J-A13008-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.
Appellant No. 829 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 29, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-SA-0000005-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 4, 2015
Appellant, Francis Adams, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered October 29, 2013, by the Honorable John F. Wagner, Jr., Court of
Common Pleas of Fayette County. After careful review, we affirm.
As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will set forth
only so much of the procedural and factual history of the appeal as is
necessary to this memorandum. Pennsylvania State Trooper Christina Marth
was traveling in her cruiser when she ran the registration on a vehicle she
observed, which returned records indicating that the registered owner of the
vehicle had a DUI related driver’s license suspension. Trooper Marth, using a
PennDot picture of Adams’s driver license, identified Adams through the
mirrors of the car as the driver. Trooper Marth issued a seat belt warning J-A13008-15
and a traffic citation to Adams for driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked.
After a summary trial, Adams was found guilty of driving while his
operating privilege was suspended or revoked pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
1543(b). Adams was later sentenced to 60 days of intermediate punishment
to be served in house arrest with electronic monitoring. Adams subsequently
filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.
Adams then filed a petition for reinstatement of direct appeal rights
nunc pro tunc, which was granted. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Adams challenges the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence supporting his conviction for driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked. Adams also claims that the Commonwealth’s failure
to provide pertinent evidence violated his due process rights.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows.
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of facts may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
-2- J-A13008-15
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Adams’s sufficiency of the evidence claim consists of a suppression of
the evidence claim and an ex post facto constitutional claim within his
sufficiency of the evidence argument. Neither of these claims, of course,
even constitute a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. (In any event,
neither was even raised in the court below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)). Adams
also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence by asserting that “[t]estimony
and an [e]xpert’s opinion this Honorable [c]ourt accepted as fact directly
contradicts and undermines Trooper Marth’s testimony and credibility.”
Appellant’s Brief, at 12. This is also not a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
as questions of credibility should be raised as weight of the evidence claims.
See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997).
We next address Adams’s weight of the evidence claim. The finder of
fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence as the fact finder is
-3- J-A13008-15
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and determines
the credibility of the witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 832
A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003). As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our
judgment for that of the finder of fact. See id. Therefore, we will reverse a
jury’s verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so contrary to
the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. See Commonwealth v.
Passmore, 857 A.2d 697, 708 (Pa. Super. 2004).
A verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks
one’s sense of justice when “the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal,” or
when “the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge to
lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall from the bench,
then it is truly shocking to the judicial conscience.” Commonwealth v.
Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted), aff’d,
938 A.2d 198 (Pa. 2007).
Furthermore,
where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Champney, 832 A.2d at 408 (citation omitted).
Adams challenges the weight the trial court afforded to Trooper
Marth’s testimony. The witnesses Adams presented testified that it was
impossible for Trooper Marth to identify Adams through the windows due to
-4- J-A13008-15
the dirt accumulated on them. Adams believed this effectively contradicted
Trooper Marth’s testimony that she was able to identify Adams through the
rear view and side mirrors of the car. The trial court, acting as the factfinder,
was free to determine the weight to give Adams’s expert, in light of Trooper
Marth’s testimony. “It is beyond argument that the fact-finder is free to
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
J-A13008-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v.
FRANCIS ADAMS, JR.
Appellant No. 829 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 29, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-SA-0000005-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 4, 2015
Appellant, Francis Adams, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered October 29, 2013, by the Honorable John F. Wagner, Jr., Court of
Common Pleas of Fayette County. After careful review, we affirm.
As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we will set forth
only so much of the procedural and factual history of the appeal as is
necessary to this memorandum. Pennsylvania State Trooper Christina Marth
was traveling in her cruiser when she ran the registration on a vehicle she
observed, which returned records indicating that the registered owner of the
vehicle had a DUI related driver’s license suspension. Trooper Marth, using a
PennDot picture of Adams’s driver license, identified Adams through the
mirrors of the car as the driver. Trooper Marth issued a seat belt warning J-A13008-15
and a traffic citation to Adams for driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked.
After a summary trial, Adams was found guilty of driving while his
operating privilege was suspended or revoked pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
1543(b). Adams was later sentenced to 60 days of intermediate punishment
to be served in house arrest with electronic monitoring. Adams subsequently
filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.
Adams then filed a petition for reinstatement of direct appeal rights
nunc pro tunc, which was granted. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, Adams challenges the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence supporting his conviction for driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked. Adams also claims that the Commonwealth’s failure
to provide pertinent evidence violated his due process rights.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows.
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of facts may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
-2- J-A13008-15
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and satisfy the jury of an accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-276 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Adams’s sufficiency of the evidence claim consists of a suppression of
the evidence claim and an ex post facto constitutional claim within his
sufficiency of the evidence argument. Neither of these claims, of course,
even constitute a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. (In any event,
neither was even raised in the court below. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)). Adams
also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence by asserting that “[t]estimony
and an [e]xpert’s opinion this Honorable [c]ourt accepted as fact directly
contradicts and undermines Trooper Marth’s testimony and credibility.”
