J-A24043-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : JOSE L. SOLIS ARROYO : No. 652 EDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered February 16, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0003019-2021
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2025
In this procedurally unorthodox case, the Commonwealth appeals the
grant of Jose L. Solis Arroyo’s (“Arroyo”) post-sentence motions for
reconsideration of suppression and judgment of acquittal/arrest of judgment.
After careful review, we determine the trial court committed an error of law
when it reversed itself after trial and suppressed evidence, having determined
police subjected Arroyo to a custodial detention requiring Miranda warnings.
Arroyo rear-ended another car and left the scene of an accident. His actions
required separate investigating officers: one to interview the driver Arroyo hit,
the other to locate and speak with Arroyo at his residence regarding the
accident, neither of whom performed a custodial detention. Thus, we reverse
the post-sentence judgment of acquittal, the suppression of Arroyo’s
statements to investigating officers, and the suppression of the results of
Arroyo’s chemical blood testing, and remand for the reimposition of sentence. J-A24043-23
The testimony presented at the suppression hearing 1 established that
on April 18, 2021, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Christoper Martin (“Martin”)
was driving on Easton Road in Doylestown, and while waiting at the traffic
light, a man driving a white pickup truck bumped into his car, causing a slight
jolt. See N.T., 4/21/22, at 10, 14. When the light changed, Martin pulled
over into a nearby parking lot expecting the other driver to do the same, but
the pickup truck continued to drive away. See id. at 11, 17-18.
Once he realized the driver was not stopping, Martin got back on the
road and followed the truck, which he observed to be driving erratically, for
several minutes. See id. at 11-12. While following the man driving the pickup
truck, Martin called 911 and identified the vehicle that struck him as a white
Dodge truck with the license plate “ZPW5280.” See id. at 12, 14-15. Martin
told the dispatcher he flashed his lights and honked his horn but the driver
still did not pull over. See id.
Martin then pulled into a 7-Eleven store parking lot and waited for police.
See id. at 15, 19. At approximately 9:45 p.m., Doylestown Township Police
Officer Jared Courts (“Officer Courts”), arrived and spoke with Martin. See
id. at 19, 24. The dispatcher ran the license plate Martin provided, determined
____________________________________________
1 By agreement of the parties, the court incorporated the testimony from the
combined supplemental preliminary hearing/suppression hearing into the trial record. See N.T., 4/21/22, at 7, 20, 75.
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“ZPW5280” was registered to Arroyo, and gave Arroyo’s address. See id. at
24-25.
While Officer Courts met Martin in the parking lot to investigate the
accident, Officer Donald Lawson (“Officer Lawson”), who also received
Arroyo’s address from the dispatcher, drove to Arroyo’s residence to see if he
could locate the driver and assist in the investigation. See id. at 28-29.
Upon arrival at approximately 10:08 p.m., Officer Lawson saw the white
pickup truck registered to Arroyo with license plate ZPW5280 in front of
Arroyo’s residence. See id. at 29-31. Officer Lawson, who was in uniform
in a marked police car and wearing his body camera,2 knocked on the door
and backed away from the steps and waited for someone to answer. See id.
at 31. Arroyo’s wife answered the door. Officer Lawson said he was
investigating an automobile accident and asked to speak with the driver of
the pickup truck. See id. at 32. In response, Arroyo came to the open door.
See id.
Officer Lawson asked Arroyo, “[W]hat happened?” and Arroyo said,
“What do you mean what happened?” See id. at 34, CPH-2 at 1:30. When
Arroyo did not answer his question, Officer Lawson explained he could either
tow the car or Arroyo could talk to him about the accident. See id., CPH at
2 The footage from the body cameras worn by the officers in the case, CPH-2
(Officer Lawson), and CPH-3 (Officer Courts), was introduced into evidence, see N.T., 4/21/22, at 35, 52, 75, and is part of the certified record.
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1:40-45. Arroyo said, “Okay.” See id. Officer Lawson then described the
information he was already provided about the accident; he said that the
other driver “already gave us your tags . . . that’s how I got your truck . . . .
So, what happened, man?” See id., CPH-2 at 1:45-2:00; N.T. 4/21/22, at
37. When Arroyo stepped outside, Officer Lawson smelled alcohol emanating
from him, and noticed his gait was unsteady. Arroyo spoke in Spanish to his
wife, who then told Officer Lawson, “He rear-ended them.” See id., CPH-2
at 2:08-2:18. Officer Lawson responded, “That’s what the [other] guy said.
There’s not a lot of damage, but he did say he was rear-ended.” See id.,
CPH-2 at 2:18-24. He added that “nobody’s hurt or anything” and “we just
need to get your insurance.” See id., CPH-2 at 2:24-28. Officer Lawson
additionally commented that “staying at the scene would be a big help.” See
id., CPH-2 at 2:28-34. Officer Lawson asked Arroyo, “Can you show me
where you hit him?” See id., CPH-2 at 2:44-52.
Officer Lawson then asked Arroyo to provide his registration and
insurance information; Arroyo looked unsuccessfully for the necessary
paperwork in his truck. His wife then found the information on a cell phone.
See id., CPH-2 at 3:00-7:45. After Officer Lawson obtained Arroyo’s license
and insurance information, he told Arroyo and his wife that the officer who
was investigating the accident was on his way to talk to Arroyo about what
happened and said, “If you just hang around for a few minutes, that’d be
great.” See id., CPH-2 at 7:45-9:30.
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After meeting with Martin, Officer Courts drove to Arroyo’s residence,
arriving at approximately 10:23 p.m., fifteen minutes after Officer Lawson’s
arrival. See id. at 26, CPH-2 at 14:25. Officer Lawson relayed to Officer
Courts that Arroyo admitted bumping into the other car and said he had
obtained Arroyo’s driver’s license and insurance information. See id., CPH-
2 at 14:25-50.
Officer Courts then approached Arroyo and, while standing
approximately five feet from the door of the house, asked him, “What
happened earlier?” See id., CPH-2 at 15:00-05; CPH-3, 7:55. As they spoke,
Officer Courts detected an odor of alcohol from Arroyo. See id., CPH-3 at
8:03-8:22. Officer Courts administered field sobriety tests, which Arroyo did
not perform satisfactorily. See id., CPH-3 at 9:00-17:00; N.T., 4/21/23, at
52-58. Officer Courts then administered a portable breathalyzer, that
registered a blood alcohol level of .242. See id., CPH-3 at 17:00-18:15.
Officer Courts placed Arroyo in handcuffs and arrested him for driving under
the influence of alcohol. See id., CPH-3 at 18:30-20:30.
As a result of their investigation, police charged Arroyo with accidents
involving damage to attended vehicle or property, driving under the influence
(“DUI”) general impairment (second offense), and DUI - highest blood alcohol
content (“BAC”) (second offense).3 See id. at 78-79. At the conclusion of
3 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3743, 3802(a)(1), 3802(c).
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the supplemental preliminary hearing/suppression hearing, the court found
the Commonwealth had presented a prima facie case on all charges. The
court invited counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law on Arroyo’s suppression claim seeking the suppression of all evidence and
statements resulting from an illegal arrest. See id. at 78-79.
In its proposed findings, the Commonwealth asserted Arroyo was
subjected to an investigative, not a custodial, detention. See
Commonwealth’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6/1/22.
Arroyo asserted that the police subjected him to a custodial detention, the
functional equivalent of an arrest, for which the right to Miranda warnings
attach. Arroyo further argued that all his subsequent statements and his blood
test results required suppression as “fruits of the poisonous tree” of the illegal
arrest and failure to read him his Miranda rights. See Arroyo’s Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6/3/22.
Initially, the court held Officer Lawson subjected Arroyo to a custodial
detention and interrogation without informing him of his Miranda rights and
suppressed Arroyo’s statements to Officer Lawson. The court found, however,
that Officer Courts’s interaction with Arroyo “purged the taint” of Officer
Lawson’s custodial detention and admitted Arroyo’s statements to Officer
Courts, along with the results of the field sobriety tests, and his blood alcohol
test. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6/13/22, at 6-9.
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Subsequent to the trial court’s suppression determination, Arroyo
waived his right to a jury trial, and the court admitted the evidence and
testimony from the supplemental preliminary hearing/suppression hearing
into the trial record.4 See N.T., 10/11/22, at 8-9. The trial court convicted
Arroyo of the above-listed offenses, and then later sentenced him to an
aggregate term of ninety days of house arrest to sixty months of restrictive
probation.5 See N.T., 12/21/22.
Arroyo filed a post-sentence petition to file a post-sentence motion nunc
pro tunc on January 5, 2023. On January 18, 2023, the court granted the
petition. Arroyo asserted Officer Courts’s interrogation should have been
suppressed because his interactions with Arroyo were a continuation of Officer
Lawson’s arrest and custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. See
Arroyo’s Post-Sentence Motion, 2/21/23,6 at 2-3.
Then on February 17, 2023, the trial court issued amended post-
sentence findings of fact and conclusions of law, reversing its pre-trial ruling.
The amended findings of fact added only three additional factual findings to
the original opinion: 1) Officer Lawson obtained Arroyo’s license and insurance
4 In essence this was a stipulated fact trial.
5 This was Arroyo’s second DUI conviction.
6 Although the docket states the post-sentence motion was filed on January
24, 2023, it is stamped as received on both February 21, 2023, and February 22, 2023.
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information, told him Officer Courts was coming to speak with him, and asked
him to “hang out”; 2) Officer Lawson said to another officer, “[L]et me just go
talk to [Arroyo] before he goes inside” prior to Officer Courts’s arrival; and 3)
Officer Lawson retained Arroyo’s driver’s license and insurance information
until Officer Courts arrived. See Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, 2/17/23, at 6. Based on these three additional factual findings, the
court reversed its pre-trial ruling and granted, post-sentence, suppression of
Arroyo’s statements to Officer Courts (in addition to the statements to Officer
Lawson) and all evidence concerning Arroyo’s field sobriety and blood tests.
The court found that all the evidence derived from Officer Lawson’s unlawful
custodial detention and interrogation rendered the subsequent evidence “fruit
of the poisonous tree.” See id. at 7-10. The court then granted Arroyo’s
motion for judgment of acquittal on all charges. See id. at 10.7
7 Both the trial court and the parties agree the court erred in granting a post-
sentence judgment of acquittal. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 35-37; Arroyo’s Brief at 3; Trial Court Opinion 5/2/23, at 7.
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The Commonwealth complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); the trial court,
however, only addressed the Commonwealth’s fourth claim 8 challenging the
judgment of acquittal in its 1925(a) opinion. 9
The Commonwealth submits the following issues for this Court’s review:
1. The trial court erred in suppressing the statements [Arroyo] made to Officer Lawson where [Arroyo] was subjected to no more than an investigatory detention, not custodial interrogation, and Miranda warnings are not required.
2. The trial court erred in suppressing the subsequent statements [Arroyo] made to Officer Courts, as well as the field sobriety tests, where [Arroyo] was not previously subjected to a custodial interrogation by Officer Lawson and Officer Courts did nothing to escalate the interaction to the level of “in custody” for Miranda purposes until [Arroyo] was formally arrested following field sobriety testing.
3. The trial court erred in suppressing the results of the chemical testing of [Arroyo’s] blood where there was no initial illegality which was exploited to obtain this evidence and where the effects of any perceived illegality was sufficiently purged by the fact that officers had independent probable cause to believe [Arroyo] was driving under the influence and where the subsequent warnings at the time of the blood draw provided an independent source.
4. The trial court erred in granting [Arroyo]’s motion for judgment of acquittal following its [post-sentence] suppression of evidence where, even if we assume that reconsideration of the
8 We remind the trial court Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925 does not afford
it the discretion to address only the issues it chooses. In the absence of a trial court opinion on the first three issues, we are compelled to analyze those issues using the trial court’s amended findings of fact and conclusions of law.
9 Because the trial court granted suppression retroactively following conviction
and sentencing, and granted judgment of acquittal, there is no dispute the Commonwealth’s appeal lies from a final order.
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suppression motions was proper, the appropriate remedy is a new trial.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
Because the first three questions presented concern the suppression of
the statements given to Officers Lawson and Courts and the evidence obtained
thereafter, based on the trial court’s determination that Lawson’s interaction
with Arroyo was a custodial detention, we address the first three interrelated
questions presented together.
The Commonwealth asserts the trial court committed an error of law
when it found Officer Lawson’s encounter with Arroyo rose to the level of a
custodial detention, requiring the administration of Miranda warnings and, in
their absence, the suppression of Arroyo’s statements to Officers Lawson and
Courts and of the blood alcohol evidence obtained thereafter. We agree.
At suppression the Commonwealth bears the burden to establish the
challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of the accused’s rights. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H). When the Commonwealth appeals an order granting a
defendant’s motion to suppress, this Court considers only the evidence from
the defense witnesses10 together with the evidence of the prosecution that
when read in the context of the entire record remains uncontradicted. See
Commonwealth v. Dales, 820 A.2d 807, 812 (Pa. Super. 2003). The
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony is in the
10 Arroyo presented no evidence at suppression.
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suppression court’s sole province. See Commonwealth v. Dutrieville, 932
A.2d 240, 242 (Pa. Super. 2007).11
Although a reviewing court is bound by the lower court’s findings of fact
if they are supported in the record, it conducts plenary review to determine if
the court properly applied the law to the facts. See Commonwealth v.
Dunkins, 263 A.3d 247, 252 (Pa. 2021); Dales, 820 A.2d at 812. If the
suppression court drew erroneous legal conclusions from the evidence, we
may reverse. See Dunkins, 263 A.3d 252.
The Commonwealth’s first three claims are resolved by our
determination that in applying the facts of record which the trial court
accepted as credible and are supported by the record, Officer Lawson’s words
and actions under the applicable law constituted an investigative detention,
not a custodial detention, under the totality of the circumstances. 12
An investigative detention, which requires reasonable suspicion, is
temporary, unless it results in the formation of probable cause for arrest, and
does not possess the coercive conditions consistent with a formal arrest. See
11 Notably in both the original and amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law the trial court found Martin’s, Officer Courts’s, and Officer Lawson’s testimony completely credible AND consistent with the evidence submitted at suppression. See Original Findings of Facts ¶¶ 74-76; Amended Findings of Fact ¶¶ 74-76. Thus, all testimony and evidence are credible and uncontradicted.
12Because the trial court found all testimony credible there is no need to analyze if and where the record facts are contradicted.
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Commonwealth v. Rice, 304 A.3d 1255, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2023);
Commonwealth v. Tam Thanh Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657, 664 (Pa. Super.
2015). A custodial detention, by contrast, is the functional equivalent of an
arrest and occurs when the nature, duration, and conditions of an investigative
detention “become so coercive [] as to constitute the functional equivalent of
an arrest.” Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa. Super.
2023) (citation omitted). During a traffic stop, police may ask the detainee a
moderate number of questions to determine a driver’s identity and to try to
confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions. See Commonwealth v. Wright,
224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019). Additionally, during an investigative
detention involving a car police may take a suspect’s keys. See Spence, 290
A.2d at 316.
A trial court assessing whether an investigative detention has evolved
into a custodial detention considers the totality of the circumstances including:
the cause for the detention, the detention’s length, the detention’s location, whether the suspect was transported against his or her will, whether physical restraints were used, whether the police used or threatened force, and the character of the investigative methods used to confirm or dispel the suspicions of the police. . . . [C]ustodial interrogation has been defined as questioning initiated by the police after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way. Further, an interrogation occurs when the police should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Spence, 290 A.3d at 314-15 (citation and brackets omitted).
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Where a driver leaves the scene of an accident that caused damage to
a car or involves personal injury, makes no attempt to stop and identify
himself, and he is identified as the driver, the evidence is sufficient to show
he was involved in the accident for which he is required to remain at the
accident scene and proves his commission of leaving the scene of an accident.
See Commonwealth v. Lowry, 55 A.3d 743, 749-51 (Pa. Super. 2012);13
Commonwealth v. Hilfiger, 615 A.2d 452, 456-67 (Pa. Super. 1992).
The uncontroverted, credited testimony shows Martin, an identified
complainant, called 911 after being rear ended at a traffic light, described the
incident to the dispatcher, followed Arroyo, observed his erratic driving,
obtained his license plate number and relayed all of this information to the
911 dispatcher. Martin pulled over into a 7-Eleven parking lot, where Officer
Courts met him to gather information about the accident and take a report.
Meanwhile, Officer Lawson obtained the same dispatch information and
headed to the residence where the truck was registered in an attempt to
locate the individual who did not remain at the scene of the accident and assist
in the accident investigation. When Officer Lawson arrived at the residence,
without the use of his lights or siren, he found the white pickup truck with the
license plate number Martin gave the dispatcher. Officer Lawson knocked on
13 Lowry involves a violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742, but like Section 3743 at
issue here, Section 3742 requires the driver to comply with the Section 3744 obligation to remain at the scene of the accident, provide information and render aid.
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the door, stepped back, waited for someone to answer the door, and asked to
speak to the driver of the pickup truck. When Arroyo stepped forward, Officer
Lawson asked him what happened, clearly in reference to the accident. At
this point Officer Lawson had reasonable suspicion that Arroyo had left the
scene of an accident, a Vehicle Code violation. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743
(requiring an individual involved in an accident involving vehicle damage “to
remain at the scene of the accident[.]”) When Arroyo hesitated, Officer
Lawson told Arroyo he had a choice: to tell him about the accident or have his
car towed.14
Officer Lawson then asked Arroyo for his license, registration and proof
of insurance, as the law permits police to do at an accident scene. See 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3744 (requiring a driver involved in an accident involving damage
to a vehicle to provide his name, address, and, upon request, his registration,
driver’s license, and insurance information). With his wife’s help, Arroyo
located the information and handed it to the officer. Officer Lawson asked
Arroyo to “hang out” to speak to Officer Courts, who arrived minutes later
after gathering information from Martin, who had stopped after the accident.
Officer Lawson did not talk in an aggressive manner, did not touch Arroyo, did
14 Significantly, Arroyo was at his residence and towing his truck, that had been in an accident, would not have caused him to be stranded or alone in a place unfamiliar to him. Moreover, as addressed infra, Officer Lawson’s questions were legally permissible in instances, like this one, where an accident causes damage to a vehicle.
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not handcuff him or put him in a police car and did not threaten to arrest
Arroyo; instead, he asked Arroyo to “hang out” until Officer Courts arrived. 15
The trial court recognizes that Arroyo’s movements were not restrained
and Officer Lawson acted in a non-confrontational manner. See Trial Court’s
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2/17/23, at 8, ¶ 12-13.
However, it regards the “threat to tow” as the operative fact which transforms
the investigative detention into a custodial detention, and assigns coercive
weight to the officer’s request that Arroyo “hang out” until Officer Courts
arrived. Id. at 8, ¶14; 9, ¶ 3.
The trial court’s primary reliance on the threat to tow and the request
that Arroyo remain nearby until Officer Courts arrived did not allow for the
required totality of the circumstances review, which would have recognized
that Arroyo’s flight from the accident scene necessitated the involvement of
two investigating officers and caused a delay in the officers’ ability to
investigate the accident. Furthermore, the court did not consider Arroyo’s
actions preceding his interaction with Officer Lawson, and as a result the
complete facts (accepted by the trial court as credible and consistent) were
not viewed in their proper context. Thus, the trial court failed to weigh the
15 That Officer Lawson did not perform field sobriety tests further demonstrates that Officer Courts, who first attended to the accident victim, was the officer with the primary responsibility to investigate the accident. Additionally, the trial court itself recognized Officer Lawson made a “request,” not a demand. See Trial Court’s Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2/17/23, at 9, ¶ 3.
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totality of the circumstances and erred as a matter of law. See Spence, 290
A.3d 314-15. Viewed in their proper context, the facts show Arroyo was at
his own home, having fled the scene of an accident in violation of his legal
responsibility to remain there. Additionally, Officer Lawson did not threaten
to arrest Arroyo for non-compliance – he stated only that Arroyo’s pickup
truck, which had just been involved in an accident, could be towed if he did
not cooperate with the accident investigation (see 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744).
Furthermore, Officer Lawson’s questions to Arroyo concerned facts regarding
the accident for which there was reasonable suspicion to believe Arroyo was
involved. These are questions police may properly ask at an accident scene
without converting a detention into an arrest.16 See Commonwealth v.
Gonzalez, 546 A.2d 26, 29-30 (Pa. 1988) (holding police did not arrest
suspect when they approached him at an accident scene and asked him, inter
alia, “what happened,” because he had a statutory obligation to provide his
license and proof of registration, was not subject to restraints comparable to
an arrest, and was asked a minimal number of questions at the scene of an
accident on a public street); Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d 14, 33
(Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (finding no arrest occurred when an officer
arrived at accident scene, asked an intoxicated woman for her license and
16 Additionally, the law authorized Officer Lawson to obtain Arroyo’s registration and insurance information as the result of the collision. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744.
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registration, told her to “sit tight,” asked her “what happened?,” and she
admitted she had been driving). Moreover, the law authorized Officer Lawson
to obtain Arroyo’s registration and insurance information as the result of the
collision. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744.17
Upon consideration of the nature, duration and conditions of this stop
as we are legally compelled to do when reviewing the level of detention, these
facts taken in their totality are not coercive enough to rise to the level of an
arrest. Officer Lawson’s encounter with Arroyo was not of long duration and
reasonable under the circumstances. Officer Lawson did not transport Arroyo
against his will, the officer used no physical restraints or threaten the use of
force, or even conduct any tests on him. He asked Arroyo to “hang out” until
the officer in charge of the accident investigation arrived as Officer Courts was
attending to the other driver hit in the accident in another location due to
Arroyo’s flight from the scene. A total of fifteen minutes (approximately)
transpired between Officer Lawson’s initial arrival and Officer Courts’s arrival
at the Arroyo residence, which is certainly reasonable. As the uncontested
facts bear out, Arroyo was at his home, and Officer Lawson did not hold him
in a specific spot or restrain his physical movement except to ask him to stay
17 So, in effect, the trial court’s finding of a custodial detention expanded Arroyo’s rights for leaving the scene of an accident than those due a person who complies with his legal obligation to remain at the scene of an accident. That the detention occurred instead at Arroyo’s house was solely the product of Arroyo’s failure to follow the law.
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until the investigating officer arrived to get his information. Keeping in mind
that if Arroyo had remained at the accident scene the same questions would
have been asked. Furthermore, Officer Lawson and Officer Courts certainly
had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention based on the
facts given by Martin, the other driver. See Spence, 290 A.3d at 314-15;
Wright, 224 A.3d at 1109.18
Furthermore, the law cited by the court to support its legal conclusion
that the encounter began as an investigative detention but rose to a “custodial
detention” is both inapplicable and distinguishable. The trial court relies
primarily on Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2014); and
Commonwealth v. Hannon, 225 A.3d 1190 (Pa. Super. 2019).19 See Trial
18 Commonwealth v. Harper, 230 A.3d 1231 (Pa. Super. 2020), see Arroyo’s Brief at 16, does not compel a different result. In that case, this Court found arguable merit to an ineffectiveness claim asserting that a police officer subjected Harper to the equivalent of an arrest because he went in uniform to a hospital where Harper was being treated for a gunshot wound to the knee and the officer told Harper he was going to perform a gunshot residue test on his hands to see if he had fired a gun, then performed a fake test with a Q-tip and saline. This Court found a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or refuse the gunshot residue test. See id. at 1234, 1239. Arroyo was neither incapacitated with an injury for which he was being actively treated nor was he threatened with an inculpatory test; Officer Lawson spoke to him outside his own house and asked questions permissible under Pennsylvania law.
19 The citation Arroyo provides for Hannon is misleading as it is a table citation. Hannon is a non-precedential memorandum opinion, and its text can be found at 2019 WL 7371848 (Pa. Super. 2019). As a memorandum opinion, Hannon is not precedential and may only be cited for its persuasive value. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
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Court’s Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2/17/23, at 8, ¶¶
9-10 (citing Lyles, 97 A.3d at 302).
The trial court erroneously relies on Lyles to determine whether Officer
Lawson subjected Arroyo to a custodial detention. As the Supreme Court
explained in the opening sentence of Lyles, that case addressed a different
legal question: whether “an officer’s request for identification elevated an
encounter to an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable
suspicion.” See Lyles, 97 A.3d at 300 (emphasis added). The issue here
concerns whether an investigative detention rose to a custodial detention.
Lyles thus has no legal relevance to the issue in this case. Hannon is not
only non-precedential, but distinguishable. In that case, by the time an officer
spoke to the suspect, he knew the suspect had a suspended license, and knew
from an eyewitness the man had been drinking and had allowed his child to
drive his car. See Hannon, 2019 WL 7371848 at *1-*3. Under those
circumstances, the memorandum opinion found the officers’ questions
amounted to custodial interrogation. Here, however, Officer Lawson had no
advance knowledge Arroyo had been drinking – he only knew that Arroyo had
most likely left the scene of an accident and he solicited only questions
surrounding how the accident occurred, and obtained his license, and
insurance information, all of which are legally permissible questions. Hannon
accordingly does not lend persuasive authority to Arroyo’s claim that Officer
Lawson conducted a custodial detention and interrogation.
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Because we hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
held that Officer Lawson’s initial interaction was a custodial detention or the
functional equivalent of an arrest, the court’s suppression of Arroyo’s
statements to Officer Courts prior to being arrested and handcuffed and the
results of the field sobriety tests Officer Courts administered and the results
of the blood draw is legal error. 20
We thus turn to the Commonwealth’s fourth issue on appeal: the trial
court’s grant of a post-sentence judgment of acquittal. See Commonwealths
Brief at 36-37. The court and both parties agree the proper remedy for the
improper admission of evidence is a new trial, not a judgment of acquittal.
See Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/23, at 7; Commonwealth’s Brief at 35-37;
Arroyo’s Brief at 3.
20 The trial court cites Commonwealth v. By, 812 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Super. 2002), for the proposition that when a valid traffic stop has ended, subsequent questioning constitutes a mere encounter, unless a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, in which case subsequent questioning is part of an investigative detention or arrest. See Trial Court’s Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2/17/23, at 8-9, citing By, 812 A.2d at 1255-56. Here, Arroyo’s departure from the accident scene necessitated questioning by two officers and therefore the valid traffic stop had not ended when Officer Courts arrived within fifteen minutes of Officer Lawson’s first interaction with Arroyo. In any event, the police assuredly had reasonable suspicion of Arroyo’s involvement in a traffic violation by the time Officer Courts arrived.
Additionally, field sobriety tests do not require Miranda warnings because such tests are physical in nature, not testimonial. See Commonwealth v. Hayes, 674 A.2d 677, 682-83 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 768 A.2d 331, 332 (Pa. Super. 2001).
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We agree. Sufficiency is not addressed on a diminished record – the
court considers all evidence whether correctly or incorrectly admitted. See
Commonwealth v. Burton, 234 A.3d 824, 829 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
omitted); Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 181 A.3d 368, 374 (Pa. Super.
2018). Accordingly, even had the trial court reached the correct result in its
post-sentence rulings on suppression, which as explained supra, it did not,
Arroyo’s remedy would be a retrial not discharge, which results from the grant
of a judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97
(1978) (stating a judgment of acquittal precludes retrial where trial court’s
ruling represents a ruling in the defendant’s favor of some or all of the factual
elements of the offense charged). Thus, as conceded by all, the court’s post-
sentence grant of judgment of acquittal was legal error.
Having found the trial court committed legal error, we reverse its grant
of a post-sentence judgment of acquittal on suppression grounds, reverse the
grant of suppression of Arroyo’s statements to investigating officers prior to
his arrest, reverse the suppression of the results of Arroyo’s chemical blood
testing, and remand for the reimposition of sentence.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Date: 9/19/2025
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