NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
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v. :
:
:
GARY BLEDSOE :
:
Appellant : No. 902 EDA 2025 :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006826-2023
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 25, 2026 Appellant, Gary Bledsoe, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on his bench trial convictions of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, persons not to possess a firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia, possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”), simple assault and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”). 1 Appellant argues that surveillance video evidence was not properly authenticated at trial, the evidence of criminal conspiracy was insufficient and
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
118 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(1), 903, 6105, 6106, 6108, 907(a), 2701(a) and 2705, respectively.
the evidence of his criminal intent with respect to four of his convictions was insufficient. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
The trial court summarized the evidence admitted at trial as follows:
[…] the Commonwealth first presented the testimony of Tari Turner-Keys. Ms. Turner-Keys testified that, on June 24, 2023 at approximately 6:00 a.m., she was inside her residence on the 6000 block of Callowhill Street in Philadelphia, when detectives arrived to execute a search warrant. The detectives presented her with photographs/video screenshots of her niece, Natasha Robinson, and [Appellant], both of whom she positively identified.
Ms. Turner-Keys further testified that [Appellant] and Ms.
Robinson “are married,” and Ms. Robinson drove a white Nissan automobile.
Philadelphia Police Detective Devin Chadderton testified next for the Commonwealth. He testified that, on June 15, 2023 at approximately 9:00 p.m., he was assigned to investigate a shooting that evening at 52nd and Market Streets in Philadelphia.
Pursuant to his investigation, Detective Chadderton obtained surveillance videos from Real Time Crime cameras and adjacent businesses. Based on his review, he created a compilation of those videos, which were played at trial. The videos depicted multiple individuals firing gunshots at a black SUV.
Additionally, Detective Chadderton testified that as part of his specialized training,[] he extracted multiple text messages and images from cell phones, which he assembled into a detailed report. Detective Chadderton’s cell phone analysis, which was presented at trial, depicted multiple text messages from the device “owner” to and from a person named Gary, who was listed in the phone’s contacts as “My Husband.” Among other messages, on June 27, 2023 - two days after the shooting incident - the device owner texted “Gary”: “GM Stinkabutt ... I wanna run and get a Tunic to wear today.” In response, “Gary” texted, Don’t be doing no extra shit please we hot.”
In addition, the device owner sent and received multiple text messages from a contact identified as “Mommy.” Among other things, she texted “Mommy” about needing to talk with her “in person” about damage to her car. The same cell phone sent images depicting what appear[s] to be bullet hole damage to a
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white vehicle. Finally, the cell phone analysis depicted text conversations with “Aunt Tari” on June 16, 2023 – the day after the shooting – in which the owner states she is “waiting for them to come get my car so I can get a rental,” along with a message on July 1, 2023, in which she notes that “Gary said the detectives were around that way not too long ago.”
Next, the Commonwealth called Philadelphia Police Detective Mark Johnson to the stand[, who] testified that, on June 15, 2023 at approximately 9:56 p.m., he arrived at the 300 block of North 32nd Street in Philadelphia in response to a radio call. There, he encountered the complainant, Michael Rogers, who was inside a black Range Rover suffering from a gunshot wound to his arm;
the Range Rover had numerous bullet holes in its passenger side, as well as [through] its windshield and rear window. Detective Johnson took photographs of the Range Rover, which were presented at trial. The photos depicted four bullet holes in the windshield, including two where the driver’s head would be, several bullet holes in the passenger door and fender of the vehicle, and two additional holes in the rear window. Upon obtaining the complainant’s consent, Detective Johnson searched the vehicle, which yielded a projectile which he secured via property receipt. Detective Johnson noted that no firearm or fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”) were recovered from the vehicle.
Detective Johnson testified that, after interviewing the complainant, he proceeded to the scene of the shooting, namely, the north side of 5200 Market Street. There, he recovered 16 nine-
millimeter FCCs and one projectile, which he secured via property receipt. Detective Johnson noted that each of the 16 FCCs were recovered from the north sidewalk of Market Street, and none were found in the road. Detective Johnson took photographs of the scene and also drew a crime scene sketch, which depicted the relative locations of the FCCs and projectile.
