Colvin v. Tunnage

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEON COLVIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02554 (UNA)

DONALD W. TUNNAGE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”),

ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The

Court grants Plaintiff’s IFP application, and for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this case

without prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of the District, sues an associate judge of the D.C. Superior Court who

presided over a case that Plaintiff filed in that court, see Colvin v. 743 Fairmont St. NW, LLC, No.

2024-CAB-007438 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 25, 2024)1 (“Colvin I”); see also Compl. at 3.

Plaintiff challenges several determinations made by the court in Colvin I, largely related to the

treatment and denial of Plaintiff’s motions and his other requests for relief. See Compl. at 3–20.

He broadly alleges that these acts were discriminatory and violated his constitutional and other

statutory rights, see id. at 2, 8, and he seeks an injunction from this Court condemning and

reversing them, see id. at 8, 10, 13–15, 17–20.

1 A court may take judicial notice of the docket and facts on the public record in other court proceedings. See Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Federal courts are generally prohibited from reviewing determinations made by local District of

Columbia courts. See Richardson v. D.C. Ct. of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.,

263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923)). The Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine “bars lower federal courts

from considering not only issues raised and decided in the state courts, but also issues that are

inextricably intertwined with the issues that were before the state court.” Araya v. Bayly, 875 F.

Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, No. 12-7069,

2013 WL 500819 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 18, 2013). In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief

against Defendant in his personal capacity, such claims are “barred under the doctrine of absolute

judicial immunity and thus must be dismissed.” Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 40 (D.D.C.

2014), aff’d, No. 14-5180, 2015 WL 13710107 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2015).

For these reasons, the case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies

this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: October 24, 2025 _______________________ CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge