J-S01024-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ISAIAH J. BROWN : : Appellant : No. 488 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000762-2024
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: March 10, 2026
Isaiah J. Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
Erie County Court of Common Pleas on March 4, 2025, after a jury found him
guilty of robbery and related charges. On appeal, Brown claims the trial court
erred by allowing the Commonwealth to exercise a peremptory strike in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After careful review,
we find Brown’s claim is waived and otherwise without merit. We therefore
affirm Brown’s judgment of sentence.
As Brown only challenges the voir dire portion of his trial, the underlying
facts supporting his conviction are not germane to this appeal. Briefly, on May
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01024-26
23, 2024, Brown was charged with multiple offenses related to a robbery
which occurred on December 4, 2023 at a Citizens Bank.
On January 9, 2024, following a trial, a jury found Brown guilty of
Robbery−Threat of Immediate Serious Injury, Robbery−Demanding Money
from a Financial Institution, Theft by Unlawful Taking−Movable Property,
Receiving Stolen Property, and Possessing Instruments of a Crime.1 On March
4, 2025, the trial court sentenced Brown to an aggregate term of 48 to 96
months’ incarceration. Brown filed a post-sentence motion for a new trial
based on a weight of the evidence claim, and the improper handling of a
Batson challenge. Following consideration of the Commonwealth’s response,
the trial court denied the post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.
In his sole claim raised on appeal, Brown argues the trial court erred by
finding the Commonwealth presented a race-neutral explanation for striking a
venire person and denying his Batson challenge. Specifically, Brown argues
the trial court did not follow the proper procedure for a Batson challenge, and
in any event the court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to strike a Korean-
American venire person, one of only three persons of color represented in the
jury panel.
Initially, we note a Batson claim presents mixed questions of law and
fact. Therefore, our standard of review is whether the trial court’s legal
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).
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conclusions are correct and whether its factual findings are supported by the
record or clearly erroneous.
In Batson, the [Supreme Court of the United States] held that a prosecutor’s challenge to potential jurors solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. When a defendant makes a Batson challenge during jury selection:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor struck one or more prospective jurors on account of race; second, if the prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror(s) at issue; and third, the trial court must then make the ultimate determination of whether the defense has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d 963, 971 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). “The trial court should consider the totality of
circumstances when determining whether the prosecutor acted with
discriminatory intent or engaged in purposeful discrimination.”
Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 602 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
This Court must give great deference to the trial court’s finding about the
absence of discriminatory intent in peremptory challenges, and we will not
overturn it unless it is clearly erroneous. See id.
Further, with respect to the preservation of Batson claims, our Supreme
Court has stated an appellant must raise a Batson objection during voir dire
in order to “preserve a challenge to the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory
strikes.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 894 (Pa. 2011). Where
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“defense counsel did not raise or preserve any claim of racial discrimination in
jury selection with a contemporaneous Batson objection at trial, we have
repeatedly held that the Batson framework does not apply.” Commonwealth
v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 287 (Pa. 2011).
Here, the record reveals that the parties waived the presence of the
judge and the court reporter during the jury selection process. Accordingly,
we cannot confirm whether Brown raised a Batson objection during the jury
selection process. However, the trial court, along with both parties, all cite to,
and rely on, a discussion that occurred seemingly contemporaneous with voir
dire regarding the striking of the at-issue venire person. According to the
Commonwealth, in its response to Brown’s post-sentence motion, arguments
about voir dire were heard outside of the presence of the venire in Judge
Mead’s chambers with a court stenographer present. See Commonwealth’s
Response to Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, 3/26/25, at ¶ 11. Despite this
contention, no such transcript appears in the certified record. 2 We note, “[i]t
is the responsibility of an appellant to ensure that the record certified on
appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary
for the reviewing court to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65
A.3d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
2 Further, our informal efforts to secure the transcript were unsuccessful as it
appears no transcript of this “argument” was filed with the clerk of courts.
-4- J-S01024-26
Even if we were to rely on the parts of the in-chambers argument that
the parties cite to, as the discussion appears to be undisputed, these citations
only prove that the Commonwealth, immediately prior to exercising
peremptory challenges, indicated that it was attempting to strike a person
who the Commonwealth noted, on its own accord, was Korean-American. See
Trial Court Opinion, at 2. The Commonwealth stated it was going to challenge
her and wanted to explain its reasoning, namely, because it found her maturity
to be questionable based on her lack of eye-contact and the amount of
personal items she brought up with her during questioning. See id.
The trial court noted it found that reason was proper. See id. In
response, defense counsel stated the venire person was rehabilitated and
there was no reason to strike her. See id. at 1-2. Notably, defense counsel
did not mention race at all.
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J-S01024-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ISAIAH J. BROWN : : Appellant : No. 488 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000762-2024
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: March 10, 2026
Isaiah J. Brown appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the
Erie County Court of Common Pleas on March 4, 2025, after a jury found him
guilty of robbery and related charges. On appeal, Brown claims the trial court
erred by allowing the Commonwealth to exercise a peremptory strike in
violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After careful review,
we find Brown’s claim is waived and otherwise without merit. We therefore
affirm Brown’s judgment of sentence.
