J-S09017-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SHAWN SHAMELL BROWN : : Appellant : No. 1689 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000376-2024
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED JUNE 3, 2026
Shawn Shamell Brown (“Brown”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his convictions for driving under the influence of
controlled substances (“DUI”), driving while operating privilege is suspended
or revoked, and illegal parking on a limited access highway. 1 We affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter
as follows. On May 13, 2022, at 11:20 p.m., Pennsylvania State Trooper
Francis Vanore (“Trooper Vanore”) responded to two reports of a stalled
vehicle, without headlights or hazard lights enabled, in the right lane of travel
on southbound Interstate 95 (“I-95”). While en route, police dispatch
informed Trooper Vanore of a crash in the same area, possibly involving the
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(2), 1543(a), 3533(a)(2)(vii). J-S09017-26
stalled vehicle. At the scene, Trooper Vanore observed a red Lexus with
extensive rear-end damage and a silver Toyota with heavy damage to the
front hood. Trooper Vanore approached Brown, the operator of the red Lexus,
and immediately noticed “a strong chemical odor emanating from . . . Brown’s
breath and person.” N.T., 5/8/25, at 19. Based on his training and
experience, Trooper Vanore recognized the odor as an indicator of narcotics
use because “there’s certain drugs and or drug categories that have a distinct
chemical odor. . . [T]hat is what that odor to me was smelling [like].” Id. at
31. He further observed that Brown spoke “in incoherent sentences” with
“slurred and thick speech” and that Brown was “unsteady on his feet while
standing still” and “his gait was slow and sluggish while he was walking.” Id
at 19. Brown denied that his vehicle had been stalled on the highway and
insisted that he was driving when the Toyota struck his vehicle from behind.
Id. at 20. When asked for identification, Brown produced a suspended
Pennsylvania driver’s license. After initially indicating that he was all right,
Brown requested emergency medical services (“EMS”).
Trooper Vanore administered a standardized field sobriety test on
Brown, the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (“HGN”) test, which he conducted out
of view of the mobile video recording (“MVR”) camera on the trooper’s patrol
vehicle. Trooper Vanore then asked Brown to submit to a preliminary breath
test (“PBT”), but after beginning the test, Brown declined to complete it. The
MVR captured the PBT, which reflected that Brown’s eyes were extremely
glazed over. The MVR also showed that Brown’s speech was slurred and
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confused to the extent that Trooper Vanore had to ask Brown to repeat himself
on several occasions. Brown also refused to consent to a blood draw.
Although Brown had requested EMS evaluation, he refused ambulance
transport to the hospital. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Trooper
Vanore determined that Brown was under the influence of a drug which
rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle and arrested him for
driving under the influence of a controlled substance, driving while operating
privilege is suspended or revoked, and illegal parking on a limited access
highway. Trooper Vanore transported Brown to the police station and released
him to his mother after processing. Brown remained free on bail throughout
the pendency of this case.
The magisterial district court scheduled a preliminary hearing on July 7,
2022. On that date, the Commonwealth was ready to proceed but Brown
requested a continuance to obtain an attorney. The court scheduled
subsequent preliminary hearings for September 28, 2022, and December 8,
2022; however, on those dates, the Commonwealth requested continuances
because Trooper Vanore failed to appear. On January 9, 2023, all parties were
ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing; however, the magisterial
district judge abruptly continued all cases that day. On February 16, 2023,
the rescheduled date for the preliminary hearing, the magisterial district judge
dismissed the matter when Trooper Vanore failed to appear.
On October 25, 2023, the Commonwealth refiled the criminal complaint
against Brown, charging him with the same three offenses alleged in the first
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complaint. On October 10, 2024, Brown filed a motion to dismiss based on a
violation of his speedy trial rights under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, as well as the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. We note that approximately
two and a half years elapsed between the filing of the Rule 600 motion and
the filing of the first criminal complaint on May 13, 2022.
