J-S09006-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : MICHAEL ADAMS : : Appellant : No. 927 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000883-2022
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.: FILED JULY 7, 2025
Michael Adams appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following his conviction of one
count each of prohibited possession of firearm, 1 possession of instrument of
crime (PIC),2 terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, 3 simple
assault,4 and recklessly endangering another person (REAP). 5 After careful
review, we affirm.
____________________________________________
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
2 Id. § 907(a).
3 Id. § 2706(a)(1).
4 Id. § 2701(a).
5 Id. § 2705. J-S09006-25
On or around May 30, 2021, Adams and his family and Telanah Oliver
and her family were involved in a physical altercation arising from a
disagreement over moving Oliver’s vehicle. See N.T. Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22,
at 8-9, 20-24. At some point during the altercation, Adams lost his phone.
Id. at 67-71. This case arises from a subsequent altercation that occurred on
June 1, 2021, when Adams attempted to retrieve his cell phone from Oliver’s
home. On July 12, 2022, the court held a bench trial on the above charges.
The trial court summarized the following facts from trial as follows:
[O]n June 1, 2021, at approximately 3:00 p.m., [Adams] knocked on [Oliver’s] front door at 17[13] South 30th Street in Philadelphia[, asking if she had his cellphone]. (N.T. [Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22,] at 7-10, 27). [] Oliver testified that. . . she and her sister, Malika, were just about to leave in her car [and] to avoid an altercation, they decided to wait a minute before leaving the home. [Id. at 27.] When they eventually went outside, [Adams] immediately followed them to [] Oliver’s car, stating, “Give me back my phone.” [] Oliver responded, “Nobody has your phone.” [Adams] replied, “Bitch, you don't have your entourage now. Fight my wife.” Malika told [] Oliver, “No[,]” and shepherded her toward the car. [Adams] then called out to his wife and stepdaughter, “Aisha, Aniyah, come on. She out here now.” ([Id.] at 25-2[9], 40).
[] Oliver testified that Aisha and Aniyah quickly approached and stood on either side of [Adams], pinning [] Oliver and Malika by the car. [Id. at 12-13.] Oliver observed Aisha holding a handgun and Aniyah holding a water bottle filled with bleach. [Id. at 11, 39-41.] When Aniyah started to unscrew the bottle cap, [] Oliver stated, “You throw that bleach on me, [and] the same thing that happened the day before is going to happen again.” [Id. at 41.]
At that point, [Adams]—who was wearing an Islamic thobe that extended down to his ankles—retrieved an assault rifle from behind his back and pointed it at [] Oliver. [Id.] at 11-18, 31, 40-41, 43-44. [] Oliver testified that, while pointing the assault rifle at her face, [Adams] threatened her as follows:
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A. [] It was a big gun. He pulled it from behind him. And he was like, [“]Bitch, do something now.[”] Like directly pointed at me.
Q. So when you say “AK-47,” you're talking about an assault rifle?
A. A long gun. It had a clip in the back of it. Like, a handle in the back, a handle in the front.
***
[And then] he made a statement like, [“]I got bail money. I got lawyer money. I got Janazah [funeral] money. Whichever way you want to do [it], that’s how we’re gonna do it.[”]
([Id.] at 13-16).
Believing that [Adams] was about to shoot her, [] Oliver sprayed him with mace in a desperate attempt to flee:
[Oliver]: The daughter has bleach in her hand, taking the top off. The wife has a little gun in her hand, and [Adams] has an AK[-]47. So[,] for me to get into my car, I sprayed the mace and backed up.
I could remember that vividly . . . he, like, pointed [it] directly [at] my face. So it was, like, I’m staring at the gun, and I was thinking[,] if I spray the mace, he’s going to shoot me anyway, but I’ll just take the chance.
([Id.] at 31, 44-45).
