J-S13038-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTOPHER ANDREW BERRIOS : : Appellant : No. 1686 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 16, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000699-2023
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 17, 2025
Appellant Christopher Andrew Berrios appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of five counts of neglect of
animals.1 Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw and
an Anders/Santiago brief.2 After review, we grant Counsel’s petition to
withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
On March 30, 2023, Appellant was charged with two counts of
aggravated cruelty to animals – causing serious bodily injury or death and
seven counts of neglect of animals. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which
was held on June 10, 2024.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 5532(a)(1).
2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,
978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). J-S13038-25
The notes of testimony from Appellant’s jury trial establish the
underlying facts as follows:
Appellant and his wife, Samantha Berrios, began breeding dogs at their
home in St. Clair Township sometime before 2022. N.T. 6/10/24 at 73-74,
136. The Berrios’ dogs were all registered to Ms. Berrios, but Appellant was
also responsible for the care of the dogs and took a lead role in breeding and
selling the animals. Id. at 74, 76-78. On August 22, 2022, Appellant and Ms.
Berrios got into an altercation. Id. at 79, 104. As a result, Ms. Berrios moved
into her sister’s apartment with the couple’s children and one of the dogs. Id.
at 43-44, 79-80, 160. At the time Ms. Berrios moved out, Appellant and his
wife had eight dogs. Id. at 73.
On October 24, 2022, Appellant messaged Ms. Berrios and stated that
one of the dogs, “Tiny,” had died. Id. at 83-84. Ms. Berrios expressed
concern and asked if Appellant was still able to care for the dogs. Id. at 84-
85. Appellant responded that he was feeding the dogs every day. Id.
On November 15, 2022, Ms. Berrios was contacted by a former neighbor
who informed her that another dog, “Ma’dusa,” was tied up on the back porch
of the property where she formerly lived with Appellant, and that Ma’dusa was
unable to move and appeared thin. Id. at 86. Ms. Berrios had a friend go to
the property, remove Ma’dusa, and bring Ma’dusa to her. Id. at 86-87. Once
Ma’dusa was back at Ms. Berrios’ home, Ms. Berrios’ grandmother began
contacting authorities due to concern for the other dogs at the property. Id.
at 87. However, Ms. Berrios’ grandmother was initially unable to contact
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humane officers, the SPCA, or an animal shelter. Id. The grandmother
successfully contacted Humane Society Police Officer Dana Mansell via
Facebook message on the night of November 16, 2022. Id. at 28-29, 87.
The following day, November 17, Officer Mansell went to the property.
Id. at 29-30. When she arrived, she knocked on the door and heard some
barking, but no one answered the door. Id. at 29. Moments later, an
unidentified man came from across the street, entered the property, and came
out with two puppies. Id. at 30. Officer Mansell noticed that the puppies had
swollen abdomens, which, based on her training, she attributed to either
worms or bloating due to lack of food. Id. at 32. She approached the man
to determine who he was and called the St. Clair Police Department to assist
her. Id. at 32-33. Police arrived and, shortly thereafter, Ms. Berrios arrived
at the property. Id. at 33, 88. Ms. Berrios, who no longer had a key to the
property, told police she was the property owner and assisted Officer Mansell
in making entry by breaking down the back door. Id. at 33-34, 41, 88.
Upon entering the home, Officer Mansell noticed the smell of fecal
matter, urine, ammonia, and decaying flesh. Id. at 34. Upon further
investigation, Officer Mansell identified four dogs in various stages of health.3
See id. at 34-40, 45-55. A dog identified by Ms. Berrios as Tiny was found ____________________________________________
3 Four dogs had been removed from the home at the time that Officer Mansell
entered the property. As previously mentioned, Ma’dusa and the two puppies had been removed from the property prior to entry. N.T., 6/10/24, at 30, 37- 38, 86-87. As stated above, Ms. Berrios brought a fourth dog, “Butterball,” with her when she moved out of the property in August 2022. Id. at 43-44, 80, 160.
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dead in a cage surrounded by garbage, fecal matter, vomit, and empty dishes.