Additionally, Detective Johnson testified that he personally recovered surveillance videos from two businesses at the scene, to wit, Rainbow Deli and Mart on Market. The videos, which were played at trial, depicted five individuals shooting at a black Range Rover, which sustained numerous bullet holes to its passenger side and windshield. Detective Johnson noted that it was the same Range Rover that he processed later that night. Among other things, the videos depicted a black male wearing a white shirt and black pants with the word “VERTEBRAE” — later identified as [Appellant] - retrieving a firearm from a white vehicle before
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immediately firing the first shots at the [black Range Rover]. The videos also depicted another male with foil in his hair, wearing a distinct tee shirt and black sneakers with white bottoms - later identified as Co-Defendant Rahmal Clark (“Co-Defendant”) - firing shots at the same vehicle.10 10 Appellant fired from the passenger side of the complainant’s vehicle while Co-Defendant fired from its front side. The videos further depicted a black female wearing a grey hijab (later identified as [Appellant’s] wife)
along with two others firing shots at the vehicle.
[Video screenshots depicting Appellant and Co-Defendant, respectively, firing gunshots at the black Range Rover are presented in the trial court’s written opinion on page 6, but omitted here.]
Finally, Detective Johnson testified that, upon reviewing the video evidence, he began to identify the shooters involved in the incident. Pursuant to those developments, on June 24, 2023, he executed a search warrant at 6225 Callowhill Street — i.e., Tari Turner-Keys’ residence. There, Detective Johnson presented Ms.
Turner-Keys with screenshots of [Appellant] and Ms. Robinson from the videos of the shooting. Ms. Turner-Keys positively identified both [Appellant] and Ms. Robinson, which she further endorsed with her signature. Following the positive identifications, Detective Johnson proceeded to search the residence, which yielded, inter alia, a nine-millimeter handgun from a duffle bag located in the living room.
Next, [Philadelphia Police Officer Dudley Woods testified that, on June 28, 2023, he was interviewed by police detectives. He positively identified Co-Defendant from a still image taken from the videos of the shooting. He testified that he was familiar with Co-Defendant from multiple encounters] over the preceding two years, including one within a few months of the identification.
Finally, prior to resting, the Commonwealth introduced stipulated evidence establishing that: (a) on June 30, 2023, Police Officer Glover arrested Co-Defendant; (b) neither [Appellant] nor Co-
Defendant were licensed to carry firearms at the time of the shooting; and (c) [Appellant] had a prior conviction which statutorily prohibited [him] from possessing a firearm at any time.
For his case-in-chief, [Appellant] testified […] that, on the evening of June 15, 2023, he and his wife, Ms. Robinson, were at 52nd
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and Market Streets because his wife wanted to “squash a beef”
with someone she had been arguing with. While there, [Appellant]
heard his thirteen-year-old cousin, Tajay, and two other girls saying “You a molester. Leave us alone” – referring to the individual in the black Range Rover. [Appellant] testified that he walked up to the Range Rover and said to the complainant, “[T]hey little girls, they 13. You don’t want to mess with them.”
According to [Appellant], the complainant said, “Mind your business. Let’s get it on,” and started reaching behind his seat for a gun. At that point, [Appellant] put his finger up in the air (as if to say, “wait a second”) and retreated to his wife’s white Nissan, but did not call the police. Instead, after claiming to hear gunshots ring out, [Appellant] emerged with an illegal firearm and started shooting at the complainant.11 11 [Appellant] also confirmed that he was the male in the video wearing the black pants with “VERTEBRAE” written on them. (See N.T. 10/17/24 at 13).
On cross-examination, [Appellant] admitted that he purchased the gun illegally on the street and that after the shooting, he gave the gun to his mother-in-law to “get rid of it.” [Appellant] also admitted that he had not simply “chanced upon” being present at 52nd and Market Streets but had been hanging out there with several other males, including Co-Defendant, for more than a halfhour prior to the shooting. He also testified that while he had known his cousin Tajay since she was three years old, he did not know her last name. Significantly, [Appellant] also admitted that the complainant “never threatened him” prior to the shooting.
[He] further admitted that, apart from his testimony a few minutes earlier, he had never previously stated that the complainant was reaching for a “gun.” Rather, [Appellant] had always maintained that the complainant was reaching for a “black object.” Finally, [Appellant] admitted texting “we hot” to his wife two days after the shooting, but claimed it had nothing to do with the shooting or the warrant out for his arrest.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/25, 1-9 (record citations omitted).
