J-S38030-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DANIEL A. BARNETT : : Appellant : No. 1852 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 22, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000731-1990
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2023
Daniel A. Barnett appeals pro se from the order denying his latest,
untimely-filed petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
This Court has previously summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
On January 30, 1990, nineteen-year-old Barnett stabbed and killed 64-year-old Margaret Ann Woodward during a car- jacking. After driving for two days with the body stuffed into the trunk of the car, Barnett attempted to dispose of Mrs. Woodward’s body by setting it on fire at a construction site. Barnett was captured after he attempted to purchase gas for the car with Mrs. Woodward’s credit card. The police found the car a few hours later and discovered Barnett’s birth certificate and clothes stained with the blood of the victim in the vehicle. Barnett subsequently took the police to the wooded area where he had left Mrs. Woodward’s body.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S38030-23
Commonwealth v. Barnett, 718 A.2d 337 (Pa. Super. 1998), non-
precedential decision at 1-2.
Barnett was arrested and charged. He entered a negotiated guilty plea
to first degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery on October 17, 1990. That
same day, the trial court imposed the negotiated sentence of an aggregate
term of life in prison. Barnett did not file a direct appeal.
On August 16, 1995, Barnett filed a pro se PCRA petition and the PCRA
court appointed new counsel to represent him. Ultimately, the PCRA court
denied Barnett’s petition and PCRA counsel did not file an appeal. However,
Barnett filed a pro se appeal and this Court filed an order directing PCRA
counsel to enter his appearance and resume his representation of Barnett. On
April 3, 1998, we rejected Barnett’s appellate claims and affirmed the PCRA
court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. Barnett supra. Thereafter,
Barnett filed an application for reargument, which we dismissed as untimely
filed. On November 12, 1998, our Supreme Court denied Barnett’s allocatur
petition. Commonwealth v. Barnett, 732 A.2d 611 (Pa. 1998).
Barnett filed a second PCRA petition on March 20, 1999, which the PCRA
court denied on August 2, 1999. Barnett appealed to this Court. On March
23, 2000, we affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief because it was
untimely filed, and Barnett failed to establish a time-bar exception.
Commonwealth v. Barnett, 757 A.2d 989 (Pa. Super. 2000). This Court
denied his petition for reargument on May 23, 2000. On October 11, 2000,
our Supreme Court denied his allocatur petition. Commonwealth v.
-2- J-S38030-23
Barnett, 795 A.2d 971 (Pa. 2000). Thereafter, Barnett filed a third pro se
PCRA petition that was dismissed on October 9, 2012, and a fourth PCRA
petition that was dismissed on June 2, 2016.
On June 1, 2022, Barnett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum and a motion for allowance to amend the petition, which the
PCRA court treated as his fifth PCRA petition. That same day, the PCRA court
issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Barnett’s fifth petition
as untimely. Barnett filed a response. By order entered June 22, 2022, the
PCRA court denied Barnett’s fifth petition. This appeal followed. The PCRA
court did not require Barnett to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but the PCRA
court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement.
Barnett raises seven substantive issues on appeal. Before we consider
their merits, however, we first note that the PCRA court properly considered
his latest filing for post-conviction relief as a serial PCRA petition. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of
obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and
statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus”);
Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining
that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under
that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . conviction
resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)”).
-3- J-S38030-23
Treating Barnett’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we must next
determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely
filed, and that Barnett failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness
of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for
relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the
petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and
proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction
over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
-4- J-S38030-23
authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Barnett’s judgment of sentence became final on November 16,
1990, thirty days after the time for filing a direct appeal to this Court expired.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Barnett had until November 18,
1991, to file a timely petition.1 As Barnett filed the petition at issue in 2022,
it is patently untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and
proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez,
supra.
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J-S38030-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : DANIEL A. BARNETT : : Appellant : No. 1852 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 22, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000731-1990
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2023
Daniel A. Barnett appeals pro se from the order denying his latest,
untimely-filed petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
This Court has previously summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
On January 30, 1990, nineteen-year-old Barnett stabbed and killed 64-year-old Margaret Ann Woodward during a car- jacking. After driving for two days with the body stuffed into the trunk of the car, Barnett attempted to dispose of Mrs. Woodward’s body by setting it on fire at a construction site. Barnett was captured after he attempted to purchase gas for the car with Mrs. Woodward’s credit card. The police found the car a few hours later and discovered Barnett’s birth certificate and clothes stained with the blood of the victim in the vehicle. Barnett subsequently took the police to the wooded area where he had left Mrs. Woodward’s body.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-S38030-23
Commonwealth v. Barnett, 718 A.2d 337 (Pa. Super. 1998), non-
precedential decision at 1-2.
