J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : ISAIAH ANDERSON, : No. 1232 EDA 2019 : Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 20, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0000624-2012, CP-51-CR-0004336-2013
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : ISAIAH ANDERSON, : No. 1233 EDA 2019 : Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 20, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0000624-2012, CP-51-CR-0004336-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2020
Isaiah Anderson appeals pro se from the March 20, 2019 order entered
by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. For the following reasons, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.
On January 11, 2012, the Commonwealth charged appellant at Docket
No. CP-51-CR-0000624-2012 with rape of a child, aggravated indecent assault
of a child, unlawful contact with a minor – sexual offenses, sexual assault,
corruption of minors, and indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of
age.1 In April of 2013, the Commonwealth charged appellant at Docket
No. CP-XX-XXXXXXX-2013 with one count of aggravated assault and two
counts of resisting arrest.2 The trial court entered an order consolidating the
two cases for trial.
On November 19, 2014, a jury convicted appellant of the
aforementioned offenses. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate
term of 13½ to 27 years’ imprisonment, to be followed by 4 years’ probation
on February 20, 2015. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal to this court. On
July 12, 2016, this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 154 A.3d 851 (Pa.Super. 2016) (unpublished
memorandum). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our
supreme court denied on July 6, 2017. See Commonwealth v. Anderson,
118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3125(b), 6318(a)(1), 3124.1, 6301(a)(1)(i), and 3126(a)(7), respectively.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3) and 5104, respectively.
-2- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
169 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2017). Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.
On August 22, 2018, appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The
PCRA court appointed James R. Lloyd, III, to represent appellant. Despite
being represented by counsel, appellant filed multiple pro se amended PCRA
petitions. On January 17, 2019, Attorney Lloyd filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel, accompanied by a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d
213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). The PCRA court entered a notice of its
intent to dismiss appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on January 25, 2019.
On February 25, 2019, the PCRA court entered an order permitting
Attorney Lloyd to withdraw as counsel. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from
the February 25, 2019 order on March 1, 2019, which was docketed by this
court at Nos. 770 EDA 2019 and 771 EDA 2019. On March 21, 2019, the PCRA
court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
In the interim, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing appellant’s
PCRA petition without a hearing on March 20, 2019. Appellant filed timely
notices of appeal from the March 20, 2019 order on March 22, 2019. In
compliance with the PCRA court’s March 21, 2019 order, appellant filed a
Rule 1925(b) statement on April 12, 2019, raising issues related to the merits
-3- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
of his petition.3 On August 27, 2019, the PCRA court filed an opinion pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On August 9, 2019, this court entered a per curiam order directing
appellant to show cause why the instant appeal should not be quashed in light
of our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969
(Pa. 2018). Appellant filed a response to the rule to show cause on August 29,
2019. On October 4, 2019, this court entered an order discharging the rule
to show cause, referring the issue to the merits panel.
In Walker, our supreme court provided a bright-line mandate requiring
that “where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket,
separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case,” or the appeal will be
quashed. Walker, 185 A.3d at 971, 976-977. The Walker court applied its
holding prospectively to any notices of appeal filed after June 1, 2018. Id. at
971. In the instant case, the notices of appeal were filed on March 22, 2019,
and therefore, the Walker mandate applies. The appeal was of a single order
resolving issues arising on both docket numbers. Based on our review of the
record, it appears that appellant filed one notice of appeal including both
docket numbers in violation of our supreme court’s mandate in Walker.
3 The PCRA court did not order appellant to file another Rule 1925(b) statement following March 22, 2019 notice of appeal, but rather relied on its initial Rule 1925 order.
-4- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
Our inquiry cannot end here. A recent en banc panel of this court held
that we may overlook the requirements set forth in Walker in cases where a
breakdown in the court system occurs. Commonwealth v. Larkin, ___ A.3d
___, 2020 WL 3869710 at *3 (Pa.Super. July 9, 2020) (en banc); see also
Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa.Super. 2019). The panels
in both Larkin and Stansbury held that a breakdown in the court system
includes instances in which the trial or PCRA court provides appellant with
misinformation. Stansbury, 219 A.3d at 160; Larkin, 2020 WL 3869710
at *3.