After the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, the trial court granted motions for judgment of acquittal on the charge of attempted murder for both Appellant and Co-Defendant. See N.T. Trial, 10/17/24, 4-11. After
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hearing all of the evidence, the court found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, PIC, simple assault, REAP and three firearms offenses. See id., 71. The court, thereafter, ordered a pre-sentence investigation and mental health evaluation and deferred sentencing. See id., 72. On December 20, 2024, the court imposed an aggregate term of nine to eighteen years’ imprisonment.2 See N.T. Trial, 12/20/24, 22. Appellant timely filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence. See Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 12/29/24. The court denied the motion by written order. See Order, 4/1/25.
Appellant filed a timely appeal. See Notice of Appeal, 4/1/25. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant complied. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Order, 4/2/25; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/28/25.
Appellant presents the following three issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting unauthenticated surveillance videos in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 and Commonwealth v. Clark, 305 A.3d 976 (Pa. Super. 2023).
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2 Specifically, the court imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment of nine to
eighteen years on the aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited convictions and also concurrent terms of probation of seven years for firearms not to be carried without a license, five years for each of carrying firearms on public streets in Philadelphia and PIC, and two years for REAP. See N.T. Trial, 12/20/24, 22. The court further found that the simple assault conviction merged into the aggravated assault conviction for sentencing purposes. See id.
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2. Whether the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that Appellant Gary Bledsoe committed the charged crimes or conspired with any other person.
3. Whether the Commonwealth failed to prove aggravated assault, conspiracy, simple assault, or [REAP] beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s Brief, 3 (suggested answers omitted).
Appellant's first issue challenges the admission of multiple surveillance camera videos. He posits that the Commonwealth failed to authenticate the surveillance videos because it failed to call any witness to “describe[] a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result,” citing Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901(b)(9).3 Appellant’s Brief, 14. He contends that a authentication of a surveillance video requires “testimony from a technician or other witness familiar with the operation of the surveillance system who can attest that the recording accurately depicts what it purports to show.” Id. Noting that the Commonwealth introduced “two critical surveillance recordings,” one facing east and the other west on the 5200 block of Market Street, he argues that neither of the detectives who recovered the videos were “a technician or custodian of those [surveillance] systems” and that with respect to the one
video from the camera facing east from the Rainbow Deli at 5215 Market
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3 Appellant changed his argument slightly from the drafting of the question presented and summary of argument in which he specifically cites to Clark. See Appellant’s Brief, 3, 10. In the body of his argument, he does not cite Clark, much less explain what persuasive value we should give this non- precedential decision. Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (defining a non-precedential decision and permitting citation to such “for their persuasive value”).
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Street, very little authenticating information was provided. Id., 14-15. Although, he continues by stating that the videos “depicted several individuals drawing weapons simultaneously—a fact that the trial court later relied upon to find conspiracy and to reject Appellant’s justification defense,” they were “inadmissible as a matter of law.”
“Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the court’s decision on such a question absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 768 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Cook, 231 A.3d 913, 919 (Pa. Super. 2020) (similar).
“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by law.” Pa.R.E. 402.4 Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is outweighed” by its unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 403. In addition, non- testimonial evidence must be authenticated, unless authenticity is stipulated, in that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Evidence that
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4 Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Pa.R.E. 401(a)- (b); Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001, 1022 (Pa. 2021).
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may satisfy this requirement includes, inter alia, testimony from a witness with knowledge “that an item is what it is claimed to be.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1). “There are three basic types of evidence that are admitted into court: (1) testimonial evidence; (2) documentary evidence; and (3) demonstrative evidence.” Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1177 (Pa. 2006). “Demonstrative evidence such as photographs, motion pictures, diagrams, and models have long been permitted to be entered into evidence provided that the demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately represents that which it purports to depict.” Id.; see also Pa.R.E. 901, comment (citing Nyce v. Muffley, 119 A.2d 530, 532 (Pa. 1956)); Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739, 747 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“authentication must be sufficient to support a finding that the [video] fairly and accurately represents that which it purports to depict”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Generally, authentication requires a low burden of proof.”
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d 814, 818 (Pa. Super. 2022). The proponent “need only present a prima facie case of some evidence of genuineness in order to put the issue of authenticity before the factfinder.”
Gregury v. Greguras, 196 A.3d 619, 633–34 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).5
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5 “[A]s commonplace and oft-used as is the term ‘prima facie case,’ it is not
well defined under Pennsylvania law.” McNeil v. Jordan, 894 A.2d 1260, 1273 (Pa. 2006). The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case in the criminal context when “it produces evidence that if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to the jury.” Id. (citation omitted). “Black’s Law Dictionary defines a prima facie case as occurring when (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Provided there is prima facie evidence of authentication to admit the evidence, the “ultimate determination of authenticity is for the jury.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 508 A.2d 316, 320 (Pa. Super. 1986).
At trial, and on appeal, Appellant challenges the admission of the three videos depicting the shooting incident only. The trial court explained its reasons for overruling Appellant’s trial objections to the authentication of these videos, as follows:
Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that there was never any real question as to the authenticity of the surveillance videos. Indeed, there were several videos from multiple angles and they each depicted the same events - i.e., the same actors, on the same date and time, engaging in the same shooting incident. Moreover, [Appellant] himself admitted that he was the one wearing the black pants with “VERTEBRAE” inscribed on them in the videos.
Further, there was no allegation of fabrication at any point prior to or during trial concerning the videos. Thus, all told, there was never any legitimate issue as to authenticity of the videos.
Nonetheless, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence establishing that the videos “fairly and accurately depicted what they purported to be.” Indeed, Detective Johnson testified that he personally recovered the surveillance videos from the two adjacent businesses on the 5200 block of Market Street, and further, that he was present at the scene on the night of the shooting, and indeed, the videos fairly and accurately depicted that precise location that night. As such, the videos were properly admitted.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/25, 12.
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one party produces enough evidence to allow the fact-trier to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party’s favor.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Therefore, prima facie evidence of authentication is enough evidence to permit an issue of authenticity to be determined by the ultimate trier of fact.
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After our review of the record, we agree with the trial court. The evidence presented by the Commonwealth, taken together, authenticated the surveillance videos presented at trial, i.e., there was enough evidence to conclude that the three primary surveillance videos accurately depicted the shooting incident on the 5200 block of Market Street at approximately nine p.m. on June 15, 2023. Detective Mark Johnson testified that he arrived at the scene of the shooting later that same night, when he took photographs and drew sketches of the location. See N.T. Trial, 10/16/24, 61-64. On June 23, 2023, he returned to the block and obtained two surveillance videos from the Mart on Market at 5231 Market Street. See id., 65-66. The videos recorded the scene from cameras looking both east and west from the store, and a photograph of the cameras was entered into evidence. See id., 68; Ex. C-14. The detective explained that he checked the time offset on the video and found that it was a little more than an hour ahead of the actual time. See id., 66-67. The videos included more than an hour before the shooting, and when the detective viewed it, he was able to identify several of the five persons depicted firing a gun. See id., 67. The detective then identified several screenshots, and explicitly stated that they were fair and accurate depictions of the video, in which certain persons can be seen firing a gun. See id., 69-72; Ex. C-16A, 16B, 17A, 17B, 18A, 18B, 21, 24, 25, 26 and 27.
With respect to the surveillance video recovered from the Rainbow Deli on the corner of 52nd and Market Streets, the officer could not definitively state when he recovered the video or what the offset time was but definitively
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stated that he personally recovered that video. See N.T. Trial, 10/16/24, 75- 76. He testified that screenshots from the video were a fair and accurate depiction of the 5200 block of Market Street the night of the shooting. See id., 77-78. The video depicted the same scene as that obtained from Mart on Market but from a camera further east down Market Street and looking west along the block. See id., 79-80.