[] Oliver testified that, after using the mace, she was able to get into her car[,] but believed that [Adams] was still going to shoot her. [Id. at 18.]. . . Oliver was so overwhelmed by having an assault rifle pointed at her that she left Malika behind in the melee. [Id. at 41-42.]. . . Oliver testified that, as she drove away, she immediately called 9-1-1 to report that [Adams] had just threatened her with a gun[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/24, at 2-4.
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Additionally, Philadelphia Police Detective Andrew Gallagher testified
that, on June 1, 2021, he executed a search warrant for 1715 South 30th
Street in response to the above incident. Detective Gallagher recovered a
total of four firearms—two rifles and two semiautomatic handguns 6—in
addition to “a lot of ammunition and a ballistic vest.” N.T. Nonjury Trial,
7/12/22, at 48. One of the rifles was an AR-15 assault rifle, which Detective
Gallagher recovered from the kitchen area of the home. See Trial Court
Opinion, 6/4/24, 5 n.8. Although Oliver erroneously referred to the weapon
as an “AK-47,” she positively identified this assault rifle as the weapon that
Adams pointed at her. Id. at 4 n.7, citing N.T. Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22, at 13-
15.
Adams also testified at trial and admitted to being present and involved
in both altercations between the families. See N.T. Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22, at
84-85. However, he testified that he was the peacemaker during the situation.
See id. at 84 (Adams testifying, “I was tryin’ to be their med[iator]. . . I was
tryin’ to break it up[.]”). Similar to Oliver’s testimony regarding the events of
June 1, 2021, Adams testified that he knocked on Oliver’s door, asked for his
phone, and, when Oliver left her house, Adams, his wife, and his stepdaughter
approached Oliver as she was walking to her car. Id. at 72-73. Adams
testified that he was asking for his phone when Oliver stated, “If you don't get ____________________________________________
6 Detective Gallagher testified that the two semiautomatic handguns were registered to Adams’ wife, Aisha Shields, who had a license to carry a firearm. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/24, at 5 n.8, citing N.T. Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22, at 54-55.
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out [of] my face, I’m gonna mace you.” Id. at 73. He then testified that the
next thing he remembered was that he was maced in the face. Id. Adams
then retreated to his front porch, where someone applied milk to his face, and
then the police arrived. Id. at 74-75. Adams testified that he did not have a
gun during the interaction and that he did not live at 1715 South 30 th Street,
although he admitted to occasionally sleeping there. Id. at 73, 76-77, 86.
Instead, Adams testified that he lived at 5211 Catherine Street, which is what
he told police the day of the incident. Id. at 77. Adams then changed his
testimony and claimed that he lived at 5420 Birch Street at the time of the
altercation. Id. Finally, Adams testified that he had “no clue” that there were
four guns in the 1715 South 30 th Street house. Id. at 95-96.
Following Adams’ conviction of the above-stated offenses, the court
sentenced him on October 18, 2022, to an aggregate term of 11½ to 23
months’ incarceration and a concurrent term of seven years' probation. 7 On
January 31, 2023, Adams filed a pro se “reconsideration petition,” claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing hearing, which the
court denied as untimely, on February 10, 2023.8 See Appellant’s First ____________________________________________
7 On October 18, 2022, the trial court denied Adams’ Motion for Extraordinary
Relief. See Order, 10/18/22. This motion was made orally prior to sentencing; however, it does not appear to be in the record. See PCRA Hearing, 3/1/24, at 25.
8 On February 25, 2023, Adams filed a pro se motion to modify and reduce sentence. Adams also filed two additional pro se motions on August 22, 2023: one to modify and reduce his sentence and another petition for (Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Reconsideration Petition, 1/31/23; see also Order, 2/10/23. On March 6,
2023, Adams filed a second pro se “reconsideration petition,” restating the
same claims of ineffective counsel he made in his first petition. The court
denied the second petition on March 28, 2023, as untimely. See Order,
3/28/23.
On May 5, 2023, Adams filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)9
petition, alleging ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to file a direct appeal.
