J-A22038-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
ANIL K. AGARWAL,
Appellant No. 2188 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 15, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at No.: CP-54-CR-0000203-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2015
Appellant, Anil K. Agarwal, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on December 15, 2014, following his jury conviction of attempted
theft by deception, and insurance fraud.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence and his competency to stand trial. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm.
We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter
from the trial court’s February 23, 2015 decision, the October 22, 2014
notes of testimony, and our independent review of the certified record.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 3922, and 4117(a)(2), respectively. J-A22038-15
The instant matter concerns the alleged burglary, on June 14, 2011, of
a property located at 10-12 Market Street, Kelayres, Schuylkill County,
Pennsylvania. Appellant claimed that the burglar had taken or damaged
many valuable items, including but not limited to an antique piano, a king-
size mattress, a queen-size mattress, custom-made silk clothing, jewelry,
two expensive televisions, electronics, 200-hundred feet of fencing, a laptop
computer, a copier, an all-in-one printer, two ladders, and power tools.
(See N.T. Trial, 10/22/14, at 135-38, 144-45, 150-57). The lot at 10-12
Market Street consists of two houses at the front of the lot and a separate
rear structure, alternately described as a very small house or an apartment.
(See id. at 95, 105, 107). The incident involves this rear structure
(apartment).
During the spring of 2011, Appellant was involved in a dispute with
Mid-County Resources (Mid-County), who alleged to have purchased the
entire lot at a tax sale. (See id. at 95). Appellant claimed his wife, who
owns many properties in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, owned the lot. (See
id. at 95, 121-22). Appellant is unemployed, but does assist his wife in
managing the properties in both states. (See id. at 120-21). Appellant
alternately stated that he lived in the apartment and that he did not reside
-2- J-A22038-15
in it but sometimes stayed there overnight. (See id. 121, 129-31).2 No
one lived in the apartment in the winter of 2010-11, because there was no
water service and pipes burst and flooded it. (See id. at 123-24). During
the spring of 2011, third parties sometimes resided there. (See id. at 121-
22, 196-97).
In April 2011, Paul Young, a property manager for Mid-County, went to
inspect the lot. (See id. at 193-95, 198-200). He found the apartment to
be in a terrible condition, containing garbage, dirty dishes, mouse droppings,
mold, broken pipes, feces in the toilet, a leaking ceiling, and no running
water. (See id. at 199). Young did not observe any of the valuables listed
above in the apartment. (See id. at 205-09).
In June 2011, Young obtained permission from Kline Township to put a
dumpster on the property for trash removal. (See id. at 200, 265). It is
Mid-County’s policy to save any items of value or in good condition. (See
id. at 201, 215, 236-37). It throws away any items that are unsalvageable.
(See id.). On the morning of June 14, 2011, Young, together with two of
his employees, Evan Lindermuth and Joe Plummer, went to the apartment to
clean it out. (See id. at 214, 234-35). Young found the apartment to be in
even worse shape than it had been in April. (See id. at 201-02).
2 The evidence at trial demonstrated that Appellant did not reside at the apartment because he kept all of his cars in New Jersey and, in a recorded statement, he stated that he lived in New Jersey. (See id. at 138-40).
-3- J-A22038-15
The men noted that the outside and rear porch were in poor condition.
(See id. at 215-16). All three men claimed the apartment had a broken
window, was filthy, smelled so badly that they had to work wearing masks,
and had no water or electricity. (See id. at 215-18, 239, 241, 252). The
toilet contained feces and there was rotting food in the refrigerator. (See
id.). More rotting food, papers, and soiled clothing covered the floor. (See
id. at 209-10, 224, 240). While there were two televisions in the
apartment, they were of the old tube-type. (See id. at 206, 223). There
was a piano, but the men ascertained that it was not playable, rotting and
filled with garbage. (See id. at 208-09, 218, 227, 242-43). They did not
see any of the other items listed above in the apartment. (See id. at 205-
09, 225, 228-29, 247). There was so much trash in the apartment that it
over-filled the dumpster and the men did not find any items that were worth
salvaging. (See id. at 228, 238, 241-42, 250, 253-54). Within a week of
cleaning out the apartment, Lindermuth and Plummer made separate lists of
the items in the apartment and their condition; those lists described a filthy,
uninhabitable apartment filled with garbage, cheap damaged furniture,
soiled clothing and linens, and rotting food. (See id. at 221-30; 244-54).
