Com. v. Baehr, M.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 20, 2025
• Docket: 3245 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S17040-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MICHAEL FRANCIS BAEHR : : Appellant : No. 3245 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 1, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004449-2022

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JUNE 20, 2025

Appellant, Michael Francis Baehr, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following

his negotiated guilty plea for one count of driving with a suspended license

due to a prior conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”). 1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows.

On May 28, 2022, Appellant drove in Upper Providence Township with a

suspended license. Appellant’s license had been suspended due to a prior DUI

conviction, and he had previously driven with a suspended license on two prior

occasions.

On July 1, 2024, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count

of driving with a suspended license. Appellant completed a written guilty plea

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1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b). J-S17040-25

colloquy, and the court conducted an oral colloquy. Pursuant to his plea

agreement, the court sentenced Appellant to the negotiated term of 12

months’ restrictive probation, with the first 6 months to be served on house

arrest. On July 9, 2024, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion seeking

to withdraw his guilty plea or modify his sentence. On October 30, 2024, the

court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion.

On November 26, 2024, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On

December 2, 2024, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement of errors complained of on appeal. On December 22, 2024,

Appellant timely complied.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

Did the trial court err in sentencing Appellant without following the sentencing norms.

(Appellant’s Brief at 5).

In Appellant’s first issue, he contends that his guilty plea was not

knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered. Appellant concedes that “the

required terms for the guilty plea were met in both the written and oral

colloquy,” but nevertheless asserts that his plea was involuntary. (Id. at 14-

15). According to Appellant, he believed that he was being brought before

the court to have his bench warrant vacated, and that he did not expect to

enter into a plea agreement. Appellant concludes that the court erred by

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and that this Court must grant

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relief. We disagree.

Our review of the denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty

plea implicates the following principles:

[P]ost-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny [than pre-sentence motions to withdraw a plea] since courts strive to discourage entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices. A defendant must demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the court were to deny his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Manifest injustice may be established if the plea was not tendered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 756-57 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

“In determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the

totality of circumstances surrounding the plea.” Commonwealth v. Hart,

174 A.3d 660, 664-65 (Pa.Super. 2017). “A valid plea colloquy must delve

into [the following] areas: 1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis

of the plea, 3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5)

the sentencing ranges, and 6) the plea court’s power to deviate from any

recommended sentence.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782

(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107

(Pa.Super. 2005)). “Furthermore, nothing in [Pa.R.Crim.P. 590] precludes

the supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read,

completed and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea

proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212-13

(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 742, 964 A.2d 893 (2009). See

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also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.

“A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he

makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea

colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 480 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

“[T]he law does not require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of

his decision to plead guilty. The law requires only that a defendant’s decision

to plead guilty be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”

Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 506 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Instantly, Appellant executed the written guilty plea colloquy on July 1,

2024. In it, Appellant acknowledged that he had reviewed the pending

charges and was satisfied with his attorney’s advice and representation. (See

Written Plea Colloquy, 7/1/24, at 2, 5-7). Appellant confirmed his

understanding of the presumption of innocence and his right to a bench or

jury trial. (Id. at 3). Appellant also confirmed his understanding of the

maximum sentence and fine he could receive for his crime. (Id. at 3-4).

Regarding the facts at issue, Appellant indicated that he would allow the

Commonwealth to summarize the facts to which he would plead guilty. (Id.

at 6).

That same day, the court conducted the oral guilty plea colloquy. During

the oral colloquy, Appellant reiterated that he had reviewed the written

colloquy with counsel. (See N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing, 7/1/24, at 5-6).

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Appellant stated that he understood he was giving up his right to go to trial

by pleading guilty, and that he was entitled to probation violation hearings,

and if he was found in violation, he could be re-sentenced up to his maximum

exposure on the underlying charge. (Id. at 6, 8). The court informed

Appellant of the maximum sentencing exposure and fines for the current

offense. (Id. at 6). The Commonwealth then provided the factual basis for

the plea, and Appellant admitted that the Commonwealth’s facts were

accurate. (Id. at 9-10). At the conclusion of the oral colloquy, Appellant

affirmed that he wanted to plead guilty. (Id. at 9). The court then accepted

Appellant’s plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (Id. at 12).

Appellant is bound by the statements made in the written and oral

colloquies, which indicate Appellant’s intent to plead guilty. See Pier, supra.

Under the totality of these circumstances, Appellant’s plea was valid. See

Hart, supra. Therefore, Appellant failed to demonstrate a manifest injustice,

and he is not entitled to relief on his first issue. See Kehr, supra.

In Appellant’s second issue, he contends that the trial court failed to

follow “sentencing norms” when imposing his sentence. Appellant asserts that

he hoped for a sentence of “time-served” so that he could more easily relocate

to Florida instead of being placed on house arrest. Appellant argues that he

was rushed into pleading guilty and did not have sufficient time to think about

his sentence. Appellant concludes that this Court must vacate and remand

for resentencing. We disagree.

It is well-settled that discretionary sentencing challenges to negotiated

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sentences are not reviewable on appeal. See Reid, supra at 784. See also

Commonwealth v. O'Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2008)

(stating: “One who pleads guilty and receives a negotiated sentence may not

then seek discretionary review of that sentence”).

Here, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea and the court

imposed the agreed-upon sentence. (See N.T. Guilty Plea Hearing at 12-13).

Following the imposition of his sentence, both the Commonwealth and

Appellant’s counsel indicated that they did not have corrections to make to

the agreed-upon sentence as approved by the court and read into the record.

(See id. at 13). Thus, Appellant cannot now challenge the discretionary

aspects of his sentence. Reid, supra; O’Malley, supra. Accordingly, we

affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 6/20/2025

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