We find that Detective Johnson’s testimony concerning his first-hand knowledge of the crime scene the evening of June 15, 2023, and the recovery of the two videos from Mart on Market was sufficient to establish that they recorded the relevant scene at the relevant time and thereby authenticated the east and west looking videos from that location. Those videos, the depictions on the videos, and Detective Johnson’s testimony, taken together, also were sufficient to authenticate the video from the Rainbow Deli. Having been on the 5200 block of Market Street, taking photographs and drawing sketches the same night as the shooting incident, the detective’s testimony established that he was familiar with the scene of the shooting. He confirmed that the videos from Mart on Market depicted the scene of the shooting at the time of the shooting. The detective also stated that the video from the Rainbow Deli depicted the same shooting from a spot east of the shooting incident and was a fair and accurate depiction of the block that night. 6
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6 We note that the video from the Rainbow Deli is further distant and less clear
than the videos from Market on Mart, which are of exceptional clarity. This (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Detective Johnson’s testimony thus linked the Rainbow Deli video to the Mart on Market videos as depicting events in the same location and time and thereby provided an ample basis to establish that it fairly and accurately represented that which it purported to depict. Certainly, the detective’s testimony about the Rainbow Deli video and the depictions on the authenticated Mart on Market surveillance videos were at least prima facie evidence that the Rainbow Deli video depicted the shooting incident, and therefore, was also admissible, with the final determination of authenticity properly left to the finder of fact. 7 See Brooks, 508 A.2d at 320.
Appellant’s assertion that the testimony did not meet the requirements of Rule 901(b)(9) misunderstands that rule. The requirement of Rule 901 is that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Subsection (b) of the rule presents “examples only … of evidence that satisfies the requirement” of subsection (a), and at that, “not a complete list.” Id. at 901(b). For
example, when proffering evidence about a process or system, the proponent
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level of clarity is not a requirement for authentication, but in this instance, makes it patently clear that all of the challenged videos depict the same incident.
7 We note that although Appellant objected to the admission of the videos, he
did not further challenge the finder of fact’s determination that the videos were authentic depictions of the shooting incident on June 15, 2023, around nine p.m. on the 5200 block of Market Street. Appellant testified that he was present at the time, confirmed his identity, named the other shooters seen on the videos and further attested to the accuracy of the depictions therein. See N.T. Trial, 10/17/24, 13-14, 27-31. He contested the interpretation of the depictions, not their authenticity.
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could authenticate it with evidence “describing a process or system and showing that it produces an accurate result.” Id. at 901(b)(9). There is no plausible reading of Rule 901 that could make subsection (b)(9) mandatory for the admission of surveillance videos, as Appellant argues. 8 See Appellant’s Brief, 14-15. Rather, subsection (b)(9) is but one example of how the proponent of video evidence could authenticate it.
Here, a police officer obtained security surveillance video, ascertained that the video recorded a relevant location at a relevant time, and watched the video to determine that it depicted the event in question, based on his personal knowledge of the scene and available physical evidence. Accordingly, we find that a prima facie case was presented that the video evidence was genuine in that it depicted what it purported to show. See Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 989-990 (Pa. Super. 2011) (where, as here, there was no allegation that a video was fabricated, the lack of a witness with personal knowledge of the events depicted on a police video did not, in McKellick, preclude authentication, where other officers testified as “persons with knowledge of what the evidence was proclaimed to be,” the traffic stop at issue, and so “the finder of fact, was free to believe or disbelieve” the
testimony as to the events depicted and whether “the videotape accurately
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8 The non-precedential decision cited by Appellant in his question presented
is contrary to Appellant’s argument. We did not mandate that video evidence must be introduced pursuant to Rule 901(b)(9), but only stated that a proponent may do so. See Clark, 305 A.3d 976 at **3. The Commonwealth, here, did not rely on that theory of authentication and so Clark is immaterial to our decision.
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and fairly represented [police] contact with Appellant”); Commonwealth v. White, 52 A.2d 360, 361 (Pa. Super. 1947) (“[t]hat a photograph may be proven without calling the person who took it is a well established principle of law”). The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by admitting the surveillance videos into evidence.
Appellant’s next two issues challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence. When reviewing a sufficiency claim, we construe “all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner”; the evidence is legally sufficient when it would “enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 38 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth may prove an offense by means of wholly circumstantial evidence, and the evidence presented “need not preclude every possibility of innocence.” Id. (citation omitted). It is the job of the fact-finder to pass upon “the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,” and the fact-finder “is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Id. “Whether evidence was properly admitted does not factor into our analysis, as sufficiency is not determined upon a diminished record.” Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 741 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (emphasis in original); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 568 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa. 1989) (“[t]he question of sufficiency is not assessed upon a diminished record”).