On June 14, 2011, Appellant contacted Chief John Petrilla of the Kline
Township Police Department and reported that a third party left the
apartment in the morning and returned to discover that someone had
burglarized it. (See id. at 126, 261, 263). The next day, Chief Petrilla met
-4- J-A22038-15
with Appellant and told him that Mid-County had cleaned out the apartment
and a burglary had not occurred. (See id. at 264). Chief Petrilla told
Appellant that he could pursue a civil action against Mid-County if he wished.
(See id. at 265). During that meeting, Appellant gave Chief Petrilla an
itemized list, with estimated values, of the stolen property. (See id. at
264). Appellant claimed the items were worth in excess of $120,000.00.
(See id. at 135, 157-59).
On June 20, 2011, Chief Petrilla again met with Appellant. (See id. at
266). At that time, he observed that several of the items that Appellant
listed as stolen were sitting in the apartment. (See id. at 269-72). Chief
Petrilla pointed them out to Appellant, who explained that, although the
items were on the list of stolen property, the burglar had broken back into
the apartment and returned them. (See id. at 270-71). Chief Petrilla
confiscated the items and the Commonwealth entered them into evidence at
trial. (See id. at 269-74).
On the day of the alleged burglary, Appellant filed a claim with Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, under his homeowner’s insurance policy, for the
value of the stolen property. (See id. at 96). On June 23, 2011, Richard
Stinger, an investigator from Liberty Mutual, met with him at the apartment
to discuss the claim. (See id. at 103). Chief Petrilla had forwarded the list
of stolen property to Liberty Mutual. (See id. at 175). Stinger stated that
the lawn was overgrown and the rear deck of the apartment was covered
-5- J-A22038-15
with junk. (See id. at 106). Further, the apartment stank, was dirty, and
there was no water service. (See id. at 110). It was also infested with
insects, so Stinger had to conduct the interview outside. (See id. at 112).
During the recorded interview, Appellant went over the list with
Stinger and confirmed its accuracy. (See id. at 111, 132-34). He could not
produce any documents that confirmed either the existence of the items or
his ownership of them. (See id. at 157-58). Stinger had suspicions
regarding the claim because he believed the property was too small to hold
that many items and the quality of the belongings in the home was not
indicative of the values that Appellant claimed for the missing things. (See
id. 160-62). Liberty Mutual ultimately denied coverage and alerted the
Pennsylvania Attorney General of possible fraud in connection with the
incident. (See id. at 168, 172, 189-90).
On March 26, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information
charging Appellant with the above-listed offenses. A trial took place on
October 22 and 23, 2014. At trial, Appellant waived his right to testify on
his own behalf. During the waiver colloquy, the following exchange
occurred.
The Court: Do you have any mental or emotional health issues of any nature that may impair your ability to understand the proceedings and your ability to make decisions?
[Appellant]: No, but I have a—like a syndrome that if I get tired because I am like half brain dead—
The Court: You are what?
-6- J-A22038-15
[Appellant]: Half brain dead. Like this side of the brain is dead.
* * *
[Appellant]: Yeah. So I was paralyzed and all that like, you know, for a few months and all that. So I have to use this side of brain to do the function of this side of brain. So if I am like somewhere like prolonged, like five, six hours, more than that, then I cannot understand right way, like what is going on.
The Court: Okay. Are you—do you have any mental or emotional health or physical issues that you believe is impairing your ability right now—
[Appellant]: No.
The Court: Now let’s talk about what he mentioned about his brain.
Mr. Brennan [defense counsel]: That’s—
The Court: Have you detected anything with regards to any physical problem or anything with regard to—and I don’t know quite how to say it—but the way a mind would work as far as responding to your questions and your discussions that would indicate to you that for some reason he’s not able to make a competent decision because of what he just brought up about his brain?