On November 13, 2024, the trial court held a Rule 600 hearing. Both
parties agreed that, barring extraordinary testimony that might arise during
the hearing, there was no evidence the Commonwealth was purposely
attempting to circumvent the time constraints of Rule 600. See N.T.,
11/13/24, at 7. The Commonwealth then presented Trooper Vanore, who
testified that he filed the initial criminal complaint on May 13, 2022, and that
he appeared to testify at the first scheduled preliminary hearing on July 7,
2022. The court continued the matter at Brown’s request so he could retain
counsel. Trooper Vanore stated that he did not appear at the next preliminary
hearing on September 29, 2022, and could not recall why he was not present.
Subsequently, in November 2022, Trooper Vanore changed barracks, moving
from Troop K in Delaware County to Troop M in Bucks County. At the next
preliminary hearing date, December 8, 2022, Trooper Vanore failed to appear.
He explained that he was unaware of the scheduled preliminary hearing
because the court sent notice to his former barracks in Delaware County.
Trooper Vanore testified that he appeared at the next scheduled preliminary
hearing date, January 19, 2023, after receiving notification from the
prosecutor. However, the magisterial district court continued all matters that
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day due to a dispute in the courtroom. Trooper Vanore stated that he never
received notification of the next hearing date in February. Id. at 9-14.
Next, Assistant District Attorney Nicholas McGuire (“ADA McGuire”), the
prosecuting attorney who handled the matter after December 2022, testified
that he learned of Trooper Vanore’s transfer to Troop M and sent him a text
message prior to the January 19, 2023 date to ensure his appearance. He
stated that Trooper Vanore failed to appear at the next scheduled hearing,
February 16, 2023, and recalled it was due to the trooper’s unavailability. ADA
McGuire testified that the district magisterial court dismissed Brown’s matter
because “the Judge typically gives you three chances. So because we had
taken other continuances in between there, he dismissed the case.” Id. at
19-22. The trial court held the matter under advisement and ultimately denied
the Rule 600 motion on November 20, 2024.
The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial on May 8, 2025, approximately
one and a half years after the Commonwealth filed the second criminal
complaint. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper
Vanore, who had extensive experience in recognizing the signs of drug use
and impairment and in making DUI arrests, and who was qualified as an expert
in field sobriety testing. The trooper explained why he arrested Brown as
follows:
[B]ased off the totality of the incident at hand, the call that we initially received [about] the crash, the observations of . . . Brown on the scene, his blank stare, the continued thick slurred speech[,] unsteady on his feet and slow and sluggish walk[,] [t]he continued incoherent sentences or having to repeat himself for me to
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understand as well as the standardized field sobriety tests that I performed[,] I believed that . . . Brown was under the influence of a controlled substance to a degree to render him incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.
N.T., 5/8/25, at 31. The trial court listened to two separate 911 calls reporting
a stalled vehicle without lights in the right lane of I-95. The trial court also
watched the MVR, which showed Brown’s slurred speech, extremely glazed
eyes, and confused demeanor.
Brown testified in his own defense and admitted that his vehicle had
been stalled in a lane of traffic without any lights on because he “didn’t have
the hazards for [his] car.” Id. at 50. He stated that he did not call 911 for
help with the stalled vehicle because he did not want to get a ticket for driving
with a suspended license. Brown explained, “Well, I tried to restart [the
vehicle], but it just wouldn’t start. Then it seemed like maybe a few minutes
passed, and then I just had a huge impact from the back.” Id. Brown testified
that he refused the blood test because he believed Trooper Vanore, instead of
a paramedic, was going to draw his blood and he did not feel this was safe.
He denied ingesting any drugs or alcohol on the day of his arrest. Id. at 52.
The trial court credited the testimony of Trooper Vanore, determined
that the MVR supported the trooper’s testimony, concluded that Brown’s
testimony was not credible, and found Brown guilty of all charges. The trial
court then imposed a sentence of six months’ probation. Brown filed a timely
notice of appeal and both he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b).
