Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Division of Administration, State of Florida Department of Transportation

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Division of Administration, State of Florida Department of Transportation

425 So. 2d 90, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21956

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedDecember 20, 1982

DocketNo. AJ-355

StatusPublished

This text of 425 So. 2d 90 (Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Division of Administration, State of Florida Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Division of Administration, State of Florida Department of Transportation, 425 So. 2d 90, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21956 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982).

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Opinion

McCORD, Judge.

Appellant, Columbia Sussex Corporation, Inc., appeals a final judgment of apportion[91]*91ment in which the trial judge ruled that appellant is not entitled to any apportionment of the damages awarded to appellee for the taking of a portion of appellee Jerri-co’s property in the eminent domain proceeding below. We affirm.

Appellant is the owner of the property adjoining Jerrico’s property. Appellant and Jerrico have reciprocal ingress, egress and parking easements on their adjacent properties. When a portion of Jerri-co’s land became the subject of the eminent domain proceeding, appellant became a party thereto and raised the issue of its own damages as a result of the taking. A verdict on damages was entered after which appellant moved for apportionment pursuant to Section 73.101, Florida Statutes. The trial court’s finding in its final judgment of apportionment that appellant did not suffer any damage resulting from the taking of the fee simple title to a portion of Jerrico’s property is supported by the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the final judgment.

In the final judgment of apportionment, the trial court gratuitously further stated that appellant may seek a separate award from the condemning authority, ap-pellee Department of Transportation. Although no issue has been raised as to that statement through cross-appeal by appellee Department of Transportation, we must deal with the question since that statement is inconsistent with our basis for affirming the trial court’s ruling. Since the issue of appellant’s damages was raised and determined in the proceeding below, appellant is precluded from further litigating such question against the Department of Transportation. See Block v. Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority, 313 So.2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

AFFIRMED.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and MILLS, J., concur.

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McCORD, Judge.

Appellant, Columbia Sussex Corporation, Inc., appeals a final judgment of apportion[91]*91ment in which the trial judge ruled that appellant is not entitled to any apportionment of the damages awarded to appellee for the taking of a portion of appellee Jerri-co’s property in the eminent domain proceeding below. We affirm.

Appellant is the owner of the property adjoining Jerrico’s property. Appellant and Jerrico have reciprocal ingress, egress and parking easements on their adjacent properties. When a portion of Jerri-co’s land became the subject of the eminent domain proceeding, appellant became a party thereto and raised the issue of its own damages as a result of the taking. A verdict on damages was entered after which appellant moved for apportionment pursuant to Section 73.101, Florida Statutes. The trial court’s finding in its final judgment of apportionment that appellant did not suffer any damage resulting from the taking of the fee simple title to a portion of Jerrico’s property is supported by the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the final judgment.

In the final judgment of apportionment, the trial court gratuitously further stated that appellant may seek a separate award from the condemning authority, ap-pellee Department of Transportation. Although no issue has been raised as to that statement through cross-appeal by appellee Department of Transportation, we must deal with the question since that statement is inconsistent with our basis for affirming the trial court’s ruling. Since the issue of appellant’s damages was raised and determined in the proceeding below, appellant is precluded from further litigating such question against the Department of Transportation. See Block v. Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority, 313 So.2d 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).

AFFIRMED.

ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and MILLS, J., concur.

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425 So. 2d 90, 1982 Fla. App. LEXIS 21956, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/columbia-sussex-corp-v-division-of-administration-state-of-florida-fladistctapp-1982.

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