Mr. Brennan: Yes, well, Your Honor, let me state this is the first I heard of that, by the way, the statement about his brain.
But let me state on the record, Your Honor, in addition to my trial practice, I also do wills and estates. I regularly meet with people who are suffering from maybe dementia or slowing down. I’m generally familiar with that, although I’m not an expert; but I’m familiar with meeting with elderly clients dealing with someone who may not be altogether able to make decisions.
I have seen none of those symptoms as a lay person would
-7- J-A22038-15
notice them in my client. Every time I called him or talked to him, he seemed very much aware of the time and place, the case that was going on. He’s very well-educated, Your Honor.
The only medical condition you saw during the trial were— because of some medication, he has to go to the bathroom a lot. Other than that, Judge, I have not seen anything that would lead me to believe that there is a mental issue here. Had there been, Your Honor, and quite honestly, I would have petitioned the Court for an examination; but—
The Court: Okay.
Mr. Brennan: —I don’t see that.
(N.T. Trial, 10/23/15, at 313-14, 320-21). On October 23, 2014, the jury
found Appellant guilty of all charges.
On December 15, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term
of incarceration of not less than eleven days nor more than twenty-four
months less one day to be followed by a three-year term of probation. At
sentencing, the parties discussed whether Appellant might have some
mental health issues; however, the trial court agreed with the
Commonwealth that Appellant was competent. (See N.T. Sentencing,
12/15/14, at 22, 28, 31, 37). Appellant did not file any post-sentence
motions.
On December 24, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On
December 29, 2014, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement on January 23, 2015. On
February 23, 2015, the trial court filed an opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
-8- J-A22038-15
Appellant raises the following questions for our review:
I. Whether the judgment of conviction must be vacated because the evidence was not sufficient, as to each element to support a conviction for attempt to commit theft by deception[?]
II. Whether the judgment of conviction must be vacated because the evidence was not sufficient as to each element to support a conviction for insurance fraud[?]
III. Whether the convictions must be vacated because [Appellant] was deprived of due process where his competency to formulate criminal intent, stand trial, and/or waive his Fifth Amendment Right was not properly considered and assessed[?]
(Appellant’s Brief, at 2-3).
In his first two issues, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his conviction. Specifically, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth
failed to prove he acted with intent. (See id. at 10). We disagree.
Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well
settled:
We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail.
The evidence established at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within the province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The Commonwealth’s burden may be met by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact
-9- J-A22038-15
finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
A defendant is guilty of an attempt if “with intent to commit a specific
crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the
commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). A defendant commits
the crime of theft by deception when “he intentionally obtains or withholds
property of another by deception.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a). We define
deception as intentionally: (1) creating or reinforcing a false impression; (2)
preventing “another from acquiring information which would affect his
judgment of a transaction;” or (3) failing “to correct a false impression which
the deceiver previously created or reinforced[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3922(a)(1)-
(3). The crime is finished at the time the defendant communicates the
intentional deception to the property owner. See Commonwealth v.
Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 839 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 862 A.2d
1254 (Pa. 2004).
Here, while Appellant did not obtain the property at issue, namely the
proceeds from the insurance claim, he took a “substantial step” towards
- 10 - J-A22038-15
obtaining it.3 On June 14, 2011, Appellant filed a claim with Liberty Mutual
for the property allegedly stolen from the apartment. He submitted a list to
Chief Petrilla of the missing property with estimated values for each item.
Chief Petrilla forwarded that list to Liberty Mutual and Appellant confirmed
its accuracy during his interview with Richard Stinger. He claimed that the
value of the missing items was in excess of $120,000.00. Viewing this
evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, it
shows that Appellant took a substantial step towards obtaining Liberty
Mutual’s money by filing an insurance claim and providing a written list of
the missing items and their estimated values to Liberty Mutual.
The evidence at trial was also sufficient to show the use of deception.
