Com. v. Arroyo, T.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 3, 2025
• Docket: 1332 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A12017-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : TIMOTHY ARROYO : : Appellant : No. 1332 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 18, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002006-2022

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 3, 2025

Appellant, Timothy Arroyo, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on April 18, 2024, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County following his convictions after a bench trial for Possession with Intent

to Deliver and Knowing and Intentional Possession of a controlled substance. 1

Appellant challenges the admission of certain testimony. After careful review,

we affirm.

We glean the relevant factual and procedural history from the trial court

opinion. On December 15, 2021, at approximately 3:15 PM, the Philadelphia

Police Department’s Narcotics Strike Force (“NSF”) was conducting

surveillance on the 2900 block of Howard Street in the Kensington section of

Philadelphia. Officer Brian Outterbridge observed a man, Javier Pagan,

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and (a)(30), respectively. J-A12017-25

approach Appellant, engage in a brief conversation, and hand Appellant

money. Appellant then walked into a blue tent on the sidewalk, returned to

Mr. Pagan, and handed him a small object.2 Backup officers stopped Mr.

Pagan once he left the area and recovered an orange stapled Ziplock packet

of powder cocaine.

“A few minutes later,” Officer Outterbridge observed another man,

Gabriel Rodriguez, approach Appellant and hand him money. Trial Ct. Op.,

9/3/24, at 2. Appellant again went to the tent, returned, and handed small

objects to Mr. Rodriguez. Backup officers stopped Mr. Rodriguez and

recovered an orange stapled Ziploc packet of powder cocaine. Officer

Outterbridge could not hear the conversations or see the denominations of the

money exchanged.

After this transaction, Appellant drove away in a black BMW.

Approximately 17 minutes later, he returned to the block, exited the vehicle,

and sat on the front steps of a residence. After receiving Appellant’s

description from Officer Outterbridge, backup officer Anthony Woltman

arrested Appellant, searched him, and recovered $650 in cash. Backup officer

Michael Robertson searched the tent and recovered 30 pink flip-top containers

of crack cocaine.

Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on April 4, 2024. Officers

Outterbridge, Woltman, and Robertson testified consistently with the above ____________________________________________

2 The tent consisted of four poles with a blue canopy on the top—it was open

on all four sides. N.T. Trial, 4/4/24, at 27.

-2- J-A12017-25

facts. The officers who recovered the drugs from the buyers did not testify,

and instead the parties stipulated to the property receipts, which indicated

that both buyers possessed powder cocaine in orange Ziploc packets. Exhibits

C-1 & C-4. The Commonwealth did not present any expert testimony.

During Officer Outterbridge’s testimony, Appellant lodged the following

objections:

Commonwealth: And how many narcotics arrests have you made over the years?

Officer Outterbridge: Well over a thousand.

Appellant: Your Honor, I’m going to object to relevance. This is, again, a trial about what happened on that date. This is not a motion to suppress. I would argue that this is irrelevant testimony for purpose of the trial.

****

Commonwealth: Officer, as of December 15th of 2021, did you know any narcotics sales to be made in the area of the 2900 block of North Howard Street in the city and county of Philadelphia?

Appellant: And, Your Honor, I do object to that question as well. [3]

Commonwealth: Officer, you just testified to two transactions you witnessed involving U.S. currency in exchange for a small item.

3 Appellant objected to the previous question, whether the area was a high-

crime area, because that question went “towards a motion and not towards, as far as relevance goes, my client’s guilt or innocence. . . .they’re trying to get in really evidence without any foundation other than the officer’s testimony, that it. . .would be overly prejudicial [and] would outweigh the relevance to the fact finder.” N.T. Trial at 17.

-3- J-A12017-25

What, if anything, did you believe that you were observing at that time?

Officer Outterbridge: I believed I observed a narcotics transaction.

Commonwealth: And what did you base your belief on?

Officer Outterbridge: Based on experience, most narcotic transactions are similar in nature. So it’s the repetition of it. You have short conversations. You have some money exchanged, normally for objects.

