provided a more favorable venue for

Appellant. See N.T. PCRA Hr’g at 15-16, 22-23. Therefore, because Appellant

failed to demonstrate that Attorney Ramos lacked any reasonable strategic

basis for her inaction, Appellant’s claim fails. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at

1043-44; see also Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013)

(reiterating that “we do not question whether there were other more logical

courses of action which counsel could have pursued; rather, we must examine

whether counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis” (citation omitted and

emphasis added)). For these reasons, we affirm.

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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 5/22/2023

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