J-S24030-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAYMIE LYNN BROOKS : : Appellant : No. 1538 WDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 13, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001467-2021
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 13, 2025
Jaymie Lynn Brooks appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
following her convictions for possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”),
intentionally possessing a controlled substance by a person not registered,
and use/possession of drug paraphernalia.1 She challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support two of her convictions and an evidentiary ruling. We
affirm.
We glean the following from the record. At Brooks’s jury trial, Trooper
Charles Smolleck of the Pennsylvania State Police testified that on October 15,
2019, the police went to a residence at 7 Pittsburgh Street2 in Fairchance and
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1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16), and (a)(32), respectively.
2 The record refers to this address as both 7 Pittsburgh Street and 7½ Pittsburgh Street. For purposes of this memorandum, we will refer to the residence at issue as 7 Pittsburgh Street. J-S24030-25
observed Brooks and Robert Johnston in the living room through a window on
the front door. N.T. Trial, 11/4/24-11/5/24, at 47, 49. The police went to the
residence because they had received information that Brooks and Johnson had
outstanding warrants. The police knocked and announced on the door. Id. at
47. Johnston opened the door and let the police in. Id. Brooks and Johnston
were the only people in the residence. Id. at 72-73. In describing the house,
Trooper Smolleck testified that “[w]hen you walk in, it’s a living room and a
dining room that’s just one big combined room and then the kitchen and then
there was a bathroom in the rear and a bedroom on the right.” Id. at 49. After
Trooper Smolleck walked inside the residence, he observed numerous bundles
of cash, numerous pills in different colors, prescription bottles without labels,
and a prescription for suboxone with Brooks’s name on it, all in plain view. Id.
at 47, 79. The police secured the residence and obtained a search warrant.
Id. at 47-48.
Trooper Smolleck testified that when they executed the warrant, police
found numerous items that corroborated the use of narcotics in a large
quantity: latex gloves, small packaging baggies, and a scale; a large quantity
of crack cocaine in red solo cups taped under the sink; numerous pills in the
dining room; six cellphones; and $6,094 in cash in the recliner in the living
room. Id. at 48-49. Trooper Smolleck noted that the scale was found inside a
kitchen drawer “in arm’s length of where the crack cocaine was located.” Id.
at 59. He stated that the baggies and latex gloves were also found in the
kitchen “in close proximity of the crack cocaine.” Id. at 62. Trooper Smolleck
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did not know who the cellphones belonged to and stated that they were not
checked for text messages or calls. Id. at 77. The police also recovered $617
from Brooks’s purse, which was comprised of 30 $20 bills, one $10 bill, three
$2 bills, and one $1 bill. Id. at 67-68.
Trooper Smolleck further testified that the police found in the residence
a gas bill for 7 Pittsburgh Street in Brooks’s name. Id. at 66-67, 80-81, 83-
84. The police also found mail with insurance company information addressed
to Johnston at 7 Pittsburgh Street. Id. at 66-67, 80. The police further
observed that there was both male and female clothing at the residence. Id.
at 84. Trooper Smolleck stated that he did not know who owned the residence
or how long Brooks had been living there. Id. at 72.
Trooper Smolleck further testified that he checked Department of Labor
and Industry records to determine Brooks’s employment. Id. at 69. He
indicated that there was no record showing Brooks had any employment in
2019. Id. Brooks was also not collecting welfare. Id. at 71.
A forensic scientist in the serology section at the Lima Regional Crime
Lab, Morgan Wiernusz, testified that she tested the evidence that the police
seized from the residence at 7 Pittsburgh Street. Wiernusz testified that she
analyzed a Ziplock bag containing two knotted plastic bags containing an off-
white substance. Id. at 91. She determined that the substance was cocaine,
which is a Schedule II drug, and had a net weight of 187.73 grams. Id. She
stated that she also tested another substance and determined it was cocaine
with a net weight of .96 grams, plus or minus .01 grams. Id. at 91-92.
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Wiernusz also reviewed baggies containing different colored tablets. Id. at 93-
94. She determined the tablets were amphetamines and oxycodone, which
are a Schedule II drugs. Id. at 94-96. Wiernusz further determined that one
baggie contained buprenorphine, which is a Schedule III drug. Id. at 96. She
did not know if there were prescriptions for the controlled substances. Id. at
101.
Another trooper, Trooper Anthony Svetz, testified that he was called to
the residence on October 15, 2019. Id. at 106. He stated that he conducted
a search of Brooks’s person and purse. Id. at 107. Trooper Svetz testified that
he found $617 in cash in Brooks’s purse. Id.
A third state trooper, Trooper Matthew Rucinski, testified that he
participated in executing the search warrant of the residence. Id. at 112-13.
