Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Downey

855 N.E.2d 482, 111 Ohio St. 3d 158
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 1, 2006
DocketNo. 2006-1188
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 855 N.E.2d 482 (Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Downey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Downey, 855 N.E.2d 482, 111 Ohio St. 3d 158 (Ohio 2006).

Opinion

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Jacqueline Souel Downey of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0022818, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 1985. On March 4, 1992, we suspended respondent’s license to practice law for 18 months, with six months stayed, for violations of the following Disciplinary Rules: DR 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally prejudicing or damaging a client), 9-102(A) (requiring a lawyer to maintain client funds in a separate, identifiable bank account), 9-102(B)(3) (requiring lawyers to maintain complete records and appropriate accounts), and 9-102(B)(4) (requiring a lawyer to promptly return funds that a client is entitled to receive). Columbus Bar Assn. v. Downey (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 141, 586 N.E.2d 76. Respondent was reinstated to the practice of law in October 1994. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Downey (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 1206, 642 N.E.2d 630.

{¶ 2} In June 2004, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed an amended complaint charging respondent with additional professional misconduct. Respondent filed an answer to the complaint, and a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline held a hearing on the complaint in February 2006. The panel then prepared written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation, all of which the board adopted.

Misconduct

Count I

{¶ 3} In 2002, David Swoope met with respondent to discuss an employment-discrimination matter. Respondent told Swoope that she would not represent [159]*159him, but she said that she would try, without charge, to negotiate a settlement with his former employer. Swoope did not sign a fee agreement with respondent and did not pay a retainer to her.

{¶ 4} Respondent researched Swoope’s legal claims and sent a settlement demand to the attorney for Swoope’s former employer. She also organized discovery-related materials for Swoope and drafted a federal complaint on his behalf.

{¶ 5} Although respondent accompanied Swoope when he filed a federal civil rights suit against his former employer, she declined to place her name on the complaint, and she again told Swoope that she would not represent him. When Swoope tried to contact respondent later, she did not return his calls.

{¶ 6} Swoope filed a grievance against respondent with relator in January 2003. In response, respondent told relator that she did not represent Swoope, although she acknowledged that she had received and reviewed relevant documents for Swoope, had contacted witnesses, had sent a letter to opposing counsel, had spoken with Swoope on several occasions, and had agreed to “assist the best way [she] could to meet the filing date” for his federal complaint. For several months, respondent did not reply to relator’s other inquiries concerning Swoope’s grievance. She did appear for a deposition in connection with relator’s investigation, but she failed to comply with relator’s deadline for providing various documents.

{¶ 7} Respondent acknowledged and the board found that respondent’s actions violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (barring lawyers from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on their fitness to practice law) and 6-101(A)(3), as well as Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring lawyers to cooperate with and assist in any disciplinary investigation).

Count II

{¶ 8} Mollavi Sonii, a native of Liberia, paid respondent $3,000 to represent him in a deportation matter. Respondent filed an application for asylum on Sonii’s behalf in August 1999 with the United States Immigration Court in Detroit, Michigan. Respondent and Sonii appeared for a hearing on the case in October 2000, but they were told that the hearing would be rescheduled for a later date. Neither of them received any notice of a new date for the hearing, and an immigration judge erroneously ordered Sonii’s removal from the country in October 2000.

{¶ 9} Sonii learned about the judge’s removal order in 2002, and he contacted respondent at that time to inquire about the status of his case. Respondent claimed during these disciplinary proceedings that she had never received the judge’s order because it had been sent to her former office address. By the time [160]*160Sonii and respondent learned about the immigration judge’s October 2000 order, Sonii’s 180-day window for filing an appeal had passed.

{¶ 10} Respondent took no action on Sonii’s behalf to challenge the judge’s removal order or to remedy Sonii’s failure to appeal that ruling.

{¶ 11} Sonii retained a new attorney, and that attorney filed a motion to reopen the asylum case in May 2004. An immigration judge granted that motion in August 2004.

{¶ 12} Respondent acknowledged and the board found that respondent’s actions violated DR 1 — 102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), Y — 101(A)(1) (barring a lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of a client), 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to carry out a contract of professional employment), and 7-101(A)(3).

Count III

{¶ 13} In May 2000, respondent filed a notice of appearance with the United States Board of Immigration Appeals on behalf of her client Khadija Ba. Ba, a citizen of Mauritius, was appealing the denial of her application for employment authorization and was seeking asylum in the United States.

{¶ 14} Respondent did not file an appellate brief on Ba’s behalf. In April 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Ba’s appeal, explaining in its order that no brief supporting her appeal had been filed within the time allowed for filing. Respondent did not tell Ba about the board’s order.

{¶ 15} Ba retained a new attorney, and that attorney filed a motion to reopen Ba’s case in February 2004. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied that motion in May 2004.

{¶ 16} Respondent acknowledged and the board found that respondent’s actions violated DR 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(l), 7-101(A)(2), and 7-101(A)(3).

Count IV

{¶ 17} Sylvester Taye, a Liberian citizen, paid respondent $700 to reopen his asylum case. Respondent filed the necessary pleadings, and a hearing was scheduled for January 15, 1997. Respondent told Taye that she would seek a continuance of the hearing, and she advised Taye that he need not appear on the scheduled date. Respondent did file a motion for a continuance, but it was late. An immigration judge went forward with the hearing as scheduled, and neither respondent nor Taye appeared. The judge ordered Taye’s deportation.

{¶ 18} Several years later, Taye retained a new attorney, and that attorney filed a motion to reopen Taye’s case. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals denied that motion.

[161]*161{¶ 19} Respondent acknowledged and the board found that respondent’s actions violated DR 1-102(A)(6), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(l), 7-101(A)(2), and 7-101(A)(3).

Sanction

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Columbus Bar Assn. v. Downey
2011 Ohio 6947 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
855 N.E.2d 482, 111 Ohio St. 3d 158, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/columbus-bar-assn-v-downey-ohio-2006.