Appellant: Objection. Your Honor, I’m going to object to this line of testimony. It’s not relevant who is the finder of fact or taking the information to determine whether or not these are narcotics transactions. At this point the Commonwealth is basically asking the witness to qualify himself as an expert and give an expert opinion as to what he observed. Once again, this is not a motion to suppress; this is a trial. And for purposes of a motion to suppress, I could understand this evidence being relevant. However, for trial purposes, you as the finder of fact at the trial are the one that needs to make that determination.

Commonwealth: Now, would that -- does that give you any impression if a dealer is selling both, the same dealer is selling both [crack cocaine and powder cocaine]--

Appellant: Objection, Your Honor.

Court: Sustained.

Commonwealth: Okay. Have you, in your experience, witnessed a same dealer selling both crack cocaine and powder cocaine?

Court: Overruled. That one’s overruled.

N.T. Trial, 4/4/24, at 15-16; 19; 29-30; 32-33 (emphasis added). With the

exception of one, the court overruled each of these objections. Id. at 16, 19,

31-33.

-4- J-A12017-25

Appellant testified that he earned approximately $500 per week via

direct deposit for his “off and on” work as a home health aide for his uncle,

who lived on the 2900 block of Howard Street, and further stated that he

earned cash for occasional plumbing work. Id. at 61. He explained that, on

the date of his arrest, he left his uncle’s house to pick up his girlfriend in his

black BMW, returned to his uncle’s house, and went inside to get money for

his uncle’s medicine when he was arrested. He also testified that he did not

consider $650 to be a lot of money—$234 was for his uncle’s medicine and

the rest was for daily expenses. Finally, Appellant denied going inside the

blue tent or interacting with anyone on the street beyond casual greetings.

The court convicted Appellant of the above charges. On April 18, 2024,

the court sentenced Appellant to 3 years of probation.

Appellant timely appealed. Both he and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err (as it conceded) in permitting the Commonwealth to elicit inadmissible expert opinion testimony from Officer Outterbridge, a lay witness?

2. Was the trial court’s conceded error harmless?

Appellant’s Br. at 3.

We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014). An

abuse of discretion is “the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the

-5- J-A12017-25

exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,

prejudice, ill-will[,] or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”

Commonwealth v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted).

It is well-settled that “[g]enerally, lay witnesses may express personal

opinions related to their observations on a range of subject areas based on

their personal experiences that are helpful to the factfinder.”

Commonwealth v. Berry, 172 A.3d 1, 3–4 (Pa. Super. 2017). Lay witness

opinion testimony is admissible if it is

(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and

(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.E. 701. By contrast, “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” may offer an opinion if,

relevantly, his “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is beyond

that possessed by the average layperson[.]” Id. at 702(a). Furthermore,

“[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue”

in a case. Id. at 704.

In Commonwealth v. Carter, we addressed the admissibility of expert

testimony where officers observed the appellant conducting narcotics

transactions and subsequently recovered the stash. 589 A.2d 1133 (Pa.

Super. 1991). During the appellant’s jury trial, the court permitted the police

-6- J-A12017-25

officers to testify as expert witnesses about, inter alia, “whether the pattern

of activity observed by the police officers was consistent with the usual pattern

of narcotics transactions.” Id. at 1134. This Court, however, concluded that

the court had abused its discretion in permitting the officers to testify as

experts. Id. at 1135. We opined that the jury did not need specialized

knowledge to determine whether it believed the officers’ testimony about their

observations, and thus, the officers’ expert testimony was prejudicial, and

cumulative. Id. at 1134-35. Moreover, we noted that permitting officers to

testify as experts would cause the jury to focus improperly on qualifications

rather than firsthand knowledge. Id. at 1135. However, the Court held that

this type of expert testimony is appropriate in cases where officers do not

observe transactions. Id.

With respect to the harmless error doctrine, “we must vacate the order

on review to correct the error unless we are convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error is harmless.” Commonwealth v. Murray, 248 A.3d

557, 576 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

An error is harmless where

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.

-7- J-A12017-25

Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 483 (Pa. 2021) (citations

omitted). In other words, “an evidentiary error of the trial court will be

deemed harmless on appeal where the appellate court is convinced, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”

Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 880 A.2d 608, 614 (Pa. 2005).

Relevantly, where a defendant opts for a bench trial, “a judge [as

factfinder], as opposed to a jury of laypersons, possesses the expertise

necessary to perceive and discount improper opinion evidence from a police

expert[.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 596 A.2d 840, 844 (Pa. Super. 1991).

The court, as factfinder, “presumptively is capable of disregarding

inadmissible evidence and considering only relevant and competent evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Neal, 713 A.2d 657, 662 (Pa. Super. 1998).

*

Appellant agrees with the trial court’s concession that it was an abuse

of discretion to allow Officer Outterbridge to offer the above testimony.

Appellant’s Br. at 16-17. He further asserts that the Commonwealth failed to

meet its burden to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt because the evidence at trial was not overwhelming and this testimony

was necessary to overcome weaknesses in the evidence. Id. at 17-18, 20-

21. Specifically, he notes that Officer Outterbridge’s descriptions of the

transactions were “extremely vague” and the drugs in the stash did not match

the drugs recovered from the buyers, and he argues that Officer

Outterbridge’s testimony filled these gaps. Id. at 20. He also cites other

-8- J-A12017-25

perceived weaknesses in the evidence, such as the lack of explanation why he

left his stash unattended in the tent, and the lack of testimony that the

packaging of the drugs recovered from the two buyers matched. 4 Id. at 20-

21. Relatedly, Appellant asserts that the court’s disbelief of his testimony is

insufficient to convict him—the Commonwealth must still meet its burden to

affirmatively establish his guilt. Id. at 22 (citing Commonwealth v. Torres,

766 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 2001)).

In support, Appellant explains that Brown, which held that the court,

as fact-finder, could discount improper opinion evidence, is distinguishable

because the court did not indicate that it disregarded the inadmissible

testimony completely. Id. at 18-19 (citing 596 A.2d at 840). He maintains

that the testimony at issue is similar to that in Carter, because, like in Carter,

police testified to observed transactions, and thus expert testimony—or lay

testimony emphasizing the officer’s experience and knowledge—was

unnecessary, cumulative, and prejudicial. Id. at 22-25. Finally, he notes that

the Commonwealth emphasized this testimony in its closing argument. Id. at

25-26.

The trial court conceded that it should not have permitted Officer

Outterbridge to testify about his experience when he was not qualified as an

expert witness. Trial Ct. Op. at 5. However, it determined that the error was

4 The parties had entered a stipulation as to the police department’s property

receipts, which stated that the cocaine recovered from each buyer was in stapled orange Ziploc packets. Commonwealth’s Ex. C-1 and C-4.

-9- J-A12017-25

harmless because the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was overwhelming—the

recovery of the same drugs in the same packaging from both buyers that had

interacted with Appellant corroborated Officer Outterbridge’s credible

testimony about his observations. Id. at 2, 7. Furthermore, the court noted

that it found Appellant’s testimony about his activities that day, his

employment, and the source of the money on his person not credible. Id. at

7-8. Finally, the court explained that, as the factfinder, it could discount

improper opinion testimony, and that it did not let that testimony influence

credibility or give it “undue weight.” Id. at 7 (citing Brown, 596 A.2d at 844).

Following our review, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion, and

appreciate the trial court’s candor, that it erroneously admitted Officer

Outterbridge’s testimony. Officer Outterbridge relied on specialized

knowledge gained from his experience as an NSF officer to opine that the

interactions he observed were drug deals. This constitutes an expert opinion,

not a lay opinion, and he was not qualified as an expert witness. 5

However, the trial court correctly concluded that admitting this

testimony was harmless error. The evidence indicated that Appellant

conducted exchanges with two buyers who were stopped shortly after, and

both had cocaine in the same type of packaging. Therefore, despite the

5 The Commonwealth cites Carter to establish that officers should not give expert testimony on the drug sales that they personally observed, but Carter does not address whether officers can give that same type of opinion testimony as a lay witness. Commonwealth’s Br. at 10-11 (citing 589 A.2d at 1133-35).

- 10 - J-A12017-25

alleged weaknesses cited by Appellant, the evidence presented at trial allowed

the court to reasonably infer that Appellant sold cocaine to the buyers, without

relying on Officer Outterbridge’s improper opinion testimony to reach that

conclusion. We have no reason to disbelieve the court’s assertion that it

“discount[ed] any improper opinion evidence.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7. Accordingly,

we conclude that the error was harmless, and Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 7/3/2025

- 11 -