Id. at 35. Officer Mansell described Tiny’s body as “a mere skeleton with flesh
and fur over it” and stated that all the dishes around Tiny’s body were devoid
of any type of sustenance. Id. at 35. In a crate next to Tiny was a dog
identified as “Blush.” Id. at 36-37. Blush was alive but was extremely thin
and had very little energy left. Id. at 37. Two more dogs, “Joe Dirt” and
“Baby,” were found upstairs in a bedroom that was covered in trash and fecal
matter. Id. at 37-38. These dogs also appeared malnourished, and Officer
Mansell noted a lack of any food or water in the room. Id. at 38.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of five counts
of neglect of animals. These counts related to Tiny, Blush, Joe Dirt, Baby, and
Ma’dusa. See id. at 201-02. On August 16, 2024, Appellant was sentenced
to one to twelve months’ incarceration for one count of neglect of animals
followed by consecutive sentences of one to two months’ incarceration for the
remaining four counts, which brought Appellant’s aggregate sentence to five
to twenty months’ incarceration. Defendant filed timely post-sentence
motions, which the trial court denied on October 16, 2024.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court directed
Appellant to file a statement of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on
November 18, 2024. Counsel filed a notice of intent to file an
Anders/Santiago brief, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4), on December 9,
2024. Appellant did not file a pro se response. The trial court filed a 1925(a)
opinion on December 9, 2024.
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In the Anders/Santiago brief, Counsel concluded that there are no
non-frivolous issues. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 2-4, 14. Additionally,
Counsel noted several meritless claims he identified from his review of the
record. See id. at 10-16. These include a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
a sentencing claim, a claim regarding the Commonwealth’s amendment of the
criminal information, a claim challenging testimony regarding the two puppies’
dehydration symptoms, and a claim regarding the trial court’s denial of a
motion for acquittal as to the felony count for causing Tiny’s death. See id.
“When faced with a purported Anders[/Santiago] brief, this Court may
not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining
counsel’s request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d
379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Counsel must comply with the
technical requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for
leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of
the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2)
providing a copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant
of the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional
arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s attention. See
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
banc). In an Anders/Santiago brief, counsel must set forth the issues that
the defendant wishes to raise and any other claims necessary to effectuate
appellate presentation of those issues. Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873
A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2005).
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Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements
established in Santiago, namely:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
“Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this
Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and
render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly
frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an
independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional,
nonfrivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers,
113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted);
accord Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(en banc).
Here, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for
seeking withdrawal. Counsel has filed a petition to withdraw, he has sent
Appellant a letter explaining Appellant’s appellate rights, he has informed
Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or with private counsel, and he has
supplied Appellant with a copy of the Anders/Santiago brief. See Goodwin,
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928 A.2d at 290. Counsel provided this Court with a copy of his letter to
Appellant informing him of his rights.
Furthermore, Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief complies with the
requirements of Santiago. Counsel has included a summary of the relevant
facts and procedural history, refers to portions of the record that might
arguably support Appellant’s claims, and sets forth the conclusion that the
appeal is frivolous. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, Counsel
has met the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago. We now
proceed to address the issues identified in the Anders/Santiago brief.
In the Anders/Santiago brief, Counsel identifies a claim that Appellant
directed him to raise on appeal as well as four potential claims that Counsel
identified based on his review of the record, which he ultimately determined
were meritless. See Anders/Santiago Brief at 10-16. First, Counsel
analyzes the sufficiency of the evidence and concludes that claim lacks
arguable merit. Id. at 10-13. Second, Counsel discusses why a sentencing
claim would lack arguable merit. Id. at 14-15. Third, Counsel discusses why
a challenge to the trial court’s grant of the Commonwealth’s motion to amend
would be meritless. Id. at 15. Fourth, Counsel explains why a challenge to
an evidentiary ruling would be meritless on appeal. Id. Finally, Counsel
addresses why a challenge to the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for
acquittal would be meritless. Id. We address each potential claim below.
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Sufficiency of the Evidence
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are
governed by the following standard:
As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s convictions will be upheld.
Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 552 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation
omitted and formatting altered). “Importantly, the fact finder, which passes
upon the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony, is free to believe
all, part, or none of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted and formatting
altered).
A person commits the offense of neglect of an animal if the person fails
to provide for the basic needs of each animal to which the person has a duty
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of care, whether belonging to himself or otherwise, including by failing to
provide: 1) necessary sustenance and potable water; 2) access to clean and
sanitary shelter and protection from the weather; and/or 3) necessary
veterinary care. See Commonwealth v. Sears, 317 A.3d 633, 636 (Pa.