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Brown raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain the [DUI] (count one) conviction since the prosecution at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . Brown was under the influence of any drug or combination of drugs, let alone to a degree which impaired his ability to safely drive, operate, or control a vehicle?
2. Whether the [trial court] erred in refusing to dismiss . . . Brown’s case because more than 365 days elapsed from the initial complaint’s filing, the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence of excludable time or excusable delay, and it failed to exercise due diligence, in violation of [Rule] 600 and . . . Brown’s state and federal constitutional rights?
Brown’s Brief at 6.
In his first issue, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with
respect to his DUI conviction. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
“presents a question of law, for which our standard of review is de novo, and
our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Greene, 340 A.3d 324,
332 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citation omitted).
When reviewing sufficiency challenges, we adhere to the following:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, this is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
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evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated[,] and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Nestor, 314 A.3d 863, 873 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation
omitted).
The relevant DUI statute provides:
(d) Controlled substances. — An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances:
****
(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).
Importantly, “[s]ection 3802(d)(2) does not require that any specific
amount or specific quantity of the drug be proven in order to successfully
prosecute under that section.” Nestor, 314 A.3d at 874 (citation omitted,
emphasis in original). “Instead, impairment evidence should be drawn from
the totality of the factual circumstances.” Id. “[T]he Commonwealth must
simply prove that, while driving or operating a vehicle, the accused was under
the influence of a drug to a degree that impaired his or her ability to safely
drive that vehicle.” Greene, 340 A.3d at 333 (citation omitted).
Brown argues that Trooper Vanore’s “lay opinion is unsupported by the
record,” and that his belief that Brown was impaired, without “evidence of
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chemical testing or drug evaluations,” was “nothing more than a hunch and
could not sustain the verdict.” Brown’s Brief at 26-28. He further avers that
the evidence did not support Trooper Vanore’s testimony that the strong
chemical odor emanated from Brown’s person, asserting “[i]t is just as
plausible that something else, such as leaking chemicals at the crash site,
caused it.” Id. at 27. Brown contends that “[t]he prosecution failed to prove
[he] ingested any substances let alone that a ‘drug’ impaired his ability to
drive. Id. at 28 (emphasis in original). Brown also claims that the
Commonwealth did not prove that Brown’s behavior was due to drugs “as
opposed to injury or shock” from the collision. Id..
The trial court considered Brown’s sufficiency challenge and determined
that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
The evidence presented at trial consisted first of the 911 calls made to the Pennsylvania State Police from two citizens reporting a vehicle stopped in the travel lane on [I-95] with its lights off; appearing to be disabled. Trooper Vanore, an expert in Field Sobriety Testing, with copious amounts of experience in drug recognition and DUI arrests, testified that by the time he arrived at the scene of the disabled vehicle, the vehicle had been rear ended. [Brown] reported to [Trooper Vanore] that he was driving the red Lexus and provided a suspended license. Trooper Vanore’s first observations of [Brown] included a strong chemical odor emanating from his person. He was speaking in incoherent sentences with slurred speech; so slurred, [Trooper Vanore] had to ask him to repeat himself. He was unsteady on his feet and his gait was sluggish. . . . [Trooper Vanore] then began performing the HGN test and then [Brown] said he wanted EMS after initially saying he was [all right]. When Trooper Vanore attempted to perform a PBT, [Brown] began the test and then said he did not want to do the test.
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The HGN was conducted out of the view of the dash camera on [Trooper Vanore’s] patrol vehicle, however the PBT can be seen. What also can be seen on camera is the extremely glazed- over look in [Brown’s] eyes, which [the trial court] noted. The video also shows just how slurred and confused [Brown] was when requesting to speak to a supervisor; requiring Trooper Vanore to ask him to repeat himself multiple times so that [Trooper Vanore] could understand what [Brown] was requesting. Based on the totality of the circumstances, as well as his experience in recognizing the signs of drug use and impairment, [Trooper Vanore] arrested [Brown] as he believed he was under the influence of a drug such that he was incapable of safely operating a vehicle. Also of note, after [Brown] had requested EMS, he was evaluated but then refused transport to the hospital and also refused [to] consent to a blood test.
