Com. v. Armour, S.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: June 5, 2026
• Docket: 1533 EDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished
• Author: Stevens

Opinion

J-S15034-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : SAKOU JUNE ARMOUR : : Appellant : No. 1533 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 1, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002250-2024

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 5, 2026

Appellant, Sakou June Armour, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County following his

conviction by a jury on the charge of Possession of Firearms Prohibited, 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105. After our careful review, we affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history have been set forth, in part,

by the trial court as follows:

On March 24, 2025, [Appellant, who was represented by counsel,] proceeded to a jury trial on one count of Possession of Firearms Prohibited, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer Dean Dicresenza, a patrolman with the Upper Darby Police Department. Officer Dicresenza testified that, on March 21, 2024, he was dispatched to [7**1] Westchester Pike for an overdose. He arrived and saw an unconscious male, [later identified as Appellant], lying on the ground. N.T., 3/25/25, at 81-83. He ____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S15034-26

administered Narcan for an overdose. As [Appellant] began to gain consciousness, he began groaning. Officer Dicresenza began assisting Appellant off the ground and, as he did so, a silver firearm fell out of Appellant’s left pant leg. [Id.] at 83-84. The officer secured the firearm by dropping the magazine out of the gun and ejecting the bullet that was in the chamber. [Id.] at 84. While the officer was testifying, the Commonwealth showed the officer’s bodycam footage and admitted it as Exhibit C1. The bodycam footage shows the entire incident from the officer driving into the parking lot where Appellant was unconscious up until he was transported to the police station. A silver firearm can be seen hanging out of Appellant’s pant leg. Prior to that, a bulge can be seen in the pant leg where the firearm was concealed. [Id.] at 90. Appellant was patted down. He became aggressive. Officer Dicresenza ran Appellant’s record, which revealed Appellant was a person not permitted to possess a firearm....The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Detective Finnegan, who testified that the firearm was operable.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/9/25, at 1-2.

The jury convicted Appellant on the sole charge of Possession of

Firearms Prohibited. On May 1, 2025, Appellant proceeded to a sentencing

hearing at which the trial court acknowledged it reviewed a pre-sentence

investigation report (“PSI”) and psychological evaluation. The Commonwealth

stated the applicable guidelines: “mitigated range 63, standard 72 to 84,

aggravated 93. No mandatory minimum.” N.T., 5/1/25, at 3. The

Commonwealth noted Appellant has a lengthy prior criminal history. Id. at 4.

Further, the Commonwealth indicated “his prior record score is POG Of

4, which is the highest it can be in one qualifying offense. That’s aggravated

assault F1 from a 2023 guilty plea.” Id. The Commonwealth noted Appellant

had other crimes and juvenile adjudications of delinquency, which were not

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factored into his prior record score. Id. The trial court acknowledged that

Appellant raised a question about the applicable guidelines, as well as his prior

record score. Id. The trial court agreed with Appellant that “not all of

[Appellant’s criminal history] is countable in the new sentencing guideline;”

however, “there is an offense that is countable.” Id.

The Commonwealth indicated Appellant was on probation in 1993, but

he was then convicted of robbery and firearm offenses, for which he received

a sentence of five years to ten years in prison. Id. at 5. He was later convicted

of aggravated assault for which he received one year to two years in prison.

Id.

The Commonwealth requested that the trial court impose a sentence of

ten years to twenty years in prison with a consecutive one year of probation.

Id. The Commonwealth noted Appellant had a “rough upbringing,” and the

trial court confirmed it was “rough.” Id. However, the Commonwealth further

noted Appellant has taken no accountability for his most recent crime. Id. at

6. The Commonwealth indicated Appellant blames everyone but himself for

his problems. Id. at 7.

Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that he reviewed the PSI, as well as

the psychological report. Id. Appellant’s counsel acknowledged Appellant has

a criminal history “going back to 1992 for juvenile cases.” Id. Appellant’s

counsel averred that Appellant has mental health issues. Id. at 8. The trial

court noted that Appellant is in his “early fifties with not a single job reported

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above the books.” Id. Appellant’s counsel responded that Appellant has

“been in jail so much time he didn’t have a chance to get a job.” Id.

Appellant’s counsel requested a sentence of five years to ten years in prison,

plus a consecutive one year of probation. Id. at 9. Appellant’s counsel argued

this recommended sentence would aid Appellant in getting the help he needs.

Id. Moreover, Appellant’s counsel noted that Appellant did not “brandish” or

point the handgun at anyone; but rather, it was in the pocket of his pants and

then fell out. Id.

Appellant informed the trial court that he “has a history of working for

Citizen Frank Clark.” Id. at 10. The trial court asked Appellant about his

aliases, which include “Secur Armor,” “Hanson Armor,” “Kevin Armor,” “Secur

Anderson,” and “Kevin Anderson.” Id. at 11. Appellant responded that he

did not recognize any of these names. Id. Appellant asked the trial court to

explain “where’s this big criminal history” that everyone was talking about,

and he noted that many of his criminal charges/cases had been dismissed.

Id. The trial court specifically indicated it was not considering any arrests or

charges that had been dismissed. Id. Appellant claimed that his guilty plea to

robbery and aggravated assault, wherein he was sentenced to ten years to

twenty years in prison, was “overturned in 2020.” Id. The trial court

responded that Appellant was mistaken in this regard. Id. at 12.

Appellant informed the trial court that he had no criminal intent as it

pertained to the gun as demonstrated by the fact he was unconscious when

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the police found him. Id. He claimed “[t]he [officer] picks me up off the

ground and throws handcuffs [on] me.” Id. The trial court responded that it

considered the nature of the offense and noted the jury found Appellant guilty.

Id. at 12-13.

The trial court indicated that Appellant has taken no responsibility for

the gun offense at issue, and, based on counsel’s representation, Appellant

needed mental health treatment. Id. at 15. Appellant responded that he has

no mental health issues; however, he acknowledged that he has

schizophrenia. Id.

At this point, the trial court indicated that it was imposing a sentence of

eight years to twenty years in prison, to be followed by one year of probation.

The trial court indicated Appellant is not RRRI eligible. Id. at 17. Appellant

informed the trial court that the sentence was not fair, and the trial court

responded it considered the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 18. The trial court

then ensured that Appellant was advised of his post-sentence and appellate

rights. Id.

On May 9, 2025, Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration of

his sentence, which the trial court denied on the same date. Appellant filed a

timely counseled notice of appeal on June 6, 2025, and all Pa.R.A.P. 1925

requirements have been adequately met.

On appeal, Appellant sets forth the sole claim in his “Statement of

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

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1. Whether the trial court erred and violated the discretionary aspects of sentencing, specifically the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, in that the trial court imposed a minimum sentence outside of the aggravated range of the applicable sentencing guidelines and did not place on the record or provide a contemporaneous written statement for the deviation from the sentencing guidelines, where the trial court cannot rely on review of the Pre-Sentence Investigation alone because said document contains impermissible factors to rely upon for aggravating reasons, specifically, prior arrests that did not result in conviction; does the trial court’s failure to give reasons for deviation from the sentencing guidelines constitute grounds for resentencing?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (footnote omitted).

On appeal, Appellant contends the sentencing court abused its discretion

in imposing a sentence inconsistent with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721 because the

court failed to provide in open court at the time of sentencing a statement of

the reason or reasons for imposing an above aggravated range sentence.

Appellant acknowledges the general rule that, where a PSI exists, the

appellate court will presume the sentencing judge was aware of relevant

information regarding the appellant’s character and weighed those

considerations with the mitigating statutory factors. See Appellant’s Brief at

16. However, Appellant argues that this presumption may not be applied in

the instant case since the PSI contained Appellant’s prior arrest record,

including crimes that did not result in conviction, which is an impermissible

factor for the sentencing court to consider. See id. at 17. Moreover, Appellant

contends the sentencing court did not consider the proper sentencing

guideline ranges when imposing sentence.

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Appellant’s issue presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not

entitle an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150

A.3d 987, 991 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Rather, before reaching

the merits of such claims, we must determine:

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation

omitted). Here, assuming, arguendo, all of these requirements have been

met, we conclude Appellant’s sentencing issue is meritless.

Our standard of review concerning the discretionary aspects of

sentencing is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Pa.Super. 2005).

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) offers the following guidance to the trial court’s

sentencing determination:

[T]he sentence imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with…the protection of the public, the gravity of the

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offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b).

Further:

“In every case in which the court imposes a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620–21 (Pa. 2002); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The sentencing guidelines are not mandatory, and sentencing courts retain “broad discretion in sentencing matters, and therefore, may sentence defendants outside the [g]uidelines.” Id. “In every case where the court imposes a sentence…outside the guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing…the court shall provide a contemporaneous written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation from the guidelines.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). However, this requirement is satisfied when the judge states his reasons for the sentence on the record and in the defendant’s presence. Consequently, all that a trial court must do to comply with the above procedural requirements is to state adequate reasons for the imposition of sentence on the record in open court.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760–61 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(citations, quotation marks, and quotations omitted).

Additionally,

Section 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which the appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the sentencing court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the sentence falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly unreasonable” based on the circumstances of the case; and (3) the sentence falls outside of the guidelines and is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c). Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d), the appellate courts must review the record and consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the sentencing court’s observations of the defendant, the findings that formed the basis of the sentence, and the sentencing guidelines. The weighing of factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) is exclusively for the sentencing court, and an appellate

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court may not substitute its own weighing of those factors. The primary consideration, therefore, is whether the court imposed an individualized sentence, and whether the sentence was nonetheless unreasonable for sentences falling outside the guidelines, or clearly unreasonable for sentences falling within the guidelines, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).

Commonwealth v. Bricker, 41 A.3d 872, 875-76 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

Initially, we note that we find no merit to Appellant’s claim that the trial

court did not utilize the correct sentencing guideline ranges. Appellant asserts

the applicable standard guideline range was “72 months-84 months with an

aggravated range of 93 months.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. During the

sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth stated the applicable guidelines as

“mitigated range 63, standard 72 to 84, aggravated 93. No mandatory

minimum.” N.T., 5/1/25, at 3. The trial court indicated on the record in open

court that it was aware of the applicable guideline ranges as articulated by the

Commonwealth, and it was going to take the guidelines into account. Id. at

19.

