Com. v. Bennett, C.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided April 16, 2015·No. 2948 EDA 2014·Unpublished

Opinion

J-S24031-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : C. ARTHUR BENNETT, : : Appellant : No. 2948 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on September 8, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Criminal Division, No. CP-23-CR-0004121-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 16, 2015

C. Arthur Bennett (“Bennett”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his nolo contendere plea to one count of possession of a

controlled substance (marijuana) with the intent to deliver (“PWID”).1

Additionally, Patrick J. Connors, Esquire (“Attorney Connors”), Bennett’s

counsel, has filed an Application to Withdraw as counsel and an

accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

We grant Attorney Connors’s Application to Withdraw and affirm Bennett’s

judgment of sentence.

On September 8, 2014, Bennett tendered a negotiated nolo

contendere plea to PWID, whereupon the Commonwealth recommended a

sentence of time served (approximately one month) to twenty-three months

1 See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). J-S24031-15

in prison. On that same date, the trial court accepted Bennett’s plea and

sentenced him in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.

Subsequently, Bennett filed a post-sentence Motion to withdraw his nolo

contendere plea, which the trial court denied. Bennett thereafter filed a

timely Notice of Appeal. In response to the trial court’s Order to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal,

Attorney Connors filed Statement indicating his intention to file an Anders

brief. Thereafter, Attorney Connors filed an Application to Withdraw as

Bennett’s counsel and an Anders brief.

“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the

merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to

withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(citation omitted). Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is

frivolous and wishes to withdraw from representation, he/she must do the

following:

(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has determined the appeal would be frivolous; (2) file a brief referring to any issues that might arguably support the appeal, but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any additional points he deems worthy of this Court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.

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2009), our Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders,

i.e., the contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders]

requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the

trial court’s proceedings and render an independent judgment as to whether

the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.” Edwards, 906 A.2d at 1228

(citation omitted).

Here, Attorney Connors has complied with each of the requirements of

Anders. Attorney Connors indicates that he conscientiously examined the

record and determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, Attorney

Connors’s Anders brief comports with the requirements set forth by the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, the record contains a

copy of the letter that Attorney Connors sent to Bennett, advising him of his

right to proceed pro se or retain alternate counsel and file additional claims,

and stating Attorney Connors’s intention to seek permission to withdraw.

-3- J-S24031-15

Accordingly, Attorney Connors has complied with the procedural

requirements for withdrawing from representation, and we will determine

whether Bennett’s appeal is wholly frivolous.

The Anders brief filed by Attorney Connors identifies the following

issue for our review: “Whether the sentence imposed on [] Bennett was

harsh and excessive under the circumstances?” Anders Brief at 1

(italicization omitted).

In terms of its effect upon a case, a plea of nolo contendere is treated

the same as a guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 666 A.2d 714,

717 (Pa. Super. 1995). By entering a plea of nolo contendere, a defendant

waives “all defects and defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of

the court, legality of sentence, and validity of plea.” Id. Legality of

sentence issues occur generally either (1) when a trial court’s traditional

authority to use discretion in the act of sentencing is somehow affected;

and/or (2) when the sentence imposed is patently inconsistent with the

sentencing parameters set forth by the General Assembly. See

Commonwealth v. Foster, 17 A.3d 332, 342 (Pa. 2011). The question of

whether a claim implicates the legality of a sentence presents a pure

question of law. Id. at 340 n.13. Issues relating to the legality of a

sentence are reviewed de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).

-4- J-S24031-15

Additionally, “when a negotiated plea includes sentencing terms (or,

more properly, the Commonwealth’s commitment to recommend a certain

sentence), the defendant’s knowing and voluntary acceptance of those terms

rightly extinguishes the ability to challenge a sentence the defendant knew

was a proper consequence of his plea.” Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98

A.3d 1268, 1277 (Pa. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Reichle, 589

A.2d 1140, 1141 (Pa. Super. 1991) (stating that where the plea agreement

contains a negotiated sentence which is accepted and imposed by the

sentencing court, there is no authority to permit an excessiveness

challenge).

Here, Bennett’s claim that his sentence is harsh and excessive does

not implicate the jurisdiction of the trial court, the validity of Bennett’s plea,

or the legality of his sentence. See Reichle, 589 A.2d at 1141. Rather, his

claim presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence,

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Related

Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Commonwealth v. Reichle
589 A.2d 1140 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1991)
Commonwealth v. Santiago
978 A.2d 349 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Commonwealth v. Nelson
666 A.2d 714 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Commonwealth v. Foster
17 A.3d 332 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2011)
Commonwealth v. Garang
9 A.3d 237 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2010)
Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, M., Aplt
98 A.3d 1268 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2014)
Commonwealth v. Edwards
906 A.2d 1225 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Commonwealth v. Infante
63 A.3d 358 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)