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In Appellant’s second issue on appeal, he argues that the evidence of criminal conspiracy was insufficient to sustain his conviction because there was no evidence of communication at the scene between Appellant and the other persons who fired their weapons at the victim, other than his wife. Appellant’s Brief, 16. He continues: the “prosecution’s own video evidence […] shows only that multiple people reacted when gunfire erupted” and argues that simultaneous participation in a crime “stretches circumstantial evidence beyond its lawful limits.” Id., 17 (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400 (Pa. Super. 2018)). “At most,” he avers, “the record supports a finding that several individuals reacted at once to a perceived threat,” which he contends cannot sustain a conspiracy conviction.” Appellant’s Brief, 17.
We are guided by the following principles:
To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the trier of fact must find that: (1) the defendant intended to commit or aid in the commission of the criminal act; (2) the defendant entered into an agreement with another (a “co-conspirator”) to engage in the crime; and (3) the defendant or one or more of the other co-
conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed upon crime. 18 Pa.C.S. § 903. The essence of a criminal conspiracy, which is what distinguishes this crime from accomplice liability, is the agreement made between the co-conspirators.
Mere association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient to establish that a defendant was part of a conspiratorial agreement to commit the crime. There needs to be some additional proof that the defendant intended to commit the crime along with his co-
conspirator. Direct evidence of the defendant’s criminal intent or the conspiratorial agreement, however, is rarely available.
Consequently, the defendant’s intent as well as the agreement is almost always proven through circumstantial evidence, such as by the relations, conduct or circumstances of the parties or overt acts
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on the part of the co-conspirators. Once the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement and the defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that defendant may be liable for the overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which co-conspirator committed the act.
Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 633 (Pa. Super. 2020).
Here, the evidence shows Appellant and Co-Defendant acting in unison, not mere simultaneity. It is evident from the surveillance videos that Appellant, his wife, and Co-Defendant were on the block “well in advance of the shooting” talking among themselves and with other people. Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/25, 15. The surveillance video looking east from Mart on Market depicts the victim’s SUV slowly coming to a halt between Appellant’s white car and one unknown gunman’s black car, directly even with Appellant. See Video Exhibit, 9:34. On the video from the Rainbow Deli, Appellant holds out an arm and walks directly to the SUV. See id., 12:35. The trial court interpreted this action as Appellant “sending a clear signal to his cohorts.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/25, 15. After a very brief time at the window of the passenger side of the SUV, Appellant walks directly to his white car and leans into the passenger side door. See Video Exhibit, 12:40-12:46. At the same time, visible in the two videos from Mart on Market and the one video from the Rainbow Deli, one unknown shooter is standing by the rear passenger side door of the black car watching Appellant and the SUV, Co-Defendant is walking to his car further west on the block and to the front passenger door of the car, and Appellant’s wife and another unknown shooter are standing separately east of the SUV along the sidewalk. See id., 4:41-4:43, 9:43-10:02, 10:40-10:46. While still
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crouched at the door into his car, Appellant waves his arm a second time, and Co-Defendant then leans into his car. See id., 4:43, 12:48. When Appellant stands up, he fires a gun at the SUV and then ducks and runs up the block still firing his gun at the SUV. See id., 10:04-10:05. Co-Defendant also stands and fires multiple times at the SUV. See id., 4:46-4:47. The two unknown shooters and Appellant’s wife also fire guns at the SUV. See id., 10:05-10:12, 12:55-12:59.
We conclude that the video evidence supports the finder of fact’s conclusion that Appellant “signaled to his cohorts,” who opened fire on the SUV “in lockstep with [Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/25, 15. We therefore agree with the trial court’s conclusion that this “evidence alone was sufficient to establish a common understanding to commit a crime. Further, the fact that not just two actors, but five, discharged their weapons in unison with [Appellant] completely dispelled the notion of a mere ‘coincidence.’” Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/25, 15.
Appellant contends that the trial court’s inference of an agreement between himself and the other four shooters on the sidewalk is precluded by our holding in Chambers that joining “into an affray spontaneously, rather than pursuant to a common plan” is insufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy. See Chambers, 188 A.3d at 110-111. Unlike in Chambers, where Chambers was engaged in fisticuffs before his friends joined in the affray, here, Appellant and his cohorts on the sidewalk intentionally armed themselves and stood ready to fire in unison on the SUV.
