NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
:
:
QUADIR B. BROWN :
:
Appellant : No. 1905 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 27, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003434-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 2, 2026 Appellant, Quadir B. Brown, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after the trial court found him guilty of third-degree murder, conspiracy to commit third- degree murder, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, and aggravated assault. 1 Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence sustaining all his convictions. Upon careful review, we affirm.
On August 3, 2022, at approximately 9:30 p.m., police officers responded to the 3100 block of Rorer Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 903/2502(c), 6106(a)(1), 6108, and 2702(a)(1).
a report of gunshots fired. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 33. Upon arrival, officers surveyed the area and located a victim, Edward Brew, who had been shot in the leg. See id. at 33-35. While being transported to the hospital, Brew informed the officers that the shooters were two males in all black heavy sweatshirts with their faces covered. See id. at 38. The shooters had fled the area on foot. See id. at 40.
Other officers discovered another victim, Tyrone Holloway, who had been shot in the back and was lying unresponsive on the sidewalk. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 49-50. Holloway was transported to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. See id. at 50. At the hospital, Brew survived his surgery but did not cooperate further in the investigation. See id. at 88-89.
About one hour after the shootings, police officers processed the crime scene at 3100 Rorer Street and recovered ten .45-caliber fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”), eleven 9mm Luger FCCs, and three fragments. See id. at 54. During their investigation, police recovered relevant surveillance footage from street cameras and nearby businesses and compiled the footage. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 73; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-35 (Video Compilation). The video compilation depicted Appellant and two other men leaving the grocery store at approximately 8:40 p.m. and walking toward
Rorer Street. See id. at 107-11.2 Appellant was wearing a black hooded
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2 At trial, defense counsel stipulated that Appellant was the individual depicted
in the grocery store surveillance footage wearing all black. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 110-11.
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sweatshirt, black sweatpants and black and yellow sneakers, while the other two men were wearing gray shorts. See id. at 108.
Police subsequently used the surveillance footage to trace the group’s movements from the grocery store to the crime scene. The footage showed the group on Westmoreland Street, move south on E Street, and through several intersections before reaching the intersection of Clearfield and Rorer Streets. As the group reached Rorer Street, at 9:30 p.m., Appellant and one of the other men in gray shorts began running toward the victims, chased them up Rorer Street, and fired at them. Both victims were struck and fell to the ground before Appellant and the second shooter fled the scene. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 110-23; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-35.
On December 2, 2022, a search warrant was executed on Appellant’s home and police placed Appellant under arrest. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 78. During the search, officers recovered a pair of black and yellow sneakers that matched what Appellant was wearing from the grocery store footage. See id. 82. Police also recovered a 9mm bullet and a black sweatshirt, but both items were concluded to not be relevant to the investigation. See id. at 84.
On December 10, 2024, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a non-jury trial, wherein the Commonwealth provided evidence that Appellant was not licensed to carry a firearm. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 12, 104; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit 32 (Certificate of Non-Licensure). The Commonwealth also provided testimony from detectives, police officers, a forensic scientist, and a medical examiner. See N.T. Trial, 12/10/24, at 14-
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29, 31-45, 48, 57-69, 72-89, 96-103, and 106-36. Finally, the Commonwealth played the video compilation prepared by Detective Thorsten Lucke, which showed Appellant and the other shooter’s path from the grocery store to the shooting. See id. at 106-24; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-35.
On December 12, 2024, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the above-referenced offenses. See Order (Trial Disposition Form), 12/12/24. Then, on February 27, 2025, the court sentenced Appellant to 16½ to 33 years of incarceration. See Order (sentence), 2/27/25. On March 1, 2025, defense counsel for Appellant filed a post-sentence motion. See Post-Sentence Motion, 3/1/25. The trial court denied the motion on July 1, 2025. See Order (denying
post-sentence motion), 7/1/25. 3 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and
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3 The trial court’s order was filed 122 days after Appellant filed his post- sentence motion. We note that the trial court has 120 days to decide a post- sentence motion, and if it fails to decide the motion within that period, the motion is deemed denied by operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a). When the motion is denied by operation of law, the clerk of courts shall enter an order deeming the motion denied on behalf of the trial court and serve copies on the parties. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). This Court has held that a breakdown occurs when the trial court clerk fails to timely enter an order deeming post-sentence motions denied by operation of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(b). See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 734, 735 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
Here, the 120th day after the filing of Appellant’s post-sentence motion fell on Sunday, June 29, 2025; therefore, the deadline for decision on the motion was extended to Monday, June 30, 2025. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(c) (incorporating by reference rules of construction in Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration including R.J.A. 107(a)-(b), relating to computation of time for rule of construction regarding to exclusion of first day and inclusion of last date of time period and omission of last day of time period which falls (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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he and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Notice of Appeal, 7/19/25; Rule 1925(b) Order, 7/23/25; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/25/25; Trial Court Opinion, 3/5/26.
Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:
I. Was the evidence sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions for [third-degree] murder, criminal conspiracy, aggravated assault, and violations of the Uniform Firearms Act where the evidence failed to establish that Appellant was the individual who committed the shooting or that he entered into an agreement with any of the individuals involved in the shooting?
II. Were the verdicts against the clear weight of the evidence for each of Appellant’s convictions where the evidence used to convict him – his proximity to the crime scene and the fact that his clothing appeared similar to the shooter’s – was so tenuous vague and uncertain that the verdicts shock the conscience?
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (answers of the trial court and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant in his first issue contends that the Commonwealth presented
insufficient evidence to sustain all his convictions because the Commonwealth
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on Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday). However, on July 1, 2025, the clerk of courts entered an order deeming the motion denied by operation of law, which was outside the 120-day period. See Order (denying post-sentence motion), 7/1/25. Nevertheless, Appellant appealed within 30 days of the date that the motion should have been denied by operation of law. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (general rule stating notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order being appealed); Commonwealth v. Moir, 766 A.2d 1253, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“In order to preserve the right to appeal a final order of the trial court, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of that order.”). Therefore, this Court may proceed to consider Appellant’s substantive issues.
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failed to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-19.
The standard of review in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence is well settled:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Banks, 253 A.3d 768, 774 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019)).
To sustain a conviction for third-degree murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant killed another person with malice aforethought. See Commonwealth v. Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(c). Further, malice is established when an actor consciously disregards an unjustified and extremely high risk that his
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actions might cause death or serious bodily harm. See Golphin, 161 A.3d at 1018.
To convict a defendant of criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish that the defendant: (1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons; (2) with a shared criminal intent; and (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1190 (Pa. 2013); 18 Pa.C.S. § 903.
A person is guilty of aggravated assault when he “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.
To convict a defendant for carrying a firearm without a license, the Commonwealth must prove that: (1) the weapon was a firearm; (2) the firearm was unlicensed; and (3) where the firearm was concealed on or about the defendant’s person, it was outside his home or place of business. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa. Super. 2004); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).
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Finally, a person violates 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108 of the Uniform Firearms Act when he carries a firearm upon a public street or any public property in Philadelphia without a license to do so. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108)).
“In addition to proving the statutory elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes.” Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 175 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “Direct evidence of identity is, of course, not necessary[,] and a defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[e]vidence of identification need not be positive and certain to sustain a conviction.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 579 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
Appellant contends the Commonwealth’s case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, consisting primarily of surveillance footage placing him near the scene approximately one hour before the shooting. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 13. According to Appellant, no witness identified him as one of the shooters, no physical or forensic evidence connected him to the crime, no evidence established a motive or prior relationship with the victims, and no cellphone evidence demonstrated his involvement in the shooting. See id. at 13, 18. Appellant maintains that his proximity to the crime and association with video footage was insufficient to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators. See id.
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Appellant further relies on Pennsylvania’s equipoise doctrine, arguing the Commonwealth’s evidence was equally consistent with Appellant’s innocence as with guilt because it supported the inference that he and his companions were merely present around where the shooting occurred. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-18 (citing Commonwealth v. Woong Knee New, 47 A.2d 450 (Pa. 1946)).4 Accordingly, Appellant contends that the evidence required the trial court, sitting as the fact-finder, to speculate as to his involvement and was therefore insufficient to sustain his convictions. See id. at 18-19. We disagree.
Upon review of the record under the appropriate standard of review, we find that the evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant’s identity as one of the perpetrators where witness testimony describing the shooters matched his appearance on the relevant grocery store video and Appellant stipulated as to his identity in that video. See Strafford, 194 A.3d at 175;see also N.T.
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4 Our Supreme Court in Woong Knee New, established that, regarding sufficiency of evidence review, when a party bearing the burden of proof in a criminal case is faced with evidence consistent with two opposing propositions, the party proves neither. See Woong Knee New, 47 A.3d at 468 (“When two equally reasonable and mutually inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same set of circumstances, a [fact-finder] must not be permitted to guess what inference it will adopt, especially when one of the two guesses may result in depriving a defendant of his life or his liberty.”). This equipoise doctrine addresses the “rare” situation where “the entirety of the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, yields competing ultimate inferences equally consistent with the defendant’s innocence as with his guilt, thereby rendering the fact-finder’s guilty verdict the product of surmise or conjecture.” In Interest of J.B., 189 A.3d 390, 412 (Pa. Super. 2018) (emphasis added).