Here, our review of the record reveals a breakdown in the court system
similar to the scenarios presented in Larkin and Stansbury. Indeed, the
PCRA court’s order dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition states that,
“[appellant] is hereby advised that he has thirty (30) days from the date of
this Order within which to file an appeal.” (PCRA court order, 3/20/19 n.1
(emphasis added).) At no point did the PCRA court notify appellant that he
was required to comply with the mandates of Walker. Accordingly, we will
overlook the requirements of Walker.
Before we can proceed to the merits of appellant’s appeal; however, we
must determine whether appellant has complied with our Rules of Appellate
Procedure—specifically Rule 1925(b).
This court has long recognized that “Rule 1925 is a crucial component
of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus
-5- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v. Epstein, 866
A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005),
cert. denied, 546 U.S.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : ISAIAH ANDERSON, : No. 1232 EDA 2019 : Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 20, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0000624-2012, CP-51-CR-0004336-2013
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA v. : : ISAIAH ANDERSON, : No. 1233 EDA 2019 : Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 20, 2019, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0000624-2012, CP-51-CR-0004336-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 28, 2020
Isaiah Anderson appeals pro se from the March 20, 2019 order entered
by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. For the following reasons, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.
On January 11, 2012, the Commonwealth charged appellant at Docket
No. CP-51-CR-0000624-2012 with rape of a child, aggravated indecent assault
of a child, unlawful contact with a minor – sexual offenses, sexual assault,
corruption of minors, and indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of
age.1 In April of 2013, the Commonwealth charged appellant at Docket
No. CP-XX-XXXXXXX-2013 with one count of aggravated assault and two
counts of resisting arrest.2 The trial court entered an order consolidating the
two cases for trial.
On November 19, 2014, a jury convicted appellant of the
aforementioned offenses. The trial court sentenced appellant to an aggregate
term of 13½ to 27 years’ imprisonment, to be followed by 4 years’ probation
on February 20, 2015. Appellant filed a timely direct appeal to this court. On
July 12, 2016, this court affirmed appellant’s judgment of sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 154 A.3d 851 (Pa.Super. 2016) (unpublished
memorandum). Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our
supreme court denied on July 6, 2017. See Commonwealth v. Anderson,
118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3125(b), 6318(a)(1), 3124.1, 6301(a)(1)(i), and 3126(a)(7), respectively.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3) and 5104, respectively.
-2- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
169 A.3d 1036 (Pa. 2017). Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States.
On August 22, 2018, appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The
PCRA court appointed James R. Lloyd, III, to represent appellant. Despite
being represented by counsel, appellant filed multiple pro se amended PCRA
petitions. On January 17, 2019, Attorney Lloyd filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel, accompanied by a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v.
Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d
213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). The PCRA court entered a notice of its
intent to dismiss appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on January 25, 2019.
On February 25, 2019, the PCRA court entered an order permitting
Attorney Lloyd to withdraw as counsel. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from
the February 25, 2019 order on March 1, 2019, which was docketed by this
court at Nos. 770 EDA 2019 and 771 EDA 2019. On March 21, 2019, the PCRA
court ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
In the interim, the PCRA court entered an order dismissing appellant’s
PCRA petition without a hearing on March 20, 2019. Appellant filed timely
notices of appeal from the March 20, 2019 order on March 22, 2019. In
compliance with the PCRA court’s March 21, 2019 order, appellant filed a
Rule 1925(b) statement on April 12, 2019, raising issues related to the merits
-3- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
of his petition.3 On August 27, 2019, the PCRA court filed an opinion pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On August 9, 2019, this court entered a per curiam order directing
appellant to show cause why the instant appeal should not be quashed in light
of our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969
(Pa. 2018). Appellant filed a response to the rule to show cause on August 29,
2019. On October 4, 2019, this court entered an order discharging the rule
to show cause, referring the issue to the merits panel.
In Walker, our supreme court provided a bright-line mandate requiring
that “where a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket,
separate notices of appeal must be filed for each case,” or the appeal will be
quashed. Walker, 185 A.3d at 971, 976-977. The Walker court applied its
holding prospectively to any notices of appeal filed after June 1, 2018. Id. at
971. In the instant case, the notices of appeal were filed on March 22, 2019,
and therefore, the Walker mandate applies. The appeal was of a single order
resolving issues arising on both docket numbers. Based on our review of the
record, it appears that appellant filed one notice of appeal including both
docket numbers in violation of our supreme court’s mandate in Walker.
3 The PCRA court did not order appellant to file another Rule 1925(b) statement following March 22, 2019 notice of appeal, but rather relied on its initial Rule 1925 order.
-4- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
Our inquiry cannot end here. A recent en banc panel of this court held
that we may overlook the requirements set forth in Walker in cases where a
breakdown in the court system occurs. Commonwealth v. Larkin, ___ A.3d
___, 2020 WL 3869710 at *3 (Pa.Super. July 9, 2020) (en banc); see also
Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa.Super. 2019). The panels
in both Larkin and Stansbury held that a breakdown in the court system
includes instances in which the trial or PCRA court provides appellant with
misinformation. Stansbury, 219 A.3d at 160; Larkin, 2020 WL 3869710
at *3.
Here, our review of the record reveals a breakdown in the court system
similar to the scenarios presented in Larkin and Stansbury. Indeed, the
PCRA court’s order dismissing appellant’s PCRA petition states that,
“[appellant] is hereby advised that he has thirty (30) days from the date of
this Order within which to file an appeal.” (PCRA court order, 3/20/19 n.1
(emphasis added).) At no point did the PCRA court notify appellant that he
was required to comply with the mandates of Walker. Accordingly, we will
overlook the requirements of Walker.
Before we can proceed to the merits of appellant’s appeal; however, we
must determine whether appellant has complied with our Rules of Appellate
Procedure—specifically Rule 1925(b).
This court has long recognized that “Rule 1925 is a crucial component
of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to identify and focus
-5- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter v. Epstein, 866
A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006), citing Riley v. Foley, 783 A.2d 807,
813 (Pa.Super. 2001). “The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or
error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify
all pertinent issues for the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). However, the
filing of a timely Rule 1925(b) statement alone “does not automatically equate
with issue preservation.” Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346
(Pa.Super. 2007), affirmed, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009). In Tucker, we
explained that:
this Court has held that when appellants raise an outrageous number of issues in their 1925(b) statement, then appellants have deliberately circumvented the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively precluded appellate review of the issues they [now] seek to raise. We have further noted that such voluminous statements do not identify the issues appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because the briefing limitations contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make[] the raising of so many issues impossible. Further, this type of extravagant 1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for the trial court to provide a comprehensive analysis of the issues.
Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in
original). Thus, “the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently
concise and coherent such that the trial court judge may be able to identify
the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest
-6- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
the existence of bad faith.” Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210
(Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis added), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1048 (Pa.
2008); see also Kanter, 866 A.2d at 401 (finding issues in Rule 1925(b)
statements waived where the court determined that “outrageous” number of
issues was deliberate attempt to circumvent purpose of Rule 1925);
Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1038-1043 (Pa.Super.
2018), appeal denied, 217 A.3d 793 (Pa. 2019), cert. denied sub nom.
Vurimindi v. Pennsylvania, 140 S.Ct. 1147 (2020) (applying the holdings
in Kanter, Tucker, and Jiricko in context of criminal appeal).
Here, we cannot conclude that appellant’s 23-page, 111-issue
statement is so concise and coherent that the PCRA court was able to conduct
a meaningful review of all the issues he sought to raise. (See appellant’s
concise statement, 4/12/19.)4 Accordingly, appellant waives all issues on
appeal for circumventing the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) so as to
preclude meaningful judicial review.
4In his brief, appellant raises 79 issues for our review. (See appellant’s brief at 4-23.)
-7- J. S37039/20 J. S37040/20
Based on the foregoing, we find all of appellant’s issues waived.5
Accordingly, we dismiss appellant’s appeal.
Appeal dismissed. Appellant’s application to amend notice of appeal is
denied as moot.
Nichols, J. joins this Memorandum.
Shogan, J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/28/2020
5 We note that appellant has raised a legality of sentence issue. (Appellant’s brief at 38-40.) Such an issue cannot be waived. Commonwealth v. Starr, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 3425114 (Pa.Super. June 23, 2020). In his legality of sentence issue, appellant contends that the trial court improperly imposed mandatory minimum sentences in violation of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and its progeny. (Appellant’s brief at 38.) Appellant’s claim is belied by the record, as upon the imposition of sentence, the trial court explicitly noted that it was not imposing mandatory minimums. (Notes of testimony, 2/20/15 at 20, citing Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa.Super. 2014). Accordingly, no relief is due.
-8-