Com. v. Brandt, Z.

2025 Pa. Super. 113

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 2173 EDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-S14003-25 2025 PA Super 113

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ZACHARY THOMAS BRANDT : : Appellant : No. 2173 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0007019-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2025

Zachary Thomas Brandt (“Appellant”) appeals from the Judgment of

Sentence entered on July 18, 2024, in the Montgomery County Court of

Common Pleas, of 54 months to 120 months of incarceration after a jury found

him guilty of, inter alia, Rape.1 He challenges the denial of his Motion to

Dismiss filed pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. After careful review, we affirm.

We glean the following procedural history from the certified record,

including the trial court’s opinion. See Tr. Ct. Op., dated 10/28/24.2 On

October 27, 2021, the Commonwealth charged and arrested Appellant with

one count each of Rape and Sexual Assault, and two counts each of ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(3) (Rape of an unconscious individual).

2 As the facts underlying Appellant’s convictions are immaterial to the issue

raised in this appeal, we provide only the relevant procedural history. J-S14003-25

Aggravated Indecent Assault and Indecent Assault.3 Appellant immediately

posted bail on October 28, 2021. The court scheduled his preliminary hearing

for November 8, 2021, but sua sponte continued it to November 29, 2021.

On November 29, 2021, Appellant waived his preliminary hearing, and the

magisterial district court transferred the case to the Montgomery County Court

of Common Pleas on December 27, 2021. On January 11, 2022, Appellant’s

counsel, Timothy Woodward, Esq., entered his appearance and Appellant

waived his formal arraignment.

The Commonwealth filed the criminal information on June 2, 2022.

“That same day, the Commonwealth also emailed discovery to [A]ttorney

Woodward at tw@timwoodwardlaw.com. The Commonwealth received no

indication that the email had not been delivered.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 9, citing N.T.

Motion, 10/16/23, at 96.

On January 11, 2023, the court administrator’s office issued a notice

scheduling the matter for a pre-trial conference on February 13, 2023.

Around that same time, Deputy District Attorney Brianna Ringwood, the chief of professional standards for the District Attorney’s Office, was conducting case reviews with the assistant district attorney then assigned to this case, Emily D’Aguanno, and both noticed that a set of photographs and a toxicology report were not in the District Attorney’s file. DDA Ringwood responded by sending an email to [A]ttorney Woodward on January 30, 2023, that, inter alia, asked him to confirm he previously had received the discovery emailed back in June 2022 and informed him that

____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(3), 3124.1, 3125(a)(1), 3125(a)(4), 3126(a)(4), and

3126(a)(1), respectively.

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certain photographs and a toxicology report not included in the initial discovery had been requested from the Pennsylvania State Police. DDA Ringwood sent the email to the tw@timwoodwardlaw.com address and received no “bounceback” email indicating it had not been delivered.

The following day, DDA Ringwood recalled that she previously had emailed with [A]ttorney Woodward using a different email address, which was identified as timwoodwardlaw@me.com. DDA Ringwood then re-sent her January 31 email to the @me address. She received a reply from [A]ttorney Woodward through the @me address on February 1, 2023, indicating he had not received any discovery. DDA Ringwood responded by instructing a member of the District Attorney’s Office to forward discovery to [A]ttorney Woodward at the @me address.6

6 Attorney Woodward testified that he previously had used the email address to which the District Attorney’s Office originally sent discovery [but h]e could not recall specifically when he switched to the @me address, but believed it was “sometime around COVID.” He further testified that during his active representation of defendant, he had not requested discovery from the Commonwealth.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 10 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).

On February 6, 2023, Thomas C. Egan, III, Esq., entered his appearance

as Appellant’s co-counsel. On February 13, 2023, at the pre-trial conference,

Appellant requested a continuance. 4 “The court also ordered that day that all

4 At that pre-trial conference, following Appellant’s request for a continuance,

Appellant signed, at the behest of the court, a waiver of his Rule 600 rights. Based on our review of the record, and the fact that the Commonwealth did not raise this waiver at the Rule 600 hearing, we conclude the waiver pertained only to the period between the court’s granting of Appellant’s request for a continuance on February 13, 2023, and the next court date, April 26, 2023. Commonwealth v. Brown, 875 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2005)(concluding that there are no formal requirements for a Rule 600 waiver if the record indicates it was an informed and voluntary decision of the (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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discovery be passed to [A]ttorney Egan. The Commonwealth forwarded

discovery to [A]ttorney Egan on March 15, 2023.” Id.