He stated that the K-9 unit indicated that drugs were under the sink. Id. at
113. Trooper Rucinski searched under the sink and found “what appeared to
be a bundle of crack cocaine” in red solo cups that were taped underneath the
sink. Id. at 113-14. Trooper Rucinski then searched the recliner in the living
room and found an envelope with a “thick stack of cash” inside in the back of
the recliner. Id. at 114-15. Trooper Rucinski also observed pill bottles with
“mixed pills” and drug paraphernalia inside the residence. Id. at 115.
Detective Jamie Holland of the Uniontown City Police Department
testified for the Commonwealth as an expert in the field of drug trafficking.
Id. at 123. The trial court accurately summarized Detective Holland’s
testimony as follows:
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Detective Holland stated the typical signs of a case of possession with the intent to deliver are large amounts of money, large amounts of controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, packaging materials, scales, and other things of that nature. [N.T.] at 124. Detective Rolland testified the amount of crack cocaine in the first sample collected was absolutely indicative of possession with the intent to deliver because the amount was extremely large and because the weight went into abnormal decimals which was significant as those possessing crack cocaine for personal use typically buy in whole grams. Id. at 124-27. Detective Holland stated the scale and the $6,094.00 in cash were indicative of possession with the intent to deliver, especially given the strange and hidden location of most of the money. Id. at 128. Detective Holland also testified that both the baggies and the latex gloves were indicative of possession with the intent to deliver. Id. at 125, 127-28.
Detective Holland’s expert opinion in this case was [Brooks] possessed the controlled substances with the intent to deliver; he added this is absolutely an amount intended for distribution rather than an amount for personal use. Id. at 128-29. Detective Holland based his opinion on the amount of money, the amount of controlled substances, the differentiating controlled substances that were listed and that were received, where the money was located, the scale, and the baggies; he stated all the boxes were being checked here for what is looked for regarding distribution of controlled substances. Id. at 129. Detective Holland testified his expert opinion was rendered to a reasonable degree of professional certainty. [Id.] Detective Holland stated he was not involved in the investigation but rather reviewed the evidence provided to him to form his opinion. Id. at 130-32. However, Detective Holland firmly stated he has never seen nor heard of anyone who used seven ounces of crack cocaine for personal use in his entire lifetime, and he added that as a result of his employment he deals with individuals who are coping with addiction on a daily basis. Id. at 130-31.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 2/11/25, at 6-7.
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After the Commonwealth rested, the defense called its only witness,
Brooks. Brooks testified that in October 2019, she was living at 7 Pittsburgh
Street in Fairchance with her boyfriend, Johnston. N.T. at 147-48, 152-53.
She said that they had lived there for approximately two years and had rented
the house from a person named “Hop.” Id. at 148, 153-54. Brooks testified
that in October 2019, she was working as a home health aide and made $777
per week. Id. at 147-49. She stated that she only took one week off from
work in 2019 after she gave birth to her daughter in June. Id. at 149-50.
Brooks testified that she had a drug addiction problem in 2019. Id. at 150.
She said that she is currently taking Subutex to “help clean [her]self up.” Id.
Brooks denied selling any drugs out of the Fairchance residence or
possessing any cocaine. Id. at 150-51. She testified that she was aware that
Johnston was “indulging in illegal activity” in the residence and selling
narcotics, but she did not know the amount of drugs or where the drugs were
located. Id. at 151, 156. Brooks stated that she did not report Johnston
because he is her daughter’s father. Id. at 156. She testified that after they
were arrested, Johnston fled to Nevada. Id. at 151-52. Brooks stated that
some of the pills found by the police were for her daughter who had a
prescription for Adderall. Id. at 156-57. Brooks acknowledged that her
daughter did not take oxycodone. Id. at 158.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Brooks guilty of the above
offenses. Id. at 181. The court sentenced Brooks to four to eight years’
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incarceration. Brooks did not file a post-sentence motion. This appeal
followed.
Brooks raises the following issues:
1. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts of drug possession and intent?
2. Whether admitting a large sum of cash, totaling $6,094.00[,] into evidence was an abuse of discretion or an error after cross[-]examination testimony revealed the evidence envelope had been opened?
Brooks’s Br. at 7.
Brooks’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Brooks
argues that since no drugs were found on her person, the Commonwealth
could not prove actual possession but was required to prove culpability
through constructive possession. Id. at 9. She asserts that the
Commonwealth failed to prove that she constructively possessed the drugs
because it did not present evidence that she had the ability to control or
exercise dominion over the drugs. Id. In Brooks’s view, there was no evidence
presented that she was a drug dealer, had the intent or the ability to exercise
control over the of cocaine, or owned the cell phones that were confiscated
from the residence. Id. at 10. Brooks further points out that only a small
amount of cash ($617) was found in her purse, there was no evidence that
the residence was in an area known for drug activity, and no drug
paraphernalia was found on Brooks’s person. Id. Brooks emphasizes that
another person, Johnston, lived in the house and Johnston absconded from
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Pennsylvania and went to another state. Id. She further argues that since the
Commonwealth’s expert, Detective Holland, was not involved in the
investigation and only reviewed the evidence, his “testimony as to the
packaging, amount, paraphernalia, and drugs, did not bolster the
Commonwealth’s case that [Brooks] herself possessed any drugs and/or
possessed the drugs with the specific intent to deliver.” Id. at 12.
