Com. v. Blunt, K.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: April 1, 2026
• Docket: 696 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Dubow

Opinion

J-S03010-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KEIRA ELOUISE BLUNT : : Appellant : No. 696 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 30, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-41-CR-0000688-2023

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: APRIL 1, 2026

Appellant, Keira (Kevin) Blunt,1 appeals from the January 30, 2024

judgment of sentence entered in the Lycoming County Court of Common

Pleas, following his conviction for Person not to Possess a Firearm and

Disorderly Conduct. Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence of five to ten years of incarceration. Appellant’s counsel, Howard

Gold, Esq., has filed an Anders2 Brief and an application to withdraw. After

careful consideration, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant

counsel’s application to withdraw.

This case arises from an incident on May 14, 2023, at the home of

Appellant and his wife, Serena Simmons, when Ms. Simmons’ son (Victim) ____________________________________________

1 At sentencing, Appellant was transitioning from female to male. Order, 1/30/24, at 2.

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). J-S03010-26

visited her for Mother’s Day. While Victim and his mother were talking on the

porch, Appellant initially argued with Ms. Simmons about Victim being at the

house. Later, Appellant again came out of the house and pulled a gun out of

his waistband, before cocking and pointing it at Victim, while yelling at him to

leave. After Victim left the house, police arrived and arrested Appellant.

At a November 17, 2023 jury trial, Victim testified to the events above,

and the Commonwealth presented a photograph obtained from a neighbor’s

video surveillance camera, allegedly depicting Appellant with a gun. A

responding police officer also testified to finding a loaded firearm on a couch

inside the front door of the house. The defense stipulated to Appellant being

a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. Appellant testified in his own

defense, admitting to having a difficult relationship with Ms. Simmons’ family,

but denied having a gun and pointing it at Victim. At the conclusion of trial,

the jury found Appellant guilty of Possession of Firearm Prohibited and

Disorderly Conduct.3

At the January 30, 2024 sentencing hearing, the court indicated its

receipt and awareness of Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation report

(“PSI”). At the hearing, the court heard from Appellant’s reverend, who

additionally submitted a letter in support of Appellant. The court also listened

to Victim’s aunt describe Victim’s trauma and “how [Appellant] and his conduct

tore the family apart.” Trial Ct. Op., 4/29/25, at 4.

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3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 5503(a) respectively.

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The court recognized that Appellant “apologized to the community and

the family[,]” claimed “that he never had any opportunities for treatment”

despite being in “jails and institutions since even before he was 18 years old,”

and alleged that the testosterone, taken while transitioning from female to

male, was “messing with his mind[.]” Id. at 4, 6-7. The court additionally

acknowledged a written statement by Appellant’s wife. Id. at 8.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of

five to ten years of incarceration for Person not to Possess a Firearm, graded

as second-degree felony because the firearm was loaded.4 The sentence was

in the mitigated range of the sentencing guidelines applicable to Appellant’s

offense gravity score (“OGS”) of 11 and prior record score (“PRS”) of 5, where

the standard range was 72-90 months, or 6 to 7.5 years, of incarceration.5

The court explained that the sentence of 5 to 10 years of incarceration

was dictated by the combination of the statutory requirement that the

minimum sentence “not exceed one-half of the maximum sentence” and the

4 The court imposed no further penalty for Disorderly Conduct but included a

one-year reentry supervision sentence pursuant to 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137.2(a). The court imposed the sentence consecutively to a revocation of parole sentence, which is not subject to this appeal.

5 While Appellant does not dispute the calculation of an OGS of 11, we observe

that the Sentencing Guidelines provide an OGS of 10 for a violation of Section 6105(a)(1), graded as a second-degree felony involving a loaded weapon. 204 Pa. Code § 303.15. Based on an OGS of 10 and a PRS of 5, the standard range would have been 5 to 6 years of incarceration. Id. at § 303.16(a). Under this calculation, Appellant’s sentence of 5 to 10 years would have been in the standard rather than mitigated range, a distinction which does not alter our analysis in this appeal as discussed infra.

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ten-year statutory maximum sentence for second-degree felonies.6 Trial Ct.

Op. at 7; see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b)(1) (addressing minimum sentences), 18

Pa.C.S. § 1103(2) (providing statutory maximum of ten years for second-

degree felony).