A second [Pre-trial Conference] occurred on April 26, 2023, at which time the case was placed on the court’s Call of the Trial List (“COTL”). Court administration subsequently issued a notice on August 8, 2023, scheduling the case for a COTL on August 29, 2023.

Id. at 11.

On August 18, 2023, Appellant filed a Rule 600 Motion to Dismiss. On

September 21, 2023, Appellant filed another Rule 600 Motion. On September

26, 2023, and October 16, 2023, the court held a hearing on Appellant’s

motions to dismiss, at which the Montgomery County Deputy Court

Administrator, Lauren Heron, “testified credibly” about the extensive backlog

of cases that existed after Appellant’s case arrived from the Municipal Court

on December 27, 2021, which was a result of the court’s COVID-19 emergency

shutdown. She also testified about the court administration’s methodical

protocol for progressing through the backlog and the manner in which it

scheduled pre-trial conferences. She noted that because Appellant was never

in custody, the court clerk put his case on “the no incarcerated list, which we

run docket by docket number, oldest docket number to newest docket

number.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 7 (quoting N.T., 10/16/23, at 20-22). In addition,

Deputy District Attorney Thomas W. McGoldrick “testified credibly that once ____________________________________________

defendant and noting “the Commonwealth has the burden of establishing any [Rule 600] waiver.”) (citation omitted)).

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staff were permitted to return to the courthouse, they were faced with a

‘mountain of cases to deal with, much more than usual.’” Tr. Ct. Op. at 11,

quoting N.T. Motion, 9/25/23, at 63. Mr. McGoldrick further testified that

“[a]lthough . . . the existence of this case was after the pandemic, the problem

caused by the pandemic was still there while this case existed. The backlog

that was created, we’re still dealing with it. It hasn’t gone away . . . the

backlog caused by the pandemic was unprecedented and it was enormous and

we have been chipping away at it since we were allowed back into the court

house.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 11-12 (quoting N.T. “Motion,” at 76-78).

Following the hearing, the court granted the parties 15 days to file briefs

and thereafter continued its disposition of the Rule 600 motions. On

November 27, 2023, the court denied the motions.

On April 15, 2024, the case proceeded to trial after which the jury found

Appellant guilty of the above charges. The court sentenced him to 54 to 120

months’ incarceration followed by three years’ probation for the Rape

conviction.5 Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal and both he and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following question for our disposition:

5 The remaining convictions merged with the Rape conviction for purposes of

sentencing.

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Did the lower court err in denying defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 where the Commonwealth failed to establish its due diligence in bringing defendant’s case to trial?

Appellant’s Br. at 3.

We review the denial of motions seeking dismissal based on a violation

of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Robbins,

900 A.2d 413, 415 (Pa. Super. 2006). “An abuse of discretion is not merely

an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or

misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result

of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record,

discretion is abused.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 486 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (citation omitted).

Our scope of review “is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule

600 evidentiary hearing and the findings of the trial court.” Id. (alterations

and citation omitted). Additionally, we “must view the facts in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party.” Id. (citation omitted).

Rule 600 requires the Commonwealth to bring a defendant to trial within

365 days of the filing of the criminal complaint. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a);

Commonwealth v. Lear, 325 A.3d 552, 560 (Pa. 2024).

Rule 600 has the dual purpose of both protecting a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights and protecting society's right to effective prosecution in criminal cases. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.

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Commonwealth v. Graves, 328 A.3d 1005, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2024),

reargument denied (Jan. 31, 2025) (citation omitted). Significantly, “the

administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate the

criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the

Commonwealth.” Thompson, 93 A.3d at 486-87 (citation omitted). Thus,

“[s]o long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth

in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule

600 must be construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to punish

and deter crime.” Id. at 486 (citation omitted).

Where a defendant is not brought to trial within that 365-day period, a

defendant may seek dismissal of the charges. “[T]o obtain relief, a defendant

must have a valid Rule 600 claim at the time he files his motion to dismiss the

charges.” Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1189 (Pa. Super.

2005).