As Brown only challenges the voir dire portion of his trial, the underlying
facts supporting his conviction are not germane to this appeal. Briefly, on May
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01024-26
23, 2024, Brown was charged with multiple offenses related to a robbery
which occurred on December 4, 2023 at a Citizens Bank.
On January 9, 2024, following a trial, a jury found Brown guilty of
Robbery−Threat of Immediate Serious Injury, Robbery−Demanding Money
from a Financial Institution, Theft by Unlawful Taking−Movable Property,
Receiving Stolen Property, and Possessing Instruments of a Crime.1 On March
4, 2025, the trial court sentenced Brown to an aggregate term of 48 to 96
months’ incarceration. Brown filed a post-sentence motion for a new trial
based on a weight of the evidence claim, and the improper handling of a
Batson challenge. Following consideration of the Commonwealth’s response,
the trial court denied the post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.
In his sole claim raised on appeal, Brown argues the trial court erred by
finding the Commonwealth presented a race-neutral explanation for striking a
venire person and denying his Batson challenge. Specifically, Brown argues
the trial court did not follow the proper procedure for a Batson challenge, and
in any event the court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to strike a Korean-
American venire person, one of only three persons of color represented in the
jury panel.
Initially, we note a Batson claim presents mixed questions of law and
fact. Therefore, our standard of review is whether the trial court’s legal
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).
-2- J-S01024-26
conclusions are correct and whether its factual findings are supported by the
record or clearly erroneous.
In Batson, the [Supreme Court of the United States] held that a prosecutor’s challenge to potential jurors solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. When a defendant makes a Batson challenge during jury selection:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor struck one or more prospective jurors on account of race; second, if the prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror(s) at issue; and third, the trial court must then make the ultimate determination of whether the defense has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 177 A.3d 963, 971 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). “The trial court should consider the totality of
circumstances when determining whether the prosecutor acted with
discriminatory intent or engaged in purposeful discrimination.”
Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 602 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
This Court must give great deference to the trial court’s finding about the
absence of discriminatory intent in peremptory challenges, and we will not
overturn it unless it is clearly erroneous. See id.
Further, with respect to the preservation of Batson claims, our Supreme
Court has stated an appellant must raise a Batson objection during voir dire
in order to “preserve a challenge to the Commonwealth’s use of peremptory
strikes.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 17 A.3d 873, 894 (Pa. 2011). Where
-3- J-S01024-26
“defense counsel did not raise or preserve any claim of racial discrimination in
jury selection with a contemporaneous Batson objection at trial, we have
repeatedly held that the Batson framework does not apply.” Commonwealth
v. Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277, 287 (Pa. 2011).
Here, the record reveals that the parties waived the presence of the
judge and the court reporter during the jury selection process. Accordingly,
we cannot confirm whether Brown raised a Batson objection during the jury
selection process. However, the trial court, along with both parties, all cite to,
and rely on, a discussion that occurred seemingly contemporaneous with voir
dire regarding the striking of the at-issue venire person. According to the
Commonwealth, in its response to Brown’s post-sentence motion, arguments
about voir dire were heard outside of the presence of the venire in Judge
Mead’s chambers with a court stenographer present. See Commonwealth’s
Response to Motion for Post-Sentence Relief, 3/26/25, at ¶ 11. Despite this
contention, no such transcript appears in the certified record. 2 We note, “[i]t
is the responsibility of an appellant to ensure that the record certified on
appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary
for the reviewing court to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65
A.3d 932, 936 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
2 Further, our informal efforts to secure the transcript were unsuccessful as it
appears no transcript of this “argument” was filed with the clerk of courts.
-4- J-S01024-26
Even if we were to rely on the parts of the in-chambers argument that
the parties cite to, as the discussion appears to be undisputed, these citations
only prove that the Commonwealth, immediately prior to exercising
peremptory challenges, indicated that it was attempting to strike a person
who the Commonwealth noted, on its own accord, was Korean-American. See
Trial Court Opinion, at 2. The Commonwealth stated it was going to challenge
her and wanted to explain its reasoning, namely, because it found her maturity
to be questionable based on her lack of eye-contact and the amount of
personal items she brought up with her during questioning. See id.
The trial court noted it found that reason was proper. See id. In
response, defense counsel stated the venire person was rehabilitated and
there was no reason to strike her. See id. at 1-2. Notably, defense counsel
did not mention race at all. Therefore, there is no indication that defense
counsel raised a Batson challenge. Accordingly, Brown has waived his Batson
claim for both his failure to include the relevant transcript in order for us to
conduct our review, and because there is no record indication that Brown even
raised a Batson claim.
We note, even if not waived, this claim appears to lack merit. In the
totality of the circumstances, we discern no legal or factual error. Again, even
if we were to rely on the citations provided by the parties and the trial court
to the argument that occurred in the judge’s chambers, it is clear the
Commonwealth provided a race-neutral explanation, and the trial court found
-5- J-S01024-26
Brown failed to carry his burden of proving a Batson claim. See Trial Court
Opinion, 6/23/25, at 1-3; see also Edwards, 177 A.3d at 971; Towles, 106
A.3d at 602. Therefore, even if not waived, Brown’s issue would not merit
relief.
As we find Brown’s sole claim raised on appeal is waived and otherwise
without merit, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
DATE: 03/10/2026
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