Super. 2024); 18 Pa.C.S. § 5532.
Here, Appellant was convicted of five counts of neglect of animals in
relation to the dogs named Tiny, Blush, Joe Dirt, Baby, and Ma’dusa. See
N.T., 6/10/24, at 201-02. The Commonwealth established that Appellant had
a duty of care for all five dogs. Ms. Berrios testified that she and Appellant
had the dogs in order to breed them. Id. at 73-74. Ms. Berrios also testified
that Appellant took a lead role in the breeding operation. Id. at 74, 76-78.
Ms. Berrios also testified that she moved out of the Berrios’ home, where the
dogs were kept and later found in poor health, on August 22, 2022. See id.
at 79. She stated that she did not reenter the home until November 17, 2022
when she met Humane Officer Dana Mansell there. See id. at 82-83. Ms.
Berrios testified that, at that time, she did not even have a key to the
residence, and she had to break the door down to enter the property. Id. at
88. This testimony was corroborated by Officer Mansell, who was there when
Ms. Berrios broke the door down to gain entry. Id. at 34.
There was also evidence presented suggesting Appellant was the only
one with access to the property where the dogs were kept and that he was
responsible for the dogs’ care. Ms. Berrios stated that Appellant changed the
locks after she moved out. Id. at 88. On October 24, 2022, Appellant notified
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Ms. Berrios that Tiny had died. Id. at 83-85. Ms. Berrios asked Appellant if
he was still able to care for the dogs in her stead. Id. Appellant’s response
suggested that he knew he was responsible for the dogs’ care as he told Ms.
Berrios that he was still feeding the dogs. Id.
As to Appellant’s neglect of the animals, the Commonwealth presented
significant testimony and evidence showing the condition of the dogs. Tiny
was found dead in a cage surrounded by fecal matter and empty dishes devoid
of food and water. See N.T., 6/10/24, at 35, 47, 49-50, 53-55. Officer
Mansell testified that Tiny’s body was simply just fur and skin over a skeleton
and that the dog’s eyes and organs had wasted away from starvation. See
id. at 35, 53-55. Dr. Broshkevitch, a veterinarian, similarly described Tiny’s
body as “essentially skin over top of a skeleton” and stated “[t]here wasn’t
even any muscle left.” Id. at 57-58, 68-69. Blush was found near death
from starvation in a cage next to Tiny’s body that was similarly covered with
fecal matter and devoid of any food or water. Id. at 35-37, 49, 50-52. Dr.
Broshkevitch testified that he examined Blush and diagnosed her with
starvation and dehydration. Id. at 60-68. Joe Dirt and Baby were found in a
bedroom covered in fecal matter without food and water. Id. at 37-39. While
Joe Dirt and Baby were not as severely gaunt as Blush, Officer Mansell testified
that these dogs were also malnourished. See id. at 38. The Commonwealth
presented evidence showing Ma’dusa had been neglected as well. While
Ma’dusa was removed from the property the day before Officer Mansell
arrived, Ms. Berrios testified that she had Ma’dusa removed after a neighbor
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reported Ma’dusa was tied up and unable to move on the back porch and
appeared to be “all skin and bones.” Id. at 86-87. Ms. Berrios’ friend, who
removed Ma’dusa from the property, also described Ma’dusa as “skin and
bones” and noted that Ma’dusa had lost over one hundred pounds since he
saw the dog a month prior to removing her from the property. Id. at 156.
Finally, Officer Mansell testified that in her entire time at the property she did
not see any sources of food or water for any of the dogs. Id. at 41.
All of the evidence stated above established that Appellant had a duty
of care for the dogs and that he failed to provide the dogs with necessary food
and water. Accordingly, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to convict the Appellant of all five counts
of neglect of animals. See Sears, 317 A.3d at 636; Wright, 255 A.3d at 552.
Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Sentencing
Next, Counsel identifies why a potential sentencing claim would fail
stating:
With regards to his sentencing [Appellant] had a prior record score of one from three prior misdemeanors. Each of the current misdemeanor 3 counts has an offense gravity score of one. So each count had a guideline range of R.S. to 1 month. [The trial court] sentenced [Appellant] to [] 1 to 12 months and four consecutive 1 to 2 month terms of incarceration in Schuylkill County Prison. Each of these constituted a standard guideline sentence. Further, “It is well-settled that, in imposing sentence, a trial judge has the discretion to determine whether, given the facts of a particular case, a given sentence should be consecutive to, or concurrent with, other sentences being imposed.” Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826, 847 (Pa. Super.