Chief Petrilla saw several of the allegedly stolen things in the apartment
3 We note that Appellant erroneously views the evidence in the light most favorable to him. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 11-19). Further, we take issue with Appellant’s claim that the trial court questioned the sufficiency of evidence at sentencing. (See id. at 18-19). Appellant takes the quoted statements out-of-context. (See id.). A reading of that entire portion of the sentencing transcript shows that the trial court was commenting that Appellant’s story was so bizarre and unbelievable that it indicated that he might have mental health problems. (See N.T. Sentencing, 12/15/14 at 30- 31). Lastly, we note that, to the extent that Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because of inconsistencies in the testimony, (see Appellant’s Brief, at 17-18), such a claim goes to the weight, not sufficiency, of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 A.2d 60, 65 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 923 A.2d 1173 (Pa. 2007). Appellant did not raise a weight of the evidence claim in his statement of the questions involved (see Appellant’s Brief, at 2), nor could he because he did not preserve such a claim below. See Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 1036 (Pa. Super. 2003).
- 11 - J-A22038-15
approximately one week after the alleged theft; Appellant admitted that he
had listed those items on the list but claimed that the thief had returned
them. Further, he overstated, to the point of absurdity, the value of the
other articles, for instance claiming that a broken and rotting piano was
worth $47,000.00. (See N.T. Trial, 10/22/14, at 136-37). The evidence at
trial also demonstrated that, both in April 2011 and on the date of the
alleged burglary, with the exception of the rotting piano, many of the
expensive pieces listed by Appellant were not in the apartment. Moreover,
items such as clothing were soiled and covered in garbage, and the
televisions were old tube-type sets, not the expensive ones Appellant
claimed were missing. Lastly, while there were some minor discrepancies
between the lists prepared by Lindermuth and Plummer, nothing
corroborated Appellant’s claims of an apartment filled with valuable
possessions.
Appellant argues that the values were mere estimates and that an
insurance company often disputes property values, thus the Commonwealth
failed to show intent to deceive. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 13-14).
However, based upon the testimony of Stinger, Young, Lindermuth and
Plummer regarding the condition of the apartment and the things therein,
the jury could easily conclude that Appellant grossly over-estimated values
of the articles. In combination with his attempt to claim money for pieces
that were present in the apartment after the alleged theft, the evidence is
- 12 - J-A22038-15
more than sufficient to demonstrate that Appellant attempted to deceive the
insurance company. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 848 A.2d 977, 983
(Pa. Super. 2004) (evidence that defendant filed false insurance claim and
“reinforced the false impression” in claim is sufficient to prove theft by
deception.). Appellant’s first claim lacks merit.
Appellant’s second issue maintains that the evidence was insufficient
to sustain his conviction for insurance fraud. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 16-
19).
We define the offense of insurance fraud as an act by a person who:
Knowingly and with the intent to defraud any insurer or self- insured, presents or causes to be presented to any insurer or self-insured any statement forming a part of, or in support of, a claim that contains any false, incomplete or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4117(a)(2).
Here, the evidence demonstrated that Appellant presented a
statement forming or in support of an insurance claim by filing a claim with
Liberty Mutual regarding the alleged theft of personal property at the
apartment. Appellant gave the police a list of the missing items and their
estimated values, the police forwarded the list to Liberty Mutual, and he
affirmed the accuracy of that list, both as to the things taken and as to their
values, in his recorded interview with Stinger. That estimate totaled over
$120,000.00.
- 13 - J-A22038-15
As discussed in detail above, Appellant’s recorded statement
demonstrated that the apartment was uninhabited in the winter of 2010-11,
because of flooding and lack of water service. Further, the evidence showed
that Appellant did not reside in the apartment but merely stayed there when
working on properties in the area, and that various third parties sometimes
resided in the apartment. Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that
Appellant was still in possession of some of the pieces on the list a week
after the theft. In addition, the evidence showed that many of the articles
allegedly stolen were not in the apartment in April 2011 and not there on the
day of the alleged theft. The testimony of all of the Commonwealth’s
witnesses showed that the apartment was in deplorable condition, the items
in the apartment were cheap, broken, soiled and otherwise valueless.
Lastly, the evidence revealed that Appellant over-stated the value of the
articles to the point of absurdity. The list of missing things and their
accompanying valuations was material because it formed the basis of
Appellant’s claim for compensation.