Barnett was arrested and charged. He entered a negotiated guilty plea
to first degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery on October 17, 1990. That
same day, the trial court imposed the negotiated sentence of an aggregate
term of life in prison. Barnett did not file a direct appeal.
On August 16, 1995, Barnett filed a pro se PCRA petition and the PCRA
court appointed new counsel to represent him. Ultimately, the PCRA court
denied Barnett’s petition and PCRA counsel did not file an appeal. However,
Barnett filed a pro se appeal and this Court filed an order directing PCRA
counsel to enter his appearance and resume his representation of Barnett. On
April 3, 1998, we rejected Barnett’s appellate claims and affirmed the PCRA
court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. Barnett supra. Thereafter,
Barnett filed an application for reargument, which we dismissed as untimely
filed. On November 12, 1998, our Supreme Court denied Barnett’s allocatur
petition. Commonwealth v. Barnett, 732 A.2d 611 (Pa. 1998).
Barnett filed a second PCRA petition on March 20, 1999, which the PCRA
court denied on August 2, 1999. Barnett appealed to this Court. On March
23, 2000, we affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief because it was
untimely filed, and Barnett failed to establish a time-bar exception.
Commonwealth v. Barnett, 757 A.2d 989 (Pa. Super. 2000). This Court
denied his petition for reargument on May 23, 2000. On October 11, 2000,
our Supreme Court denied his allocatur petition. Commonwealth v.
-2- J-S38030-23
Barnett, 795 A.2d 971 (Pa. 2000). Thereafter, Barnett filed a third pro se
PCRA petition that was dismissed on October 9, 2012, and a fourth PCRA
petition that was dismissed on June 2, 2016.
On June 1, 2022, Barnett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum and a motion for allowance to amend the petition, which the
PCRA court treated as his fifth PCRA petition. That same day, the PCRA court
issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Barnett’s fifth petition
as untimely. Barnett filed a response. By order entered June 22, 2022, the
PCRA court denied Barnett’s fifth petition. This appeal followed. The PCRA
court did not require Barnett to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), but the PCRA
court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement.
Barnett raises seven substantive issues on appeal. Before we consider
their merits, however, we first note that the PCRA court properly considered
his latest filing for post-conviction relief as a serial PCRA petition. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of
obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and
statutory remedies for the same purpose . . . including habeas corpus”);
Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining
that “claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought under
that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under the PCRA if the . . . conviction
resulted from one of seven enumerated errors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9543(a)(2)”).
-3- J-S38030-23
Treating Barnett’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we must next
determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely
filed, and that Barnett failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness
of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for
relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the
petition is met.
The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as
follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the
claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional
right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s
time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the
lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the
claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and
proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction
over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
-4- J-S38030-23
authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.
Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Here, Barnett’s judgment of sentence became final on November 16,
1990, thirty days after the time for filing a direct appeal to this Court expired.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Therefore, Barnett had until November 18,
1991, to file a timely petition.1 As Barnett filed the petition at issue in 2022,
it is patently untimely unless he has satisfied his burden of pleading and
proving that one of the enumerated exceptions applies. See Hernandez,
supra.
Barnett has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time
bar. Instead, he maintains that his request for habeas corpus relief exists
outside the parameters of the PCRA. In support of this claim, Barnett cites
this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Rouse, 191 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. Super.
2018). In Rouse, a panel of this Court concluded that a petition for writ of
habeas corpus claiming that the second-degree murder sentencing statute, 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b), was unconstitutionally void for vagueness involved a
claim that was not cognizable under the PCRA.
Initially, after reading Barnett’s lengthy brief we are uncertain whether
he raises this type of due process claim in challenging his first-degree murder
conviction. Nonetheless, we note that our Supreme Court in Commonwealth
1 Because the one-year date fell on a Saturday, Barnett had until the following
Monday to file his direct appeal. See generally, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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v. Moore, 247 A.3d 990, 998 (Pa. 2021), expressly “reject[ed] the Superior
Court’s ruling in Rouse.” In Moore, the High Court concluded that Moore’s
challenge to the sentencing statute for first-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
1102(a), as unconstitutionally “void for vagueness” was cognizable under the
PCRA. Id. Because Moore’s PCRA petition was untimely, and he had neither
pled nor proven a time-bar exception, our Supreme Court concluded that the
PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of Moore’s petition relief.
Barnett’s present appeal mandates the same conclusion; his petition is
cognizable under the PCRA, it is untimely, and we have no jurisdiction to
consider his claims.
Order affirmed.
Date: 11/14/2023
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