The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law. Therefore, “[o]ur
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa.Super. 2019). When
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 23 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc)
(citation omitted). “Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of
fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.” Id. (citation
omitted). This standard applies equally where the Commonwealth’s evidence
is circumstantial. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1229
(Pa.Super. 2018). This Court “may not substitute our judgment for that of the
factfinder.” Commonwealth v. Griffith, 305 A.3d 573, 576 (Pa.Super.
2023). The factfinder, “while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and
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the weight of the evidence[,] is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa.Super. 2017).
Here, the relevant offenses under 35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(30) provide:
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:
(16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized by this act. . . .
(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.
35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(16), (30).
To sustain a conviction for PWID, the Commonwealth must prove both
that (1) the defendant possessed a controlled substance and (2) the defendant
had the intent to deliver the controlled substance. Commonwealth v.
Taylor, 33 A.3d 1283, 1288 (Pa.Super. 2011).
Possession can be established “by proving actual possession,
constructive possession, or joint constructive possession.” Commonwealth
v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “Where a
defendant is not in actual possession of the prohibited items, the
Commonwealth must establish that the defendant had constructive possession
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to support the conviction.” Id. Constructive possession exists where the
defendant has “the power to control the contraband and the intent to exercise
that control.” Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa.Super.
2013) (citation omitted). “Constructive possession is an inference arising from
a set of facts that possession of the contraband was more likely than not.”
Commonwealth v. McClellan, 178 A.3d 874, 878 (Pa.Super. 2018). The
Commonwealth may prove constructive possession by the totality of the
circumstances. Hopkins, 67 A.3d at 820. “[A] defendant’s mere presence at
a place where contraband is found or secreted is insufficient, standing alone,
to prove that he exercised dominion and control over those items.” Parrish,
191 A.3d at 37. “Rather, knowledge of the existence and location of the
contraband is a necessary prerequisite to proving the defendant’s intent to
control, and, thus, his constructive possession.” Id.
Further, “[t]wo actors may have joint control and equal access and thus
both may constructively possess the contraband.” Commonwealth v. Jones,
874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted).” Additionally, the
power to control the contraband “may be found in one or more actors where
the item in issue is in an area of joint control and equal access.”
Commonwealth v. Valette, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. 1992). This Court
recently explained:
In Commonwealth v. Macolino, 503 Pa. 201, 469 A.2d 132 (1983), our Supreme Court addressed the issue of joint constructive possession and held that “possession of an illegal substance need not be exclusive; two or more can possess the same drug at the same time.” Id. at 136. In
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that case, the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that contraband and items of drug paraphernalia discovered in the shared bedroom of a married couple were in the constructive possession of both spouses. The Supreme Court held that “constructive possession can be found in one defendant when both the husband and wife have equal access to an area where the illegal substance or contraband is found.” Id. at 135.
The Supreme Court thereafter clarified that “even absent a marital relationship[,] constructive possession may be found in either or both actors if contraband is found in an area of joint control and equal access.” Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 510 Pa. 305, 507 A.2d 1212, 1214 (1986). In Mudrick, the Supreme Court found that the jury could find that cocaine found in a bedroom shared by two occupants was in an area of joint control and equal access to both individuals. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Aviles, 419 Pa.Super. 345, 615 A.2d 398 (1992) (en banc) (concluding there was sufficient evidence to show that the appellant constructively possessed cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and large amounts of cash openly accessible to her in two bedrooms she had rented out to her sister and brother-in- law as the appellant had access to the unlocked bedrooms and there was no evidence that appellant was denied entry to these rooms in her home).
Commonwealth v. Smith, 317 A.3d 1053, 1059-60 (Pa.Super. 2024).
Here, our review of the record demonstrates that the Commonwealth
presented sufficient evidence that Brooks constructively possessed the
controlled substances. The evidence established that Brooks and Johnston
were the only adults residing in the home and nobody else was present when
the police officers executed the search. Brooks readily admitted that she lived
at the residence with Johnston for approximately two years and that she was
aware that Johnston was selling narcotics out of the home. The items seized
were from common areas of the residence, which Brooks had equal access to.