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Trial, 12/10/24, at 110-11; Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-35. The trial court explained:
During the trial, Appellant’s counsel stipulated that the person in the recovered video was Appellant. Based on this stipulation, Appellant was wearing a dark outfit and distinct shoes. This outfit matches the description that one of the victims provided, which stated that the gunmen were dressed in all black outfits.
The Commonwealth then presented a minute-by-minute recitation of Appellant’s path from the grocery store on Wil[l]ard Street to the crime scene. During this recitation, the Commonwealth repeatedly highlighted that Appellant is seen wearing the identical clothes and distinct shoes in the various surveillance videos. Once Appellant’s group arrives at the crime scene, Appellant and another member of his group begin running towards the victims on Rorer Street. As Appellant and his accomplice begin chasing the victims up Rorer Street, the lower quality camera captures two gunman firing at the victims.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/25, at 4-5 (emphasis added; record citations omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the evidence established far more than Appellant’s proximity near the scene of the shooting. See Banks, 253 A.3d at 774. In fact, the surveillance footage, Appellant’s stipulation identifying himself in the grocery store video, his distinctive clothing and shoes, and the continuous sequence of events depicting his movements from the grocery store to the crime scene permitted the trial court, as the fact-finder, to reasonably infer that Appellant was one of perpetrators. See Strafford, 184 A.3d at 175; Williams, 255 A.3d at 579.
Moreover, although Appellant characterizes the Commonwealth’s evidence as equally consistent with innocence under the equipoise doctrine,
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here the evidence viewed as a whole does not support two equally reasonable inferences. In Woong Knee New, our Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for first-degree murder despite his admission he had been with the victim around the time of the murder because there was no evidence tending to prove that the defendant committed the crime. See Woong Knee New, 47 A.2d at 468. Here, based on the video footage, there was no evidence that anyone else was or could have been the shooter aside from Appellant and the other shooter in gray shorts. See Commonwealth Trial Exhibit C-35. Accordingly, because the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence identifying Appellant as one of the shooters, Appellant’s first issue is meritless. See Banks, 253 A.3d at 774.
Appellant in his second issue argues that his convictions were against the weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 19-22. Our standard of review for this claim requires us to inquire into whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a post-verdict challenge to the weight of the evidence rather than directly reviewing the credibility of the evidence presented:
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that[,] notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
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review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).
Any conflicts in the evidence or contradictions in testimony are exclusively for the fact-finder to resolve. See Commonwealth v. Roane, 204 A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019). Our Court gives great deference to the trial court’s decision regarding the weight of evidence because it had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented. See Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.”). Furthermore, “[i]n order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the weight of evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” See Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 311 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted).
Appellant conveys a similar argument as that in his first issue and avers that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence because his proximity to the crime scene, and the fact that his clothing appeared similar to the shooter, was too tenuous. See Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. Moreover, since the Commonwealth failed to show that Appellant was engaged in any criminal activity combined with the absence of additional evidence in this case, Appellant alleges that the existing evidence tying him to the shooting renders
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the verdict so shocking that a new trial is required in the interests of justice. See id. at 21.
Here, Appellant conflates weight and sufficiency of the evidence by addressing a lack of evidence, which is the focus of a sufficiency challenge, rather than assessing the credibility of the testimony presented by the Commonwealth, which is the focus of a weight challenge. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-53 (Pa. 2000) (explaining distinctions between claim challenging sufficiency of evidence and claim challenging weight of evidence). Appellant’s entire argument for his weight claim is unavailing because a weight claim concedes that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. See Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2022).
Even if Appellant correctly raised this issue, he essentially requests that we replace the trial court’s credibility determinations with our own; this we cannot do. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“[I]t is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the trial court. The weight to be accorded conflicting evidence is exclusively for the fact[-]finder, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal if they are supported by the record.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, the trial court opined that, based on the evidence, it reasonably believed, as the fact-finder, that Appellant was correctly identified as one of the shooters captured in the recovered video surveillance footage. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/25, at 8. We discern no
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error or abuse of discretion in this conclusion. Therefore, we find Appellant’s second issue meritless.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 9/2/2026