Com. v. Baker, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 14, 2025
• Docket: 10 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S26044-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYWON D. BAKER : : Appellant : No. 10 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 9, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002036-2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYWON D. BAKER : : Appellant : No. 11 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 9, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002041-2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TYWON D. BAKER : : Appellant : No. 12 MDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 9, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002053-2007

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., OLSON, J., and BECK, J. J-S26044-25

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED OCTOBER 14, 2025

Tywon D. Baker (“Baker”) appeals pro se from the order entered by the

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his serial petition pursuant

to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Because Baker filed an untimely

PCRA petition and failed to establish an exception to the statutory time bar,

we affirm.

On June 23, 2008, Baker entered a negotiated guilty plea to several

charges, including third-degree murder and aggravated assault, based upon

his involvement in the shooting death of Sean Hernandez (“Hernandez”) and

shooting at police officers during a standoff. The trial court accepted the plea,

and that same day, sentenced Baker to the agreed-upon sentence of thirty to

sixty years in prison. Baker did not file a direct appeal.

On May 26, 2009, Baker filed a timely PCRA petition, alleging that his

plea counsel was ineffective and seeking the reinstatement of his direct appeal

rights. The PCRA court denied the petition on June 22, 2010. This Court

affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 2100 MDA 2010 (Pa. Super. Sept.

14, 2012) (non-precedential decision). Over the course of approximately the

next decade, Baker filed additional PCRA petitions and a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, none of which merited any relief. See PCRA Petitions,

11/26/2010, 3/3/2016, 10/12/2018; see also Commonwealth v. Baker,

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

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242 A.3d 406, 2020 WL 6608872 (Pa. Super. Nov. 12, 2020) (non-

precedential decision).

On December 7, 2023, Baker filed the instant PCRA petition, invoking,

inter alia, the newly-discovered facts and governmental interference

exceptions to the PCRA’s time bar, based upon the Commonwealth’s alleged

withholding of evidence of gunshot residue found on Hernandez’s palm. Baker

asserted that his plea was unknowingly entered because he did not have this

information.

The PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition

without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Baker filed a response to the

Rule 907 notice. Ultimately, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Baker

filed a timely appeal.

On appeal, Baker presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the PCRA court commit legal error where [Baker] has alleged and proven the Commonwealth engaged in gamesmanship with regards to its last-minute discovery disclosure of material evidence of [Baker’s] actual innocence of third-degree murder, despite retaining knowledge of said evidence’s existence for well over a year, constituting a Brady[2] violation that infringed upon a criminal defendant’s right to make a knowing and intelligent decision relating to the entrance of a guilty plea?

2. Did the PCRA court commit legal error where it misapprehended the requirements for relief with regards to the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements and the newly-discovered evidence exception?

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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3. Did the PCRA court commit legal error where it imposed an additional criteria of proving trial counsel’s ineffective stewardship upon [Baker] in order to meet the newly- discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements?

Baker’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

Before we assess the merits of Baker’s claims, we must answer the

threshold question of whether the petition was filed timely or, alternatively,

whether he satisfied an exception to the statutory time bar. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Crucial

to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the underlying

petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant PCRA petition was

timely filed.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The timeliness

requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and

the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 994 (noting “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is

jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack jurisdiction over

the petition and cannot grant relief”). The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a

question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of

review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 121 (Pa.

Super. 2014).

The PCRA sets forth the following guidelines governing the timeliness of

any PCRA petition:

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(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Additionally, the petitioner must file a petition

invoking one of the exceptions “within one year of the date the claim could

have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2).

Baker’s judgment of sentence became final on July 23, 2008, after the

time to file a direct appeal expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Therefore, a timely

PCRA petition must have been filed on or before July 23, 2009. The present

PCRA petition, filed on December 7, 2023, is facially untimely.