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Ct. 1997). [The trial court] indicated that [it] believed the facts of this case warranted consecutive sentence.
Anders/Santiago Brief at 14-15 (some formatting altered).
Based upon our independent review of the record, we agree with
Counsel’s determination that a sentencing claim would be frivolous. We
discern no viable challenge to the legality of Appellant’s sentence. Appellant
was sentenced within the statutory limits for each offense, there were no
mandatory minimum sentences applicable to Appellant’s convictions, and,
because Appellant posted bail, there was no pre-trial detention for which the
trial court could give him credit for time served.
As to any possible challenges to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s
sentence, as this court has explained, “[t]here is no absolute right to appeal
when challenging the discretionary aspect of a sentence[,]” even in the
Anders/Santiago context. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 661
(Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such
claims we must determine:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted and some formatting altered).
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“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an
appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.
Issues not presented to the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1251
(Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Here, Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion challenging his
sentence and did not raise any sentencing issues during the sentencing
hearing. See Post-Sentence Mot., 8/26/24; N.T. Sentencing H’rg, 8/16/24.
Because no challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing was raised in
the trial court, the issue is waived and, therefore, frivolous. See Malovich,
903 A.2d at 1251; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); see also Commonwealth v. Cook, 175
A.3d 345, 349 (Pa. Super. 2017) (stating that where a discretionary
sentencing claim is not preserved, it is waived and, therefore, frivolous on
direct appeal, even in the Anders/Santiago context). Accordingly, we agree
with Counsel’s determination that there are no non-frivolous challenges to
Appellant’s sentence.
Amendment to the Criminal Information
Next Counsel identifies a meritless challenge to the Commonwealth’s
amendment of the criminal information, stating that:
[The trial court] denied [Appellant’s] objection to amending the criminal information three days before the jury trial to extend the time frame of the neglect. However, she specifically allowed the Defense the opportunity to present alibi witnesses relevant to the time in question which were not previously disclosed.
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Anders/Santiago Brief at 15 (citations omitted).
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend
an information for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Small,
741 A.2d 666, 681 (Pa. 1999). As we have explained,
[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. If in reaching a conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies the law, discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct the error.
Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 10 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
Rule 564 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as
follows:
The court may allow an information to be amended, provided that the information as amended does not charge offenses arising from a different set of events and that the amended charges are not so materially different from the original charge that the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the court may grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in the interests of justice.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 564.
“[T]he purpose of Rule 564 is to ensure that a defendant is fully apprised
of the charges, and to avoid prejudice by prohibiting the last minute addition
of alleged criminal acts of which the defendant is uninformed.”
Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation omitted). “[O]ur courts apply the rule with an eye toward its
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underlying purposes and with a commitment to do justice rather than be
bound by a literal or narrow reading of [the] procedural rules.”
Commonwealth v. Grekis, 601 A.2d 1284, 1289 (Pa. 1992).
When presented with a question concerning the propriety of an
amendment, we consider:
[w]hether the crimes specified in the original indictment or information involve the same basic elements and evolved out of the same factual situation as the crimes specified in the amended indictment or information. If so, then the defendant is deemed to have been placed on notice regarding his alleged criminal conduct. If, however, the amended provision alleges a different set of events, or the elements or defenses to the amended crime are materially different from the elements or defenses to the crime originally charged, such that the defendant would be prejudiced by the change, then the amend[ment] is not permitted.
Commonwealth v. Mentzer, 18 A.3d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2011)
(citations omitted).
Since the purpose of the information is to apprise the defendant of the charges against him so that he may have a fair opportunity to prepare a defense, our Supreme Court has stated that following an amendment, relief is warranted only when the variance between the original and the new charges prejudices [a defendant] by, for example, rendering defenses which might have been raised against the original charges ineffective with respect to the substituted charges.
Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223 (citation omitted).
In determining whether a defendant suffered prejudice, we consider the
following factors:
(1) whether the amendment changes the factual scenario supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds new facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether the entire
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factual scenario was developed during a preliminary hearing; (4) whether the description of the charges changed with the amendment; (5) whether a change in defense strategy was necessitated by the amendment; and (6) whether the timing of the Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample notice and preparation.
Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203 (citation omitted).
Here, the Commonwealth filed a motion to amend on June 6, 2024,
seeking to amend the criminal information to reflect an incident date of
“between . . . August 22, 2022 and November 16, 2022” rather than simply
“November 16, 2022.” See Commonwealth’s Mot. to Amend, 6/6/24. The
Commonwealth did not seek to add any additional charges to the information.
Id. The trial court addressed the motion on the morning of trial. See N.T.,
6/10/24, at 4-8. Appellant argued that the original criminal information stated
the crimes occurred “on or around November 16th of 2022.” Id. at 5-6.
Appellant claimed the amendment would change the period of time for which
he was prepared to defend and voiced concerns about being able to present a
protection from abuse order that allegedly prevented Appellant from entering
the house where the dogs were kept as well as alibi witnesses who would
testify that Appellant had previously moved out of the house. Id. at 6-8. The
trial court responded to Appellant’s argument by stating:
“[Y]ou had to know that this doesn’t occur on one day. It is pretty clear. And I don’t know what your discovery says or what witnesses will testify to, but just in reading [the affidavit of probable cause and the criminal information], it says they were left uncared for. If a dog doesn’t get care on one day, it doesn’t die, it’s not covered in fecal matter.”
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Id. at 7. Appellant advised the court that he would like to call alibi witnesses
who could testify that he moved out of the home at the end of August 2022.
Id. at 8. The trial court stated that it was only fair for Appellant to present
the testimony of those witnesses and granted the motion to amend. Id.
After our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the information.
See Small, 741 A.2d at 681. The amendment did not add any additional
charges, criminal events, or criminal conduct to the information. The
amendment to the information merely clarified the timeline of events. Since
the amendment to the information did not change the basic elements of the
crimes charged and did not add charges arising out of a different factual
situation from the original information, defendant was on notice about the
criminal conduct the Commonwealth alleged he engaged in. See Mentzer,
18 A.3d at 1202.
Furthermore, the record does not reflect that the amendment required
Appellant to change his defense strategy. The two concerns Appellant raised
about the Commonwealth’s amendment to the information were that he would
need to call alibi witnesses going back to August 2022 and that he would not
be able to present evidence of a protection from abuse order. See N.T.,
6/10/24, at 6-8. However, Appellant presented testimony supporting both
arguments at trial. See id. at 7, 104, 116-17, 122-23, 127, 137-40, 143-45,
148-54. Therefore, the amendment to the information did not change
Appellant’s defense strategy. See Mentzer, 18 A.3d at 1203. For the reasons
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stated above, Appellant could not have been prejudiced by the amendment to
the information. See Sinclair, 897 A.2d at 1223. Accordingly, Appellant is
not entitled to relief on this claim, and we agree with Counsel’s assessment
that this claim is frivolous.
Mooted Issues
Counsel also identifies two preserved issues that were ultimately
mooted because defendant was not convicted of the related charges. Counsel
explains that:
[T]he [trial] court denied an objection to Ms. Mansell’s testimony regarding [the two puppies’] dehydration symptoms. However, the jury did not convict [Appellant] of any charges related to [the two puppies]. Finally, the [trial] court denied [Appellant’s] motion for acquittal relative to the felony count for causing Tiny’s death. But again, the jury did not convict [Appellant] of this felony charge.
Anders/Santiago Brief at 15 (some formatting altered).
“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court
cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.” Commonwealth v.
Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 881 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Rivera v.
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 837 A.2d 525, 527 (Pa. Super.
2003)).
After our independent review of the record, we agree with Counsel’s
determination. Appellant was not convicted of any charges related to the two
puppies and was acquitted of the felony count for causing Tiny’s death. See
N.T., 6/10/24, at 201-02. Since Appellant was acquitted of the underlying
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charges for each of these challenges, any appeal issues regarding these
charges are moot. See generally Bricker, 41 A.3d at 881 (holding
Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth’s
amendment of the information was moot where the trial court later dismissed
the amended counts for lack of evidence). Accordingly, we agree with
Counsel’s determination that these issues would be meritless on appeal.
Finally, our independent review of the record does not reveal any
additional, non-frivolous issues on direct appeal. See Flowers, 113 A.3d
at1250; see also Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291. For these reasons, we grant
Counsel’s petition to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 06/17/2025
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