Following reinstatement of his right to file a post-sentence motion and

an appeal, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, challenging solely the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. In denying the post-sentence motion,

the court asserted that it had “properly weighed and considered all relevant

factors” in imposing the sentence. Trial Ct. Op. at 5. The court recounted

that the PSI indicated that Appellant “had behavioral issues as a child which

resulted in re-homing through detention centers, group homes, and other

hospitals[,]” had been “expelled from school for fighting[,] and had been on

his own since he was 17 years of age.” Id. at 6. The court noted that

Appellant had outbursts and expressed anger at trial and sentencing, including

against police and his attorney. Id. The court found that Appellant’s anger

issues were not solely due to his taking testosterone, as he “had behavioral

issues since childhood.” Id. at 6-7. The court summarized its reasons for

imposing the sentence:

The [c]ourt found that the amount of confinement was consistent with the need to protect the public from individuals brandishing a gun in that manner along with his past criminal history, the fact that he was on supervision at the time, how serious what he did ____________________________________________

6 Specifically, because the statutory maximum sentence was 10 years, the court recognized that it “could not impose a minimum sentence more than five years or 60 months[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 7.

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that day was and the impact on the one victim as was discussed at the time of the hearing.

Id. at 8.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b). In its brief Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the court relied upon its April

29, 2025 opinion denying post-sentence motions.

Appellant presents the following issue on appeal:

Whether the [s]entencing [c]ourt abused its discretion in sentencing the Appellant to a period of incarceration, specifically five to ten years, when the Appellant provided and argued mitigating factors?

Anders Br. at 7.

As a preliminary matter, we address Attorney Gold’s request to withdraw

as counsel, as in such cases we “may not review the merits of the underlying

issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v.

Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In order for counsel to withdraw from an appeal pursuant to Anders,

counsel must comply with the following requirements:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

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We conclude that counsel satisfied these requirements in his brief to this

Court. Attorney Gold additionally confirms that he sent Appellant a copy of

the Anders brief and his petition to withdraw, as well as a letter informing

Appellant of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, and to raise any

additional points with this Court. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873

A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2005) (describing notice requirements). Appellant

has not responded to counsel’s Anders brief or his motion to withdraw.

As counsel satisfied the stated requirements, we will address the

substantive issue raised in the Anders brief. Subsequently, we must “make

a full examination of the proceedings and make an independent judgment to

decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at

355 n.5 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d

1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (noting Anders requires the

appellate court to “review ‘the case’ as presented in the entire record with

consideration first of issues raised by counsel”).

As noted, Appellant seeks to challenge the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentence are not

appealable as of right. Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa.

Super. 2015). Rather, we must determine if Appellant invoked our

jurisdiction, which requires us to consider (1) whether Appellant filed a timely

notice of appeal; (2) whether Appellant preserved the issue at sentencing or

in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) “whether Appellant’s brief

includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of

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appeal” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) “whether the concise

statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under

the [S]entencing [C]ode.” Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722,

725 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

We recognize that Appellant timely appealed, preserved his sentencing

challenge in his post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement

in the Anders brief. Accordingly, we consider whether he has presented a

substantial question for our review.

“A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellant contends that he is asserting a substantial question because

the sentencing court failed to consider fully his rehabilitative needs or his

mitigation evidence, in violation of the Sentencing Code. Anders Br. at 13-

16. We conclude that Appellant has not asserted a substantial question. As

we have repeatedly held, “a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating

factors does not raise a substantial question[.]” Commonwealth v.

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Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1233 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).7

Similarly, in the absence of an excessive sentence claim, “a claim that the trial

court failed to consider an appellant’s rehabilitative needs fails to raise a

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citation omitted).8 More broadly, “we have held that a claim

that a court did not weigh the factors as an appellant wishes does not raise a

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa.

Super. 2014). Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to address Appellant’s

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.9

Moreover, even if Appellant could have framed a substantial question

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence, we would conclude that

Appellant’s claim would fail on the merits. With respect to sentences within

the sentencing guidelines, Section 9781(c) instructs that an appellate court

7 We recognize, however, that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction

with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1096 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). Appellant has not raised an excessive sentence claim in this case.

8 But see Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770 (recognizing that a claim for failure to

consider rehabilitative needs in conjunction with an excessive sentence claim raises a substantial question).

9 As noted supra, it appears that the court and the parties miscalculated Appellant’s OGS. We recognize that “an allegation that the trial court inappropriately calculated the offense gravity score raises a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Troell, 290 A.3d 296, 299 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). We conclude, however, that Appellant waived this specific challenge by failing to preserve it in his post-sentence motion.

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should affirm the sentence imposed unless it finds that “the case involves

circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly

unreasonable[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2). Where, as here, a PSI report

exists, we presume “that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Finally, we

defer to the sentencing court’s assessment of the sentencing factors as it is

“in the best position to measure factors such as the nature of the crime, the

defendant’s character, and the defendant’s display of remorse, defiance, or

indifference.” Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 696 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citation omitted).

As set forth above, the sentencing court provided ample reasoning

supporting a sentence of five to ten years of incarceration, after it reviewed

Appellant’s PSI and listened to the statements provided at the sentencing

hearing. Furthermore, following our independent review, we discern no

meritorious issues to be raised on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's

judgment of sentence.

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Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw as counsel

granted.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 4/1/2026

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