The first step in conducting a Rule 600 analysis is to calculate the

“mechanical run date.” Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Pa.

Super. 2003). “The mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must

commence under Rule 600. It is calculated by adding 365 days ... to the date

on which the criminal complaint is filed.” Id. (citation omitted). If a defendant

is not brought to trial until after the mechanical run date, and files a Rule 600

motion to dismiss, “the court must assess whether there is excludable time

and/or excusable delay.” Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1241

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

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Rule 600(C) provides that “periods of delay at any stage of the

proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has

failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the

time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be

excused from the computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis added).

When delays are not caused by the Commonwealth, those periods of time,

known as “excludable” periods, are added to the “mechanical run date” to

produce the “adjusted run date.” Lear, 325 A.3d at 560 (citation omitted).

The adjusted run date provides “the deadline for the Commonwealth to bring

the defendant to trial under Rule 600.” Id. “[T]ime attributable to the normal

progression of the case simply is not ‘delay’ for purposes of Rule 600[] and,

thus, counts toward the 365-day deadline.” Commonwealth v. Walker, 331

A.3d 43, 47 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citing Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d

323, 325 (Pa. 2017) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

To determine whether delays are excludable from the Rule 600

calculation, the rule requires that the cause of the delay must first be

determined before courts may consider whether the Commonwealth acted

with due diligence throughout the life of the case. Walker, 331 A.3d at 46.

“[I]t is only when the Commonwealth both caused the delay and lacked due

diligence that the delay is properly included in the Rule 600 calculation.” Lear,

325 A.3d at 560 n.7.

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“Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care,

but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been

put forth.” Walker, 331 A.3d at 46 (citation omitted).

With respect to delays caused by court congestion, a “limited exception

to the general rule” applies in cases involving certain “judicial delay.” Lear,

325 A.3d at 561. Where delay occurs because of a single judge’s scheduling

conflicts, the Commonwealth must demonstrate “that it complied with the due

diligence requirements of Rule 600 at all relevant periods throughout the life

of the case.” Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 603 (Pa. 2021).

However, where the cause of the delay is attributable to matters outside the

Commonwealth’s control, such as court closures during a pandemic as well as

other “medical-, weather-, and security-related emergencies,” Lear provides

that these delays constitute “other periods of delay” for which the

Commonwealth does not need to prove due diligence. Lear, 325 at 563 n.9.

The Lear Court found delays attributable to the pandemic to be excludable

time because “[n]o amount of due diligence on the part of the

Commonwealth could have possibly hastened [the defendant]’s trial

date.” Id. (emphasis added). “In other words, when delays occur as a result

of circumstances outside of the Commonwealth’s control, those delays are

excludable from the Rule 600 calculation.” Walker, 331 A.3d at 47.

Appellant argues that because the Commonwealth filed its criminal

complaint in October 2021, three months after the courts fully opened

following its emergency shutdown due to the pandemic, the trial court erred

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in relying on the COVID-19 backlog to deny his Rule 600 motion. Appellant’s

Br. at 22-23. After discussing the facts of Graves, supra, Appellant argues

that the Commonwealth “had an affirmative duty to make efforts to schedule

the trial before October 27, 2022,” and the record is “devoid of any evidence”

that the Commonwealth attempted to contact court administration to request

a court date. Appellant’s Br. at 22-23 (citing Commonwealth v. Hawk, 597

A.2d 1141 (Pa. 1991). Appellant also contends that the fact that he did not

receive full discovery until March 15, 2023, shows the Commonwealth failed

to act with due diligence. Id. at 23-25. He concludes that “[p]ursuant to

Graves, supra, the Commonwealth simply failed to establish its due

diligence” and, therefore, “[c]ourt delays attributable to the COVID-19 backlog

should not have been considered and defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant

to Rule 600 should have been granted.” Id. at 25.

Appellant’s reliance on Graves is misplaced. In Graves, the

Commonwealth filed the appellant’s criminal complaint after the courts had

reopened following the pandemic. Numerous delays occurred and Graves filed

a Rule 600 motion. After a hearing, the court granted the motion and

dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed,

concluding that, based on the evidence presented at the hearing on the

motion, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. The

evidence presented at the Graves hearing pertained to delays which included

time between the filing of the criminal complaint and the defendant’s arrest,

continuation of the preliminary hearing after a police detective failed to

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appear, and whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in obtaining

and providing discovery to the defendant. See Graves, 328 A.3d at 1009-

1012. Significantly, the Graves case did not include any evidence of delay

caused by an administrative backlog redounding from the pandemic. 6

In Appellant’s case, however, the trial court heard extensive evidence

from the Montgomery County Deputy Court Administrator about the significant

backlog of cases caused by the shutdown of the courts in Montgomery County

due to the pandemic, how it scheduled cases after the pandemic in order to

address its extensive backlog, how court administration generally prioritized

cases for preliminary hearings, the lack of judges available to address the

cases on backlog and the subsequent impact that shortfall had on scheduling

all cases for pre-trial conferences and trials, and the court administrator’s

inability to accommodate every possible request for an earlier listing. See

N.T. Motion, 10/16/23, at 16-24. These facts distinguish Appellant’s case

from Graves and, thus, we conclude Graves is inapposite.

In addressing Appellant’s arguments, the trial court opined that,

following Lear, supra, Appellant’s assertion that “the Commonwealth did not

act with due diligence, is now moot[.]” Tr. Ct. Op. at 6. The court explained

6 The Graves court also concluded that the period between the date the court

scheduled the trial (two months prior to adjusted run date) and the trial date (which was two months after the adjusted run date) would not be excluded because the evidence “failed to demonstrate” that the Commonwealth “complied with the due diligence requirements of Rule 600 at all relevant periods throughout the life of the case.” 328 A.3d at 1011-1012 (quoting Harth, 252 A.3d at 603).

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that “while the criminal complaint in this case was filed on October 27, 2021,

after the courthouse had fully reopened in July 2021, the prior ‘court-wide

shutdown’ precipitated by the pandemic, which was followed by a ‘court-wide

slowdown[,]’ caused the delay in bringing defendant to trial.” Id. (quoting

Lear, 325 A.3d at 563). The court concluded that the evidence presented at

the hearing on the Rule 600 motion “supports the conclusion that the court-

wide scheduling backlog in existence from the time this case arrived in this

court was the cause of defendant not being brought to trial as of the filing of

his Rule 600 motion.” Tr. Ct. Op. at 8.

In addition, the trial court concluded that “against the backdrop” of the

court’s administrative backlog, the Commonwealth’s evidence demonstrated

that it exercised “reasonable diligence [ ] under the circumstances” in bringing

the case to trial. Tr. Ct. Op. at 11-13. Specifically, the court found that the

fact that “the discovery conveyed in June 2022 was emailed to an address no

longer used by defendant’s counsel does not demonstrate a lack of due

diligence on the part of the Commonwealth given that the address had been

used multiple times in the past and no ‘bounceback’ had been received.” Id.

at 13. The court also found that “no evidence from the [Rule 600] hearing

suggested . . . that the Commonwealth engaged in conduct at any point during

the life of this case designed to frustrate defendant’s speedy trial rights.” Id.

at 14.

Based on our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s

dismissal of Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. In light of Lear and the delays that

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were not caused by the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth’s diligence is not

a factor to be considered in calculating whether Appellant sustained a Rule

600 violation. Moreover, as explained below, we conclude that Appellant’s

Rule 600 motion was filed prematurely.

The Commonwealth filed its criminal complaint on October 27, 2021;

the mechanical run date for Appellant’s trial was, thus, October 27, 2022. The

delays discussed above, however, resulted in an adjusted run date

significantly beyond that date. Specifically, when the magisterial district court

sua sponte continued the preliminary hearing, the resulting 21-day delay

adjusted the run date to November 19, 2022. Following Appellant’s waiver of

his arraignment on January 11, 2022, there was a delay of 398 days before

the court scheduled a pre-trial conference. Based on the evidence presented

at the Rule 600 hearing, which the trial court found credible, this delay was

not caused by the Commonwealth. As a result, pursuant to Lear and Walker,

that 398 days is excludable and the adjusted run date, thus, became

December 22, 2023. Accordingly, Appellant’s Rule 600 Motions filed on

August 18, 2023, and September 21, 2023, were premature.

Having found the trial court properly exercised its discretion in

dismissing Appellant’s Rule 600 motion, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 5/29/2025

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