Com. v. Blenker, B.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 17, 2026
• Docket: 845 WDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Olson

Opinion

J-A06010-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : BRITTANY MICHEL BLENKER : : Appellant : No. 845 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 24, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-56-CR-0000742-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: March 17, 2026

Appellant, Brittany Michel Blenker, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on March 24, 2025, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s

post-sentence motion on June 2, 2025. On this direct appeal, Appellant’s

counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and an accompanying brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth

v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude that Appellant’s counsel

has complied with the procedural requirements necessary to withdraw.

Moreover, after independently reviewing the record, we conclude that the

appeal is wholly frivolous. We, therefore, grant counsel’s petition to withdraw

and affirm the judgment of sentence.

On December 30, 2024, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to

trafficking in individuals, possession of a controlled substance with the intent J-A06010-26

to deliver (“PWID”), and corruption of minors.1 On March 24, 2025, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 30 to 84 months in

prison for her convictions. The sentence was composed of the following: a

standard range sentence of 30 to 84 months in prison for the trafficking in

individuals conviction; a concurrent, standard range sentence of six to 48

months in prison for the PWID conviction; and, a concurrent, standard range

sentence of nine to 36 months in prison for the corruption of minors

conviction. See N.T. Sentencing, 3/24/25, at 6 and 11-12.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, where she claimed that

her sentence was manifestly excessive because: 1) “the record does not

reflect that [Appellant] was ever specifically caught or found to be in

possession of a specific quantity of illegal drugs;” 2) Appellant “had a very

limited prior record;” 3) Appellant was “also a ‘trafficking’ victim” of her

co-defendants; 4) Appellant was “post-partum, having been pregnant and

delivered [while] incarcerated;” and, 5) Appellant suffers from “depression,

anxiety, and PTSD.” Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 4/3/25, at 2-3.

The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on June 2, 2025

and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Further, on appeal, Appellant’s

counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and an Anders brief.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3011(a)(3), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i), respectively.

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Before reviewing the merits of this appeal, this Court must first

determine whether counsel has fulfilled the necessary procedural

requirements for withdrawing as counsel. Commonwealth v. Miller, 715

A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

To withdraw under Anders, counsel must satisfy certain technical

requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for leave to withdraw

stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel

has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” Miller, 715 A.2d at 1207.

Second, counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel:

(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state[s] counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the Anders brief to his or her

client and advise the client “of [the client’s] right to retain new counsel,

proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.”

Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2007).

If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal

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is in fact wholly frivolous.” Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5; see also

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc) (holding that the Anders procedure requires this Court to review “the

entire record with consideration first of the issues raised by counsel. . . .

[T]his review does not require this Court to act as counsel or otherwise

advocate on behalf of a party. Rather, it requires us only to conduct a review

of the record to ascertain if[,] on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that

counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated. We need not analyze those

issues of arguable merit; just identify them, deny the motion to withdraw, and

order counsel to analyze them”). It is only when all of the procedural and

substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be permitted to

withdraw.

In the case at bar, counsel complied with all of the above procedural

obligations. We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze whether

this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Our analysis begins with the claim

raised in the Anders brief:

[The trial court] abused its discretion in sentencing [Appellant] to incarceration of [30 to 84 months in prison] rather than the guidelines standard range minimum of [18 months].

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.

Appellant's claim on appeal challenges the discretionary aspects of her

sentence. “[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, whose judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

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discretion.” Commonwealth v. Ritchey, 779 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super.

2001). Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to

appeal the discretionary aspects of her sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the

discretionary aspects of her sentence. Id.

As this Court explained:

[t]o reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902, 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).

Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it

sentenced her at the “high end” of the standard sentencing range for her

trafficking in individuals conviction. According to Appellant, the trial court

erroneously failed to consider several mitigating factors and thus imposed a

manifestly excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-12.

As to this claim, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, raised the

claim in her post-sentence motion, and properly included a Rule 2119(f)

statement in her brief. Therefore, we turn to the issue of whether Appellant’s

claim raises a substantial question.

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Generally, to raise a substantial question, an appellant must “advance

a colorable argument that the trial judge's actions were: (1) inconsistent with

a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McKiel,

629 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748

A.2d 721, 726 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc). Additionally, in determining

whether an appellant has raised a substantial question, we must limit our

review to Appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement. Goggins, 748 A.2d at 726.

This limitation ensures that our inquiry remains “focus[ed] on the reasons for

which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal,

which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.” Id. at 727

(emphasis omitted).

Appellant contends that her aggregate sentence is excessive because

the trial court failed to consider certain mitigating circumstances. Under our

precedent, Appellant's claim presents a substantial question, thus permitting

our review. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (“an excessive sentence claim – in conjunction with an assertion

that the court failed to consider mitigating factors – raises a substantial

question”); Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(holding: a claim that the appellant’s sentence was unduly excessive,

“together with his claim that the court failed to consider his rehabilitative

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needs and mitigating factors upon fashioning its sentence, presents a

substantial question”).2

We have explained:

sentencing is vested in the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion involves a sentence which was manifestly unreasonable, or which resulted from partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. It is more than just an error in judgment.

Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Appellant claims that the trial court failed to adequately consider several

mitigating circumstances when imposing sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at

8-12. Appellant’s discretionary aspect of sentencing claim fails immediately

because, during Appellant's sentencing hearing, the trial court was informed

by a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report. See N.T. Sentencing, 3/24/25,

at 5. Given this fact, we must “presume that the sentencing judge was aware

of relevant information regarding [Appellant's] character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

2 We note that we have also “held on numerous occasions that a claim of inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Eline, 940 A.2d 421, 435 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quotations, citations, and corrections omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 469 (Pa. Super. 2018) (collecting cases). Nevertheless, in light of our conflicting precedent, we will review the merits of Appellant's discretionary aspects of sentencing claim.

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Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). To be sure, our Supreme Court has

held:

A [PSI] report constitutes the record and speaks for itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that [sentencing courts] are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any extended or systematic definitions of their punishment procedure. Having been fully informed by the [PSI] report, the sentencing court's discretion should not be disturbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that the weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at hand.

Id.

Further, as the trial court explained at sentencing:

The reasons for these sentences are that they fall within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines and comport with the stipulations of counsel reached at the plea hearing.

Additionally, [Appellant] supplied a highly addictive and dangerous illegal controlled substance to a minor child for her and others to use to their advantage in order to entice the minor to be subjected to various forms of labor and servitude as well as to engage in sexual activity.

N.T. Sentencing, 3/24/25, at 13.

We thus conclude that Appellant’s excessive sentencing claim is belied

by the record and frivolous.

We have independently considered the issue raised within Appellant’s

brief and we have determined that the claim is frivolous. In addition, after an

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independent review of the entire record, we see nothing that might arguably

support this appeal. The appeal is therefore wholly frivolous. Accordingly, we

affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition for leave

to withdraw.

Petition for leave to withdraw appearance granted. Judgment of

sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 03/17/2026

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