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Indeed, some of the contraband was in plain view. Although Brooks testified
that she did not know the location or amount of the contraband, the jury as
factfinder was within its right to assess credibility and believe all, part, or none
of her testimony. Miller, 172 A.3d at 640. We agree that the evidence was
sufficient to establish that Brooks constructively possessed the controlled
substances. Hopkins, 67 A.3d at 820.
Having found that Brooks possessed the controlled substances, we next
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Brooks on the
second element of PWID – intent to deliver. To determine if there was
sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of intent to deliver, courts may
consider various factors. First, “the intent to deliver may be inferred from
possession of a large quantity of controlled substance.” Commonwealth v.
Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 39 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted). Also
relevant are “the manner in which the controlled substance was packaged, the
behavior of the defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and large[]
sums of cash found in possession of the defendant.” Commonwealth v.
Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237-38 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). Another
factor that may be considered is expert testimony. Taylor, 33 A.3d at 1288.
“Expert opinion testimony is admissible concerning whether the facts
surrounding the possession of controlled substances are consistent with an
intent to deliver rather than with an intent to possess it for personal use.” Id.
(citation omitted). We consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing
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whether a defendant possessed controlled substances with the intent to
deliver. Id. at 1289.
Here, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s conclusion that Brooks possessed the controlled substances with the
intent to deliver them. The items seized from Brooks’s residence included,
inter alia, baggies containing approximately 188.69 grams of cocaine; a scale,
sandwich baggies, and latex gloves in close proximity to the cocaine; and
$6,094 in cash in the recliner. Detective Holland, who was qualified as an
expert in the field of drug trafficking, testified that these items were indicative
of possession with intent to deliver. N.T. at 124-28. Detective Holland pointed
out that the amount of cocaine found in the residence was “an extremely large
amount of cocaine or crack cocaine to have on hand,” and had an estimated
street value of $7,000 to $14,000. Id. at 124, 127. Detective Holland opined
that, based upon his education, training, and experience, he was “[a] hundred
percent” certain that the controlled substances were used for distribution and
not for personal use. Id. at 128-29. He testified that “in [his] entire lifetime,”
he “never heard of somebody using seven ounces of cocaine” for their personal
use and he deals with people who have drug addictions on a daily basis. Id.
at 131. Based on the totality of the circumstances and viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain Brooks’s convictions
for possession and PWID.
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Brooks’s second issue challenges the admissibility of the envelope
containing the $6,094 in cash. Brooks argues that on cross-examination,
Trooper Smolleck testified that he and his corporal signed and sealed the
evidence bag containing the envelope with the $6,094 on October 15, 2019,
the day that the search warrant was executed. Defense counsel pointed out,
and Trooper Smolleck agreed, that two additional signatures appeared on the
evidence bag containing the envelope on September 2, 2020. Brooks argues
that Trooper Smolleck “had no explanation as to why there were two other
signatures and more importantly could not confirm whether any money was
removed, taken out and replaced, or even how much money was in the
evidence envelope at trial.” Brooks’s Br. at 13-14. Brooks emphasizes that the
Commonwealth used the amount of $6,094 seized in the search to support
the offense of PWID since it was a large amount of cash. According to Brooks,
“[t]he money was never removed and re-counted by the Commonwealth
and/or [Trooper Smolleck] during trial, even after testimony revealed that the
evidence envelope had been opened after it was originally sealed by [Trooper
Smolleck] on October 15, 2019.” Id. at 14.
The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and
will only be reversed where there is an abuse of that discretion. See
Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 451 (Pa.Super. 2018). An abuse
of discretion exists where the court overrides or misapplies the law or
exercises judgment in a way “that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
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bias, prejudice, ill will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Here, the trial court found that the evidence’s probative value was not
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence. Trial Ct. Op. at 11 (citing Pa.R.E. 403). The court determined that
the admission of the envelope containing the $6,094 “simply corroborated the
testimony provided by multiple witnesses[.]” Id.
Brooks’s argument on this issue is unclear and underdeveloped. Her
brief does not specify the legal rule that she contends the admission of the
envelope violated. Nor does she offer any citation to any legal authority in this
part of the argument section of her brief. See Commonwealth v. Lonon,
No. 1498 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 94197, at *2 (Pa.Super. filed Jan. 9, 2020)
(unpublished mem.) (citing Commonwealth v. Spotz, 716 A.2d 580, 585
n.5 (Pa. 1998)) (explaining that undeveloped or unclear arguments are
waived). In any event, we agree with the trial court that it did not abuse its
discretion in finding no Rule 403 violation. To the extent Brooks’s brief can be
read as asserting a lack of authentication, the issue is likewise meritless.
Detective Smolleck testified that $6,094 in cash was recovered from the
recliner and he and the other troopers logged the money into an inventory
sheet and placed it into an envelope on the night of the search. N.T. at 48-49,
73-75.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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DATE: 11/13/2025
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