Following [Trooper Vanore’s] testimony, [Brown] took the stand and testified on his own behalf. He explained that his car stalled and that he did not call the police because he knew he should not have been driving with a suspended license. He claim[ed] he was rear ended by another car and the impact was “horrible” causing him to be “shaken up.” Notably, Trooper Vanore testified that [Brown] told him at the scene that he was driving when he got rear-ended; not that he was stalled. He tried to blame his behavior not on being under the influence, but on his being shaken up from the accident. He then testified that he would have done a blood test but did not want [Trooper Vanore] to perform the blood test on him. He claimed that he would have performed the PBT but it was too painful to breathe hard enough to complete the test. These statements regarding the blood test and the PBT were just not credible. The [trial court] does not believe [Brown] was being truthful when he [said] he believed [Trooper Vanore] was going to conduct the blood test, nor does the [trial court] think [Brown] was being truthful when he [said] it hurt to breathe harder. These were excuses. He can be seen on the MVR barely making an effort to blow into the PBT before giving up and saying he did not want to do the test.
While the above consists of circumstantial evidence, our courts have consistently held that wholly circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree that rendered him incapable of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. . . . [Trooper Vanore] testified credibly
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as to his observations; the [trial court] was able to see the look in [Brown’s] eyes; the 911 calls indicated he had been stopped in the lane of travel for no apparent reason; and [Brown’s] testimony was riddled with excuses, contradictions, and untruths. Based on what was presented, the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that [Brown] had consumed drugs and had operated a motor vehicle.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 12-15 (citations omitted, paragraph break
added).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
we determine that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find Brown
guilty of DUI on the basis that he was under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to the degree which impaired his ability to safely drive,
operate or be in actual control of the movement of the vehicle. Specifically,
Trooper Vance, who testified as an expert in field sobriety testing, described
Brown’s slurred speech, incoherent sentences, blank stare, and unsteady gait.
He further testified to the strong chemical odor emanating from Brown’s body,
which Trooper Vanore knew, from his training and experience, to be the
distinct odor of certain drugs. In addition, the trial court viewed the MVR from
the camera on Trooper Vanore’s patrol vehicle and observed Brown’s “slurred
and confused” speech, noting that his eyes had an “extremely glazed-over
look.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 13. Although Brown offered excuses
for his stalled vehicle, his failure to call for emergency assistance, and his
suspicious condition and demeanor, the trial court found his testimony to be
noncredible. Further, although Brown did not submit to any drug testing, we
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emphasize that there is no requirement that a drug must be detected in the
defendant’s body in order to sustain a conviction under section 3802(d)(2).
See Nestor, 314 A.3d at 874. Rather, “impairment evidence should be drawn
from the totality of the factual circumstances.” Id. Here, the totality of the
circumstances, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, established beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown ingested
a drug or combination of drugs that impaired his ability to safely drive,
operate, or be in actual physical control of the movement of his vehicle. Thus,
we conclude the record supports the trial court’s finding of guilt with respect
to Brown’s DUI conviction. Accordingly, no relief is due on Brown’s first issue.
In his second issue, Brown claims that the trial court should have
dismissed the matter pursuant to Rule 600. He further claims that he suffered
a violation to his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the United States
and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Since Brown raises a constitutional speedy
trial claim apart from the Rule 600 challenge, we will address this issue as two
separate claims.2
In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review requires a
determination as to:
whether the trial court abused its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court’s findings and the evidence of ____________________________________________
2 See Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 812 (Pa. Super. 2020) (holding that the court must conduct a two-part inquiry “in cases where an appellant presents independent claims premised on both the procedural rule and the constitutional guarantees”).
