Colvin v. White

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 25-2193
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PARNELL COLVIN; Mr. RICHARD No. 25-2193 VELA, Jr., D.C. No. 2:21-cv-02109-RFB-NJK Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* v.

TOMMY WHITE, AKA Thomas White; LABORERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA - LOCAL 872,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Richard F. Boulware, II, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 30, 2026**

Before: GOULD, FRIEDLAND, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.

Parnell Colvin and Richard Vela appeal a district court order denying their

motion for partial summary judgment and granting Defendants’ motion for

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). summary judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Colvin and Vela’s due process claim fails as a matter of law. Section

411(a)(5) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)

provides that “[n]o member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended,

expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues . . . unless such

member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable

time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.” 29 U.S.C.

§ 411(a)(5) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Colvin and Vela were expelled

without being provided a full and fair hearing. But it is also undisputed that Colvin

and Vela refused to pay their supplemental dues. Nothing in Local 872’s

constitution suggests that the union cannot require payment of supplemental dues,

in addition to monthly membership dues. See Loc. 1052 of United Bhd. Of

Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. L.A. Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 944 F.2d

610, 613 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that review of “a union’s interpretation of its own

constitution . . . is deferential”); Motion Picture & Videotape Eds. Guild, Loc. 776

v. Int’l Sound Technicians, Loc. 695, 800 F.2d 973, 975 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A]bsent

bad faith or special circumstances, an interpretation of a union constitution by

union officials, as well as interpretations of the union’s rules and regulations,

should not be disturbed by the court.”). Nor does anything in the record support

2 25-2193 Colvin and Vela’s assertion that the supplemental dues were voluntary.1

2. The district court also did not err in denying Colvin and Vela summary

judgment on their fiduciary duty claim. Enforcing payment obligations in

accordance with Local 872’s constitution did not constitute a breach of fiduciary

duty. Nor did Colvin and Vela produce any evidence showing “intentional

misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of law.” Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 78.138(7)(b)(2).

3. Colvin and Vela’s “retaliatory” discharge claim under 29 U.S.C. § 529

also lacks merit. It is undisputed that they alleged facts showing that they

“exercised the right to oppose union policies” by publicly criticizing union leaders

and were subject to an adverse action. Casumpang v. Int’l Longshoremen’s and

Warehousemen’s Union, Loc. 142, 269 F.3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir. 2001). But

Colvin and Vela have failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ non-discriminatory

reason for their discharge was “pretext for impermissible retaliation.” Yartzoff v.

Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Casumpang, 269 F.3d at

1059 (requiring a “causal link between protected activities and an adverse

employment action”); Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir.

1 The district court correctly declined to consider a declaration that was provided for the first time in a reply brief. See Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1996).

3 25-2193 2003) (requiring either “direct” or “‘specific’ and ‘substantial’ evidence of pretext

to survive summary judgment” (quoting Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d

1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998))). The district court did not err in granting Defendants

summary judgment on this claim.

AFFIRMED.2

2 Vela’s motion for miscellaneous relief (Dkt. No. 22) is granted in part. We confirm that we reviewed Vela’s brief independently and did not attribute to him Colvin’s arguments or factual assertions.

4 25-2193