Com. v. Bradley, R.
Opinion
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
RONNIE BRADLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 2219 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 11, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006748-2010
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 17, 2017 Appellant, Ronnie Bradley, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime.1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court accurately set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a); 903; 6106; 6108; 907, respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
SHOULD APPELLANT’S CONFESSION TO POLICE HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE APPELLANT SUFFERED FROM LIFELONG INTELLECTUAL DEFICITS?
WAS APPELLANT’S CHARACTER FOR BEING PEACEFUL AND NONVIOLENT IMPROPERLY IMPEACHED BY THE FACTS OF THE CRIMES AT ISSUE?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 26 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa.Super. 2005)).
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.
Williams, supra at 27 (quoting Jones, supra).
In determining whether a defendant’s waiver of his Miranda[2] rights is valid, a trial court must consider: (1)
whether the waiver was voluntary, in the sense that the waiver was not the result of governmental pressure; and (2) whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with full comprehension of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequence of that choice. The Commonwealth bears the burden of
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
establishing that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Factors to be considered in determining whether a waiver is valid and a confession is voluntary include: the duration and means of interrogation; the defendant’s physical and psychological state; the conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude exhibited by the police during the interrogation;
and any other facts which may serve to drain one’s powers of resistance to suggestion and coercion.
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 625 Pa. 104, 139, 91 A.3d 55, 76 (2014), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1400, 191 L.Ed.2d 373 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Lillian Harris Ransom, we conclude Appellant’s first issue merits no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of that issue. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed August 3, 2016, at 8-10) (finding: testimony/evidence at suppression hearing showed police issued Appellant verbal Miranda warnings followed by seven questions to confirm his understanding of warnings; Appellant signed Miranda waiver in nine places and initialed document seven times; in addition to coherently responding to detective’s questions, Appellant identified photograph of his cohort, whom Appellant had named in his statement to police; when asked to review his statement before attesting to veracity of its contents, police asked Appellant to read several sentences from statement out loud so police officers knew Appellant could read; Appellant’s mother testified that Appellant received
mental health services from ten separate institutions, prior to date he gave statement to police, and was enrolled in special education classes from sixth grade until he stopped going to school in ninth grade; Appellant testified he was able to read and write at only fourth grade level at time he gave statement to police;3 Appellant introduced no other testimony/evidence to verify his reading level, intelligence, or mental health at time he gave statement to police; detective who took Appellant’s statement saw no signs of Appellant’s alleged diminished mental health/intellectual deficits at time of statement; Appellant might have some issues which led him to seek treatment in different mental health facilities, but his answers to questions posed by police were responsive, and his signatures throughout four-page statement established that Appellant’s Miranda-waiver and statement to police were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). Therefore, with respect to Appellant’s first issue, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
In his second issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth asked two of Appellant’s character witnesses inappropriate questions. Specifically, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth sought to impeach two of his character witnesses’ testimony by asking them if they would be surprised that police located a gun under Appellant’s bed in connection with the crimes charged,
3 In its findings of fact and conclusions of law issued at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court expressly stated it found Appellant’s testimony incredible. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 4/8/14, at 34-35.)
that Appellant admitted ownership of the gun to police, and that police arrested Appellant for murder. Appellant claims these questions were improper because the Commonwealth can impeach a defense character witness’ testimony only with the witness’ knowledge of acts Appellant committed prior to commission of the offenses at issue. Appellant maintains defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s questions but the court overruled the objections. Appellant insists the court’s rulings do not constitute harmless error because evidence of good character alone is enough to warrant a verdict of not guilty, particularly where Appellant argued that his cohort was responsible for Victim’s murder. Appellant concludes the court admitted improper impeachment testimony, and this Court must reverse and remand for a new trial. We disagree.
The standard of review of a trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence is well established and very narrow:
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the court’s decision on such a question absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
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