Moreover, in its Opinion, the trial court acknowledged the sentencing

guidelines provided “for a standard range sentence beginning at 72-84 months

incarceration with an aggravated range beginning at 93 months or 7.75

years.” Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/9/25, at 6. The trial court then stated it

sentenced Appellant above the aggravated range to 8 years to 20 years in

prison. Id. Accordingly, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim the trial court

was not aware of or applied the correct sentencing guideline ranges.

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Furthermore, regarding Appellant’s claim that the trial court did not

state adequate reasons on the record for the sentence, we note the trial court

specifically referenced its review of the PSI, the psychological evaluation of

Appellant, and the sentencing guideline ranges. N.T., 5/1/25, at 3. The trial

court noted Appellant’s “rough” upbringing. Id. at 6. The trial court indicated

that Appellant is in his “early fifties with not a single job reported above the

books.” Id. at 8. The trial court advised Appellant that the court was

considering the nature of the offense. Id. at 11. The trial court concluded

that Appellant took no responsibility for the gun offense at issue, and Appellant

needed mental health treatment. Id. at 15. In this vein, the trial court noted

the PSI reported that Appellant has schizophrenia. Id. Further, the trial court

acknowledged that Appellant has a lengthy criminal history, and his prior

record score is four. Id. at 4.

Based on the aforementioned, we conclude the trial court’s statements

substantially conform with the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The

trial court specifically referenced Appellant’s prior criminal record, his age, his

personal characteristics, and (what the trial court obviously felt was) his lack

of potential for rehabilitation. Furthermore, there is no dispute the trial court

reviewed the PSI, as well as a psychological report. Therefore, we presume

that the sentencing judge was fully apprised of Appellant’s characteristics and

properly weighed those factors. See Antidormi, supra. “Having been fully

informed by the [PSI], the sentencing court’s discretion should not be

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disturbed.” Id. at 761 (citation omitted).

“The court is not required to parrot the words of the Sentencing Code,

stating every factor that must be considered under Subsection 9721(b)….The

record as a whole must reflect due consideration by the court of the statutory

considerations.” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 145–46

(Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted)). In the case sub judice, in examining the

record as a whole, the sentencing court adequately informed Appellant of the

reasons that it exceeded the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines.

To wit, the sentencing court referenced Appellant’s criminal history, his risk

for recidivism, and the seriousness of his crime.

Moreover, we note that Appellant claims the trial court erred in relying

on the PSI because it included reference to Appellant’s prior arrest on charges

for which he was not convicted. We find no abuse of discretion in this regard.

In Commonwealth v. Berry, 323 A.3d 641 (Pa. 2024), our Supreme

Court examined the issue of whether a sentencing court could consider arrests

that “did not result either in juvenile adjudications or adult convictions.” Id.

at 643. The Supreme Court determined that such “prior arrests are not

probative at a sentencing hearing and are not otherwise relevant to the factors

that are central to the sentencing determination.” Id. at 651. It held that “the

sentencing court committed an error of law when it relied upon prior arrests

as a sentencing factor[.]” Id. at 654.

In the case sub judice, in accordance with Berry, the trial court clearly

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stated on the record that it was not considering any arrests or charges, which

did not result in a conviction or adjudication of delinquency. Also, the trial

court acknowledged mere arrests or dismissed charges are not countable in

the sentencing guidelines. N.T., 5/1/25, at 4. Thus, to the extent Appellant

claims the trial court relied on an impermissible factor (i.e., his prior arrest

record) set forth in the PSI, we find there is no merit. See Berry, supra.

Finally, to the extent Appellant contends the trial court could not rely on

any part of the PSI because it included Appellant’s prior arrests (which did not

result in juvenile adjudications or adult convictions), we agree with the

Commonwealth that Appellant has cited no authority supporting this position.

See Commonwealth’s Brief at 15. Simply put, while Berry, to which Appellant

cites, holds that the trial court may not consider a defendant’s prior arrest

record (set forth in the PSI or otherwise introduced into evidence) for

sentencing purposes, Berry did not hold the entire PSI, particularly the

relevant portions thereof, must be disregarded on this basis. Moreover, while

the trial court acknowledged Appellant had questions about the applicable

guidelines and prior record score, there is no indication Appellant objected to

the admission of the PSI in the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Goodco

Mechanical, Inc., 291 A.3d 378 (Pa.Super. 2023) (holding the appellant

waived claim on appeal that the PSI was inadequate or deficient since he did

not object to the admission of the PSI in the trial court) (citing to Pa.R.A.P.

302(a)).

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Finally, we note the well-stated presumption in Pennsylvania is that

“when the trial court has the benefit of a [PSI] report, it is presumed that the

court was both aware of and appropriately weighed all relevant information

contained therein.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1212

(Pa.Super. 2021) (emphasis added).

Based on the aforementioned, we conclude the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Simply put, Appellant has not

demonstrated that his sentence is unreasonable. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c).

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 6/5/2026

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