Baker attempts to invoke the newly-discovered facts and governmental

interference exceptions to the time bar. Baker’s Brief at 7-19. He claims that

the Commonwealth had a duty to disclose the gunshot residue found on

Hernandez’s person, contending it established Hernandez killed himself. Id.

at 8-10, 11, 12, 16. According to Baker, he could not have knowingly pled

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guilty without knowledge of this evidence. Id. at 10, 12. He did not receive

the report indicating the presence of gunshot residue until December 6, 2022,

but notes that the report was dated May 9, 2008, and the tested items were

submitted on March 19, 2007. Id. at 12, 14; see also id. at 16, 17 (stating

that he found an email between his plea counsel and a Commonwealth agent

detailing the evidence on December 6, 2022). Baker acknowledges that the

Commonwealth provided this evidence to his counsel on June 6, 2008, but

argues that it did not disclose this evidence in a timely manner and that his

plea counsel never provided him with this information. Id. at 13-15. He

asserts that because it was the Commonwealth’s obligation to provide this

document in discovery, it was not his burden to uncover this evidence. Id. at

14-15, 17. Baker further rejects the PCRA court’s finding that his plea counsel

would have shared this information with him prior to the entry of the plea,

asserting there is no evidence to support it. Id. at 15.

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the government

did not interfere with Baker’s failure to previously raise a claim concerning the

residue found on Hernandez previously. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (citation

omitted). “In order for a defendant to establish the existence of a Brady

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violation, he must establish that there has been a suppression by the

prosecution of either exculpatory or impeachment evidence that was favorable

to the accused, and that the omission of such evidence prejudiced the

defendant.” Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 696 (Pa. 2003)

(citation omitted).

As Baker recognizes, the Commonwealth provided the report at issue,

which was received by his counsel on June 6, 2008, before he entered his

guilty plea. See Baker’s Brief at 13-15. Thus, there was no Brady violation,

and Baker makes no claim that the government providing the document in

question to counsel prior to his plea in anyway interfered with his ability to

bring his substantive claim concerning the validity of his plea sooner.

Further, assuming the information regarding the residue found on

Hernandez constitutes a newly discovered fact, neither Baker’s pleadings nor

the record supports a finding that he was unable to obtain it sooner through

the exercise of due diligence. PCRA petitioners must “perform due diligence

to discover the facts upon which their claim is predicated.” Commonwealth

v. Myers, 303 A.3d 118, 123 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). Although

due diligence does not require “perfect vigilance nor punctilious care,” a

petitioner must establish that he made “reasonable efforts …, based on the

particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for

collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 194 A.3d 126, 134 (Pa. Super.

2018) (citation omitted).

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As noted above, Baker has filed numerous PCRA petitions over the last

fifteen years. As far back as 2009, Baker raised claims based upon, inter alia,

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to conduct a proper investigation

of the case, failing to file a motion to modify Baker’s sentence, and failing to

ensure Baker’s mental competency to enter a guilty plea. See PCRA Petition,

5/26/2009. Baker unquestionably could have contacted his plea counsel to

obtain his file to effectuate these filings, at which point he would have learned

of the information contained in the document in question and that plea counsel

had obtained it prior to Baker pleading guilty. He gives no explanation as to

why he failed to do so.

Finally, Baker takes issue with the PCRA court’s finding that Baker’s

claim he was unaware of the existence of the report despite it being included

in discovery “would be more appropriately argued as an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim.” PCRA Court Opinion, 2/28/2025, at 5 (unnumbered); see

Baker’s Brief at 16, 18-19. Baker argues that the PCRA court should have

addressed the claim under the newly-discovered fact exception, and upon a

finding that he properly invoked the exception, address plea counsel’s

ineffectiveness for failing to provide the report to Baker. Baker’s Brief at 18.

As noted above, however, Baker did not satisfy the newly-discovered fact

exception by failing to establish that he could not have learned of the existence

of the gunshot residue report, and plea counsel’s possession thereof, sooner

through the exercise of due diligence. To the extent Baker seeks to have us

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decide his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it is well-settled law that

“a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise

untimely petition for review on the merits.” Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737

A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999).

Because Baker’s PCRA petition is facially untimely, and he failed to

establish any of the exceptions to the PCRA time bar, the PCRA court did not

have jurisdiction to entertain his petition. We likewise lack jurisdiction to

consider the claims he raises on appeal.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 10/14/2025

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