PCRA counsel was appointed, and on August 11, 2023, he filed an amended
petition, requesting his appellate rights be reinstated nunc pro tunc. On March
1, 2024, the court held an evidentiary hearing on Adams’ PCRA petition, and,
on March 19, 2024, the court entered an order granting reinstatement of
Adams’ direct appellate rights and post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc. See
Order, 3/19/24, at 1; see also N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/1/24, at 26.10 Adams
did not file any post-sentence motions. On March 20, 2024, Adams filed a
reconsideration. In our review of the record, it does not appear that the trial court ruled on these motions.
9 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
10 At the PCRA hearing, the Commonwealth asked the trial court to include the
ability to file post-sentence motions in their order to reinstate Adams’ direct appeal rights nun pro tunc because, as of the PCRA hearing, “nothing [had been] preserved” for appeal. See PCRA Hearing, 3/1/24, at 26; see also Commonwealth v. Liston, 977 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa. 2009) (order granting PCRA petitioner leave to file a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc does not automatically confer an additional right to file post-sentence motions nunc pro tunc).
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timely notice of appeal. Both the trial court and Adams have complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Adams raises the following issue for our review: “Was the
evidence insufficient to convict [Adams] of the offenses where [] Adams
retreated into his residence while an altercation was happening and [] Adams
did not possess a firearm?” Appellant’s Brief, at 3. 11
This Court’s standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is well-settled:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all ____________________________________________
11 In Adams’ Rule 1925(b) statement, in addition to his sufficiency claim, Adams asserts that he did not possess a firearm at the time of the altercation, that he was maced, and that a firearm was pulled on him. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 5/8/24, at ¶ 3. Further, Adams alleges he was not living at 1715 South 30th Street at the time of the incident. Id. at ¶ 4. Adams’ statements on his firearm possession and residence at the time of the incidents seek to dispute the credibility of the evidence introduced by the Commonwealth in favor of Adams’ own testimony. Thus, these claims go to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency of it. However, in failing to file a post-sentence motion, Adams has not properly preserved a weight of the evidence claim. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3) (claim challenging weight of evidence “shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial: (1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a post-sentence motion”). Additionally, Adams failed to ensure that the notes of testimony from his sentencing hearing were included in the certified record, so we are unable to confirm whether a weight claim was lodged at that proceeding. Finally, although he also challenges the credibility of Oliver’s testimony throughout his brief, Adams raises only a sufficiency claim in his statement of questions presented. See Appellant’s Brief, at 3. The failure to preserve a weight claim will result in waiver of that claim. Commonwealth v. Barkman, 295 A.2d 721, 736 (Pa. Super. 2023). Consequently, we find the weight of evidence claim waived.
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reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense. Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal
citations omitted). Any question of doubt is to be resolved by the factfinder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Adams argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any
of the charges because the testimony of Oliver, the complaining witness, and
the discovery of the firearm at 1715 South 30 th Street were insufficient to
prove he possessed a firearm. See Appellant’s Brief, at 19-22. Specifically,
Adams argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was in actual or
constructive possession of a firearm because the firearm was not found on his
person, and there is no evidence linking the firearm discovered in his residence
to the incident.12 See Appellant’s Brief, at 21. He also argues that the “mere
discovery” of a firearm inside a defendant’s residence, without any other
12 At trial and at one point in his brief, Adams argues that he was not living at
1715 South 30th Street, the location where the firearms were recovered by the police. See N.T. Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22, at 86-87; see also Appellant’s Brief, at 20. However, at other places in his brief, Adams states that 1715 South 30th Street is “his home” and “[his] residence.” Appellant’s Brief, at 20, 21. For purposes of our analysis, we assume that Adams resides at 1715 South 30th Street, as he repeatedly indicates in his brief.
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evidence linking the firearm to the incident, fails to establish the defendant
possessed or used the firearm in the altercation. Id. at 22. Additionally,
Adams contends that Oliver’s testimony is insufficient to establish his
possession of a firearm because her testimony was contrary to his own
testimony. Id. at 21-22. Specifically, as to his REAP conviction, Adams posits
that there is a “lack of evidence” that he possessed or used a firearm. Id. at
23.
Primarily, this Court notes that a sufficiency of the evidence review does
not include an assessment of the credibility of testimony offered by the
Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 A.2d 710, 713-14 (Pa.
Super. 2003). A mere conflict in the testimony of the witnesses does not
render the evidence insufficient because “it is within the province of the fact
finder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to believe all,
part, or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Rabold, 920 A.2d 857,
859 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). In fact, “variances in testimony
go[] to the credibility of the witness and not the sufficiency of the evidence”
and is irrelevant in our sufficiency analysis. Commonwealth v. Galloway,
434 A.2d 1220, 1222 (Pa. 1981). Thus, for purposes of his sufficiency
argument, it is of no moment that Oliver’s testimony contradicted Adams’ own
testimony. To the extent that Adams challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review such argument on the merits below.
The relevant portion of the statute for persons not to possess a firearm
is as follows: “A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in
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[this statute] or whose conduct meets the criteria in [this statute] shall not
possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to
possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this
Commonwealth.”13 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
Furthermore, “a person commits [REAP,] a misdemeanor of the second
degree[,] if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2705.
Possession of a firearm may be established “by proving actual
possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession.”
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Further, the testimony of one witness, alone, is
sufficient to establish that a defendant actually possessed a firearm at the
time of the commission of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Antidormi,
84 A.3d 736, 756-57 (Pa. Super. 2014). “‘Constructive possession’ is found
where the individual does not have actual possession over the illegal item but
has conscious dominion over it.” Commonwealth v. Heidler, 741 A.2d 213,
215-16 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc).
13 Evidence offered at trial established that Adams is prohibited from possessing a firearm under section 6105 because of a prior conviction of an enumerated offense. See N.T. Nonjury Trial, at 61, 73, 86 (counsel stipulated Adams was ineligible to possess a firearm); see also Commonwealth Ex. 12 (court summary that Adams pled guilty to aggravated assault prior to this case). Therefore, we do not address the other statutory elements necessary to sustain Adams’ conviction under sections 6105.
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Here, there was sufficient evidence to establish Adams possessed a
firearm. Both Oliver and Adams testified that Adams was at 1715 South 30 th
Street on the day of the incident. See N.T. Nonjury Trial, at 17, 87. At trial,
Oliver testified that Adams, his wife, and his stepdaughter surrounded her car
when she and her sister were trying to leave the neighborhood in her car. Id.
at 12-13. Oliver testified that Adams pulled a big gun from behind him and
directly pointed it at her and said “Bitch, do something now.” Id. at 13, 18.
Oliver also described the gun Adams held as “a long gun [with] a clip in the
back of it. Like, a handle in the back, a handle in the front.” Id. at 13. During
the execution of a search warrant, an assault rifle was recovered in the kitchen
of 1715 South 30th Street. Id. at 50. When shown a picture of the gun
recovered at 1715 South 30th Street, Oliver identified it as the same gun
Adams held during the incident on June 1, 2021. Id. at 13-15; see also
Commonwealth Ex. C-1A. Oliver’s testimony alone is sufficient to prove actual
possession. Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756-757. Further, contrary to Adams’
claims, constructive possession is not relevant here because the
Commonwealth adduced sufficient evidence of Adams’ actual possession of a
firearm at the time of the incident. Viewing the aforesaid testimony in a light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude that
there was sufficient evidence presented that Adams was in possession of a
firearm.
As to his REAP conviction, Adams argues that Oliver’s testimony was
uncorroborated by any physical evidence or independent witness testimony
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and, therefore, fails to prove his conduct placed Oliver in danger of serious
bodily harm. See Appellant’s Brief, at 22. He also posits that his retreat to
his porch after being maced by Oliver does not constitute reckless behavior
that endangers another person. Id. We disagree.