It is settled that the Commonwealth may meet its burden of proof
based entirely on circumstantial evidence. See Tarach, supra; see also
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868-69 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Further, the jury may infer intent from the defendant’s conduct. See
Vargas, supra at 869 (inferring intent to possess narcotics with intent to
deliver); see also Commonwealth v. Buford, 101 A.3d 1182, 1186 (Pa.
- 14 - J-A22038-15
Super. 2015), appeal denied, 114 A.3d 415 (Pa. 2015) (intent to kill can be
inferred from use of deadly weapon on vital part of body). Based on the
evidence discussed above, the jury could properly infer that Appellant, in an
attempt to obtain money he was not entitled to from the insurance
company, intentionally provided a false list to Liberty Mutual seeking
proceeds for items that were still in his possession and substantially over-
inflating the values of other items, in an attempt to defraud it. Appellant’s
second claim lacks merit.
In his final claim, Appellant argues that he was deprived of a fair trial
because he was incompetent to participate in a criminal proceeding. (See
Appellant’s Brief, at 20-24). Specifically, he alleges that issues regarding his
mental health arose during the trial and at sentencing but no one ever
requested a competency evaluation. (See id. at 20). Appellant waived his
claim.
A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. Thus, the burden is on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was incompetent to stand trial. In order to prove that he was incompetent, the defendant must establish that he was either unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or unable to participate in his own defense.
Stated otherwise, the relevant question in a competency determination is whether the defendant has sufficient ability at the pertinent time to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and to have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings.
- 15 - J-A22038-15
We extend great deference to the trial judge’s determination as to competency because he or she had the opportunity to observe directly a defendant's behavior. Furthermore, we note that it is a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion to accept one expert witness’s opinion over that of a conflicting opinion where the record adequately supports such a resolution.
Commonwealth v. Flor, 998 A.2d 606, 617-18 (Pa. 2010), cert. denied,
131 S.Ct. 2102 (2011) (citation omitted).
In his brief, Appellant admits that he did not preserve this issue at
trial. (See id. at 20 n.8). Yet, Appellant argues that this Court held in
Commonwealth v. Megella, 408 A.2d 483, 485 (Pa. Super. 1979), that
the failure to raise the issue of a defendant’s competency at trial, does not
waive the matter on appeal. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 20 n.8). However, in
Megella, this Court found that the defendant had preserved the issue by
raising and litigating it in post-trial motions. See Megella, supra at 485.
Here, Appellant did not file a post-trial motion and did not litigate the
question below. Rather, Appellant raised it for the first time in his Rule
1925(b) statement. An appellant cannot raise matters for the first time in a
Rule 1925(b) statement. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111,
1118 (Pa. Super. 2011) (issues raised for first time in Rule 1925(b)
statement are waived). Further, an appellant cannot raise a subject for the
first time on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094,
1098 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 956 A.2d 432 (Pa. 2008) (new
- 16 - J-A22038-15
legal theories cannot be raised for first time on appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Thus, we find that Appellant waived this claim.
Moreover, in effect, Appellant is claiming that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing. 4 (See Appellant’s
Brief, at 20-24). However, Appellant must raise claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel on collateral review. See Commonwealth v.
Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 576 (Pa. 2013). Therefore, to the extent that
Appellant is claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel,
we dismiss any such claim without prejudice for Appellant to seek collateral
review under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546, in accordance with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in
Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 737 (Pa. 2002). See also
Holmes, supra at 576. Otherwise, Appellant’s third claim is waived and
does not merit relief.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment
of sentence.
4 We note for clarity that mental health is not the equivalent (or a precondition of) competency to stand trial. Therefore, the mere assertion of mental health issues, particularly without any supporting medical opinion, does not establish incompetency to stand trial. The trial court properly treated the two issues separately. See 50 P.S. 7402(a); see also Commonwealth v. Tyson, 402 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. 1979) (“Even though one has a history of mental illness that person may, at a given time, be competent to stand trial and may have been legally sane at the time of the commission of the crime.”).
- 17 - J-A22038-15
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/17/2015
- 18 -