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the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will . . . discretion is abused.
Commonwealth v. Womack, 315 A.3d 1229, 1237 (Pa. 2024) (citations
omitted). “The proper scope of review . . . is limited to the evidence on the
record of the Rule [600] evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the [trial
court]. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party.” Commonwealth v Lapaglia, 320 A.3d 745, 750 (Pa.
Super. 2024) (citation omitted).
Rule 600 requires that a trial “in a court case in which a written
complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from
the date on which the complaint is filed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). For
purposes of this calculation, “periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings
caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise
due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which
trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
However, in a two-complaint scenario such as the case at bar, our
Supreme Court has explained:
Where the Commonwealth files two different criminal complaints against a defendant, the Commonwealth receives the benefit of the filing date of the second complaint for Rule 600 purposes where it demonstrates that it acted with due diligence between the period in which the complaints were filed. The Commonwealth
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must also establish that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control and that its actions were not an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the speedy trial requirements.
Womack, 315 A.3d at 1241. “The Commonwealth’s actions after the
withdrawal or dismissal of the first complaint only become relevant for Rule
600 purposes if the Commonwealth was forced to file a second complaint
because it failed to exercise due diligence in prosecuting the first complaint.”
Commonwealth v. Mullen, 341 A.3d 799, 806 (Pa. Super. 2025). To
determine whether the Commonwealth should receive the benefit of the filing
date of the second complaint, the trial court must consider “whether the
Commonwealth’s basis for filing the second complaint was precipitated by its
lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint. That is because, more
often than not, two-complaint cases involve a situation where the
Commonwealth re-files an identical complaint due to some barrier in
prosecuting its initial complaint.” Womack, 315 A.3d at 1240 (citation
omitted). It is the Commonwealth’s burden to demonstrate due diligence by
a preponderance of the evidence to avail itself of an exclusion under Rule 600.
See id. at 1239. “Due diligence is fact specific, to be determined case-by-
case; it does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a
showing the Commonwealth has put forward a reasonable effort.” Id. at
1239-40.
Brown argues the trial court erred when it denied his Rule 600 motion
because the Commonwealth “did not do everything reasonable within [its]
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power to guarantee a prompt trial, and the delay was not beyond the
prosecution’s control.” Brown’s Brief at 20-21 (quotation marks omitted).
Brown avers that Trooper Vanore’s “repeated absences caused substantial
delay” and that Trooper Vanore “did not update his address or properly
monitor the case, and the prosecution did not take adequate steps to fulfill its
duty to notify him.” Id. at 20. Brown further argues that “[t]he court mailed
notices, the barracks should have ensured [Trooper Vanore] received them,
and the prosecution had the ability to secure [Trooper Vanore’s] presence but
failed to do so.” Id.
The trial court considered Brown’s Rule 600 challenge and determined
[I]n the instant matter, the Commonwealth was duly diligent in prosecuting the first complaint. The matter was promptly scheduled for a preliminary hearing on July 7, 2022, following the May 13, 2022 arrest date. At that time, [Brown] requested a continuance for counsel. The matter was rescheduled, and Trooper Vance was absent on September 29, 2022. At the December listing, Trooper Vanore was not present because he was not aware of that listing. He explained credibly that he did not receive notice of that date and believed this was because notice had been sent to his prior assignment at Troop K in Media when he had been reassigned to Troop M in Dublin. This was not a deliberate act by the Commonwealth to send notice to the incorrect [b]arracks; the Commonwealth was without knowledge of [Trooper Vanore’s] transfer. Once [the prosecutor] discovered Trooper Vanore moved, he texted [him] with notice of the January 2023 date.
At the January date, the Commonwealth was once again ready to proceed with its witnesses, but the court continued the entire afternoon list of cases. Trooper Vanore explained he never received another notice for this matter and the court found that to be credible. It is not clear why Trooper Vanore did not receive
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notice of the February 13, 2023 date, but he failed to appear and [the magisterial district judge] dismissed the matter.
Throughout the life of the case, the Commonwealth was diligent in attempting to get their witness to court. Rule 600 does not require “perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing that the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort.” There was only one listing, September 29, [2022,] where Trooper Vanore failed to appear and there was no real evidence why. The other two dates where [Trooper Vanore] failed to appear were dates where the court or the Commonwealth attempted to notify [Trooper Vanore] of the date, but it was not received for one reason or another. As such, the Commonwealth was diligent in prosecuting the first complaint and therefore the time between dismissal of the first complaint, February 16, 2023, and the refiling of the second complaint, October 23, 2023[,] is irrelevant. From October 23, 2023 to October 10, 2024, when the motion to dismiss was filed, 365 days had not elapsed and therefore the case was not at risk for dismissal under Rule 600 on the second complaint.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 6-7 (paragraph breaks added, unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
After careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
denial of Brown’s Rule 600 motion. The record shows that the Commonwealth
was ready to proceed with the preliminary hearing on July 7, 2022; however,
Brown requested a continuance to obtain counsel. At the next scheduled
hearing, September 28, 2022, Trooper Vanore inexplicably failed to appear.
On December 8, 2022, Trooper Vanore did not appear to testify because he
did not receive notice of the hearing. He credibly testified at the Rule 600
hearing that he transferred barracks in November 2022 and that the court
sent the notice to the incorrect address. Trooper Vanore was present at the
next preliminary hearing on January 9, 2023; however, the district magisterial
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court abruptly continued all matters that day. Ultimately, on February 16,
2023, the district magisterial court dismissed the matter after Trooper Vanore
again failed to appear due to lack of notice.
Thus, the district magisterial court continued four out of the five
scheduled preliminary hearings dates — July 7, 2022, December 8, 2022,
January 9, 2023, and February 16, 2023 — for reasons that were beyond the
Commonwealth’s control. With respect to the September 28, 2022 hearing
date, Trooper Vanore testified that he could not recall why he did not appear.
While it is unfortunate that the Commonwealth was unable to provide a reason
for Trooper Vanore’s failure to appear, we emphasize that due diligence “does
not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the
Commonwealth has put forward a reasonable effort.” Womack, 315 A.3d at
1239-40. Here, we conclude that the Commonwealth put forth a reasonable
effort to prosecute the first criminal complaint, where all but one of the
continuances were for reasons beyond the Commonwealth’s control.
Furthermore, we determine that there is no evidence that the Commonwealth
purposely attempted to circumvent the time constraints of Rule 600. Indeed,
Brown conceded this point at the Rule 600 hearing. See N.T., 11/13/24, at
7. Based on the foregoing, we agree that the Commonwealth is entitled to
the benefit of the filing date of the second complaint for purposes of Rule 600.
Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Brown’s Rule 600 motion as 365 days had not elapsed between the
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filing of the second complaint and the date of the Rule 600 motion.
Accordingly, no relief is due on Brown’s second issue.
In his final issue, Brown claims that the delay between the filing of the
first criminal complaint and the date of trial violated his constitutional right to
a speedy trial under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Where
a defendant has raised a separate constitutional-based speedy trial issue apart
from the Rule 600 issue as a basis for the motion to dismiss, we employ a
two-step inquiry: “(1) whether the delay violated [Rule 600]; and if not, then
(2) whether the delay violated the defendant’s right to a speedy trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by
Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Commonwealth v.
DeBlase, 665 A.2d 427, 431 (Pa. 1995) (citation omitted). “In evaluating
speedy trial issues, our standard of review is whether the trial court abused
its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court’s findings
and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party.” Womack, 315 A.3d at 1237.