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See Chambers, 188 A.3d at 111. The trial court made a permissibly reasonable inference that Appellant’s arm motion was a signal to his cohorts, who within seconds all fired “in unison” on the SUV. See Trial Court Opinion, 15. Thus, Appellant’s argument ultimately fails because it relies on a view of the evidence in the light most favorable to himself, contrary to the standard of review. See In Interest of J.B., 189 A.3d 390, 408 (Pa. 2018) (“in undertaking sufficiency review, [the appellate court should] not act in the capacity of a ‘super-jury’ to reconsider and re-determine the facts of the case adduced at trial and decide, anew, an appellant’s guilt or innocence”). Indeed, he explicitly cites trial counsel’s closing argument, which, of course, was an attempt to persuade the fact finder to favor his version of events. See Appellant’s Brief, 16; see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626, 630 (Pa. Super. 1998) (even though the appellant may be correct that he did not possess an intent to harm the victim, that “is more properly an argument of factual inference which can be addressed to a jury, which is in turn free to agree or disagree with it” and not properly a sufficiency argument). Accordingly, we find the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for criminal conspiracy.
Appellant also contends that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions for aggravated assault, criminal conspiracy, simple assault and REAP because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted with the requisite intent. See Appellant’s Brief, 17-18. He notes that there was an absence of proof that the victim was injured at all. See id., 18. He then asserts
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that his testimony was “uncontradicted” that the victim “initiated the confrontation by following two teenage girls and responding aggressively when confronted.” Id., 18. He argues that he was thus forced to react to events. See id., 19. He argues that the Commonwealth was thereby obligated to rebut his testimony of self-defense, but failed to do so. See id., 19.
We find that Appellant’s argument, as presented, is unreviewable because he failed to assert the justification defense in his Rule 1925(b) Statement.9 “It is well-established that any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived for appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020). Even if we were to assume that Appellant’s vague assertion that the evidence provides an “implication” that the victim “started any altercation,” somehow provided the basis for an appellate justification defense claim, we would still find it waived because it was not included in the statement of questions presented. See Appellant’s Brief, 3. He alleges only that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions with no assertion as to why. See id. “No question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly
suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Rule 2116 “requires that the issues to
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9 With respect to the question in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant alleged
the Commonwealth failed to prove any of his convictions because he “did not have the conscious object or purpose to cause serious bodily injury.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, ¶ 5. “Additionally, there was no real evidence of injury, no information about medical records, or a photo of the alleged injury. The victim never appeared for the trial. The clear implication is that the so-called victim started any altercation. If anything [Appellant] was forced to react to events.” Id.
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be resolved must be included in the statement of questions involved.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2009).
To the extent we interpret Appellant’s argument to challenge the Commonwealth’s proof of his intent to cause serious bodily injury to sustain his aggravated assault conviction or shared an intent with his co-conspirators, we find it meritless. The video evidence plainly shows Appellant firing multiple gunshots at the victim’s SUV. See Video Exhibit, 10:04-10:06, 12:54-12:56. Firing a single gunshot at a potential victim is sufficient to prove an intent to cause serious bodily injury and sustain a conviction for aggravated assault. See Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2001) (multiple gunshots fired at a victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault whether or not the victim was struck by any bullets); Woods, 710 A.2d at 631 (firing a gun into an occupied vehicle permits the fact finder to infer an intent to cause serious bodily injury sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault). As for Appellant’s shared intent with his co-conspirators, they each also fired multiple times at the victim’s SUV, at least sixteen times in total, and thereby demonstrated the same intent.
Galindes, 786 A.2d at 1012.10
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10 Appellant’s argument that the Commonwealth did not prove the requisite
mens rea for simple assault and REAP are not supported by any argument, and we therefore deem those claims waived for review. See Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141, 145 (Pa. Super. 2009) (finding two appellate issues waived where the appellant “provided only one short paragraph in support of each […], neither of which contains any citation to authority”); (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 8/25/2026
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Commonwealth v. Bobin, 916 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2007) (finding arguments waived on appeal when “amounting to less than one half page and containing no analysis or case citation”). We also find waived any putative claim to Appellant’s convictions for PIC or the firearm offenses because he did not explicitly assert these convictions in his sufficiency argument, and any implicit argument is also entirely unsupported in the brief. See id.