Com. v. Baez, M.
This text of Com. v. Baez, M. (Com. v. Baez, M.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
J-S31011-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MANUEL BAEZ : : Appellant : No. 493 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 25, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003914-2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 13, 2022
Manuel Baez appeals pro se from the dismissal of his second petition
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Since the petition
was untimely, we affirm.
On December 16, 2016, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to
third degree murder and robbery in relation to the 2015 strangulation and
robbery of Howard Baker. See N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 12/16/16, at 8-13.
After pleading guilty, Appellant immediately proceeded to sentencing where
the trial court imposed the agreed-upon aggregate sentence of thirty to sixty
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S31011-22
years of imprisonment.1 Id. at 12-23. Appellant did not file a post-sentence
motion or direct appeal.
On June 9, 2017, Appellant submitted his first pro se PCRA petition.
Appointed counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a no-merit letter pursuant
to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). After
issuing Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a
hearing, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition and permitted counsel
to withdraw. Appellant timely appealed. However, he failed to comply with
the PCRA court’s order to file a concise statement of matters complained of
on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).2 Accordingly, we were unable to
reach the merits of any issue presented by Appellant and affirmed the PCRA
court’s order on that basis. See Commonwealth v. Baez, 219 A.3d 253
1 Appellant was sentenced to twenty to forty years of incarceration for the homicide and a consecutive ten to twenty years of imprisonment for the robbery.
2 Appellant initially responded to the Rule 1925(b) order by submitting a second PCRA petition, which the PCRA court properly dismissed as premature. See Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961 (Pa.Super. 2019) (reiterating the established principle that a PCRA court has no jurisdiction to consider a subsequent PCRA petition while an appeal from the denial of a first PCRA petition is still pending). Appellant needed to choose either to appeal from the order denying his prior PCRA petition or file a new PCRA petition; he could not do both. Accordingly, this attempted petition had no effect on the timeliness of the instant petition. See Commonwealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4, 12 (Pa. 2012) (holding that the PCRA court does not have jurisdiction to place a serial petition in repose pending the outcome of an appeal in the same case). It was not until the following year that Appellant finally submitted a late Rule 1925(b) statement.
-2- J-S31011-22
(Pa.Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision). On February 5, 2020, our
Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Baez, 224 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020).
On November 3, 2020, Appellant filed a pro se motion requesting the
appointment of counsel, which the PCRA construed as a second PCRA petition
and appointed counsel. Thereafter, appointed counsel submitted a
Turner/Finley no-merit letter, contending that all the claims raised within
Appellant’s current and prior PCRA petitions were meritless. On January 25,
2022, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition
without a hearing and granted counsel’s petition to withdraw. Having received
no response from Appellant, on February 17, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s second PCRA petition as meritless. Appellant pro se timely filed a
notice of appeal and the PCRA court issued an order directing Appellant to file
a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Order, 2/17/22. Appellant did not file a
concise statement.
On appeal, Appellant raises multiple substantive issues for our review.3
See Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 2. The PCRA court opined that Appellant
again waived all his claims by failing to file a court-ordered Rule 1925(b)
concise statement. See PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/22, at 1. However, we
must first determine whether Appellant’s PCRA petition satisfies the PCRA’s ____________________________________________
3 We note that Appellant’s brief does not contain a statement of questions. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(4); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (stating that the court may dismiss an appeal where briefs fail to conform with the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure).
-3- J-S31011-22
timeliness requirements, since no court has jurisdiction to review an untimely
PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091 (Pa. 2010). In
order for a petition to be timely under the PCRA, it must be filed within one
year of the date that a petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 16, 2017,
when the period for filing a direct appeal expired. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b)(3).
Consequently, Appellant had until January 16, 2018, to file a timely PCRA
petition. Id. at § 9545(b)(1). However, Appellant did not file the instant
PCRA petition until February 24, 2020. Thus, Appellant’s petition, filed more
than three years after his judgment of sentence became final, is patently
untimely. Accordingly, unless Appellant pled and proved one of the three
exceptions to the PCRA time-bar outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1),4 we
cannot address the claim he asserts therein.
4 These exceptions are:
(i) The failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution of laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-4- J-S31011-22
Appellant did not allege below or in this appeal any exceptions to the
time-bar. Therefore, Appellant has not satisfied his burden of establishing
that the PCRA court erred when it dismissed Appellant’s second petition. See
Commonwealth v. Wiley, 966 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding
that this Court “may affirm the decision of the [PCRA] court if there is any
basis on the record to support the [PCRA] court’s action[.]”). Since neither
the PCRA court nor this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the
claims raised in an untimely PCRA petition, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
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