Appellant’s Brief, at 12. This is also not a sufficiency of the evidence claim,
as questions of credibility should be raised as weight of the evidence claims.
See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997).
We next address Adams’s weight of the evidence claim. The finder of
fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the evidence as the fact finder is
-3- J-A13008-15
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and determines
the credibility of the witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 832
A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 2003). As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our
judgment for that of the finder of fact. See id. Therefore, we will reverse a
jury’s verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so contrary to
the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. See Commonwealth v.
Passmore, 857 A.2d 697, 708 (Pa. Super. 2004).
A verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks
one’s sense of justice when “the figure of Justice totters on her pedestal,” or
when “the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes the trial judge to
lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall from the bench,
then it is truly shocking to the judicial conscience.” Commonwealth v.
Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted), aff’d,
938 A.2d 198 (Pa. 2007).
Furthermore,
where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.
Champney, 832 A.2d at 408 (citation omitted).
Adams challenges the weight the trial court afforded to Trooper
Marth’s testimony. The witnesses Adams presented testified that it was
impossible for Trooper Marth to identify Adams through the windows due to
-4- J-A13008-15
the dirt accumulated on them. Adams believed this effectively contradicted
Trooper Marth’s testimony that she was able to identify Adams through the
rear view and side mirrors of the car. The trial court, acting as the factfinder,
was free to determine the weight to give Adams’s expert, in light of Trooper
Marth’s testimony. “It is beyond argument that the fact-finder is free to
accept or reject the credibility of both expert and lay witnesses, and to
believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Gunn v. Grossman, 748 A.2d
1235, 1240 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). The trial court found that
the testimony of Trooper Marth was more credible. We do not find such a
verdict, placing faith in a sworn officer of the law’s testimony, to be against
the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Thus, Adams’s argument
merits no relief.
Adams final argument is that the Commonwealth’s failure to provide
pertinent evidence violated his right to due process. Specifically, that the
Commonwealth’s failure to produce the mobile video recording (“MVR”) of
the traffic stop was in direct violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).1
____________________________________________
1 Adams attempts to raise two sub-arguments within his Brady claim. First, that Pennsylvania State Police did not follow policy in regards to retaining the MVR. Second, that the policy as written violates Brady. Adams did not raise either claim in the lower court. Therefore, we deem them waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
-5- J-A13008-15
In Brady, the Court decided that “the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id., at 87 (emphasis
added). To prove a Brady violation, the defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating that: “(1) the prosecutor has suppressed evidence; (2) the
evidence, whether exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant,
and (3) the suppression prejudiced the defendant.” Commonwealth v.
Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 133 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
Adams cannot prove that the Commonwealth suppressed the evidence.
No Brady violation occurs where the parties had equal access to the
information or if the appellant knew or could have uncovered such evidence
with reasonable diligence. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564,
578 (Pa. 2005). Adams had a 31-day window in which he could have
accessed the MVR video. See Reproduced Record, at 97a.2 During this 31-
day period, there was equal access to the MVR. Reasonable diligence on the
part of Adams would have provided him access to the MVR. Therefore, since ____________________________________________
2 A letter referencing the departmental policy for retention of mobile video/audio recordings has been included in the reproduced record. It is not in the certified record. This Court has, under certain circumstances, overlooked an omission of material from the certified record when it could be found in the reproduced record. See, e.g., Stewart v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 806 A.2d 34, 37 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2002). See also Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note. No one has disputed the letter’s authenticity and we will therefore consider it in the disposition of this issue.
-6- J-A13008-15
there was equal access to the MVR no Brady violation has occurred. See
See Collins, 888 A.2d at 578.
Second, a Brady claim is valid only if the withheld evidence was
exculpatory, as compared to “potentially useful,” and there was a showing of
bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v.
Snyder, 963 A.2d 396, 406 (Pa. 2009). Here, the attorney for the
Commonwealth contends that the MVR was never in their possession. See
Appellee’s Brief, at 6. Adams provided no evidence to prove otherwise.
Furthermore, Adams make no assertion as to the MVR’s relevance to the
case at hand.
Adams also baldly claims that “the failure of the Commonwealth to
provide the Petitioner with NCIC records prior to trial violates” Brady.
Appellant’s Brief, at 22. That is the sum and substance of this claim; it is
completely undeveloped. Therefore, we deem the argument pertaining to the
NCIC records waived. See Commonwealth v. Bavusa, 832 A.2d 1042,
1052 (Pa. 2003) (reiterating that arguments for undeveloped claims are
waived).
Judgement of sentence affirmed.
-7- J-A13008-15
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/4/2015
-8-