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to a speedy trial.” DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 432. “The speedy trial
guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive
incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying
public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the
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ability of an accused to defend himself.” Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189
A.3d 944, 954 (Pa. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To
determine whether an unconstitutional speedy trial violation occurred, the
court must consider: (1) whether the delay was uncommonly long; (2) the
reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his constitutional
rights; and (4) whether the defendant suffered prejudice because of the delay.
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (Pa. 1972); see also DeBlase, 665
A.2d at 432. Further,
[a] finding in the defendant’s favor of any one of the four factors, standing alone does not constitute a violation. Rather, each of the four factors are related and each must be weighed carefully in the court’s evaluation of a criminal defendant’s claim that his speedy trial rights were violated.
DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 432 (citations omitted).
Brown argues the delay between the filing of the first complaint and his
trial violated his right to a speedy trial because:
(1). . . Brown’s case was delayed for over 600 days, (2) [Trooper Vanore’s] repeated and inexcusable failures to show up for scheduled court listings caused the dismissal [of the first complaint] and considerably prolonged the case, where the prosecution improperly relied on the court to notify him, (3) . . . Brown asserted his constitutional rights to a speedy trial, and (4) the substantial delay prejudiced him, as he languished under pretrial bail conditions during that time.
Brown’s Brief at 23.
The trial court considered Brown’s constitution-based speedy trial claim
and determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
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In this instant matter, [Brown] filed his motion to dismiss on October 10, 2024. The original complaint had been filed on May 13, 2022. This is approximately two-and-one-half years. This court does not consider that an extremely significant amount of time. However, assuming arguendo, that it is a sufficiently lengthy delay to trigger further inquiry, this court will address the [four] factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo. The first step is to balance the length of delay and the reason for delay. As discussed above, the reason for delay was due to various mistakes in notifying the Commonwealth’s witness, Trooper Vanore[,] and also due to the [magisterial] district court’s cancellation of its lists. Additionally, the first complaint was dismissed by the [magisterial district judge] after three perceived failures of the Commonwealth to put forth its case, but this court believes that position of “three strikes and [you’re] out” is unreasonable, especially given the underlying reasons for delay and the due diligence by the Commonwealth.
[Brown] did properly assert his right regarding speedy trial so that factor is not at issue. The final factor in the Barker v. Wingo balancing test is the resulting prejudice to the interests meant to be protected by speedy trial. The speedy trial rule exists, in part, to prevent oppressive incarceration and to minimize the possibility that delay will impair a defendant’s ability to [present] a defense. In the instant matter, [Brown] was not incarcerated and thus, one of the major interests the speedy trial rule is meant to protect is not even applicable. Furthermore, there was no real argument put forth from the defense regarding how the delay prejudiced [Brown’s] ability to put forth a defense in this matter, nor does the court see any. As such, this court cannot see how [Brown’s] constitutional rights to due process were violated.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/4/25, at 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
After careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it found no violation of Brown’s constitutional-based right to
a speedy trial. Applying the Barker four-part balancing test set, we agree
with the trial court that the total length of delay between the first criminal
complaint and the date Brown filed his Rule 600 motion, approximately two
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and a half years, was not excessive, particularly since Brown remained free
on bail throughout the pendency of this case. Next, we conclude that the
delay was not due to the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence. As discussed
above, in every instance but one, the district magisterial court continued the
case for reasons beyond the Commonwealth’s control. We further determine
that Brown asserted his constitutional right to a speedy trial by raising it his
Rule 600 motion. Lastly, we conclude that there is no evidence that the delay
prejudiced Brown. Brown was not incarcerated during the pendency of the
case, and he made no argument that the delay impaired the preparation of
his defense. Indeed, his only claim of prejudice is that he “languished under
pretrial bail conditions;” however, he did not specify how the pretrial bail
conditions negatively impacted him. Thus, after reviewing the factors set forth
in Barker, we conclude there was no violation of Brown’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial. Accordingly, no relief is due on Brown’s final issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of Brown’s claims
merit relief. We thus affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 6/3/2026
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