To sustain a REAP conviction, the Commonwealth must prove that the
defendant had an “actual present ability to inflict harm.” Commonwealth v.
Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 728 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Danger,
not merely the apprehension of danger, must be created. Commonwealth
v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 949 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Contrary to Adams’ claim, the uncorroborated testimony of a single
witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as
that testimony addresses every element of the crime charged.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa. Super. 2018). Here,
Oliver’s testimony addressed Adams’ possession of the firearm, that he
pointed it at her, and threatened her. See N.T. Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22, at 8-
9, 13, 16, 20-24 (Oliver testifying that, while pointing a large gun at her,
Adams said, “Bitch, do something now” and “I got bail money. I got lawyer
money. I got Janazah [funeral] money. Whichever way you want to do [it],
that's how we’re gonna do it.”). A person may be convicted of REAP when
there is sufficient evidence that the victim was in actual danger from a pointed
gun, regardless of if it is loaded, and the perpetrator was capable of inflicting
actual harm. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 503 A.2d 11, 13-14 (Pa.
Super. 1985). Adams cornered Oliver at her car after two days of escalating
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altercations between Adams, his family, and Oliver and pointed a large firearm
at Oliver’s face while threatening her. See N.T. Nonjury Trial, 7/12/22, at 8-
9, 13, 16, 20-24. We conclude the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to allow the factfinder to reasonably infer that Adams had the actual
present ability to inflict great bodily harm on Oliver. Finally, Adams’ assertion
that his retreat to the porch after being maced did not constitute reckless
behavior is similarly meritless. Although Adams did run to his porch after
being maced, he was maced after he pointed an assault rifle at Oliver and
threatened her. Id. at 26, 38, 74. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to
sustain Adams’ REAP conviction.
Next, Adams posits that his PIC conviction must be vacated if there is
insufficient evidence to prove he possessed a firearm. Appellant’s Brief, at
“A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses
any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
907(a). Because we have already found there was sufficient evidence to prove
Adams possessed a firearm, this claim has no merit. See N.T. Nonjury Trial,
7/12/22, at 13, 18; see also id. at 16 (Oliver testifying Adams used assault
rifle to threaten her).
Finally, Adams asserts that because he retreated from the scene, the
convictions for terroristic threats and simple assault must also be vacated.
See Appellant’s Brief, at 23. However, Adams does not further discuss the
elements of these crimes or provide meaningful arguments for the
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insufficiency of evidence for either conviction. Thus, we find those claims
waived.14 See Commonwealth v. Sipps, 225 A.3d 1110, 1116-17 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (where appellant fails to develop issue in argument section of
brief and fails to cite legal authority, issue is waived); see also Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a).
Judgment of sentence affirmed. ____________________________________________
14 Even if we did not find these claims waived, there is sufficient evidence to
sustain Adams’ convictions of terroristic threats and simple assault. “A person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to. . . commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1). Here, we agree with the trial court, who opined: “Applying the [evidence discussed, infra], [Adams] threatened [] Oliver [while pointing an assault rifle at her face], and there is no question, given the surrounding circumstances of the statement, that the threat was communicated with the intent to terrorize her.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/24, at 13.
Further, we agree with the trial court's analysis of Adams’ conviction of simple assault, that deems “[a] person [] guilty of assault if he. . . attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3).
“The Commonwealth need not establish the victim actually suffered bodily injury [in a simple assault conviction]; rather, it is sufficient to support a conviction if the Commonwealth establishes an attempt to inflict bodily injury.” Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 948 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). A person also commits simple assault if he or she “attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2701(a)(3). As applied in this context, "physical menace" includes pushing, shoving, and other forms of physical force or threat. Here, the evidence established that [Adams] pointed an assault rifle at [] Oliver's face while threatening her. His actions clearly constituted an attempt to put another in fear of serious bodily injury[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/24, at 13-14.
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Date: 7/7/2025
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