Columbia Ave. Saving-Fund, Safe-Deposit, Title & Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Prison Commission

92 F. 801, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2990
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Georgia
DecidedFebruary 28, 1899
StatusPublished

This text of 92 F. 801 (Columbia Ave. Saving-Fund, Safe-Deposit, Title & Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Prison Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Columbia Ave. Saving-Fund, Safe-Deposit, Title & Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Prison Commission, 92 F. 801, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2990 (circtdga 1899).

Opinion

SPEER, District Judge.

To entitle the plaintiff' to the relief it seeks against the prison commission of Georgia, it must demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the structures proposed by the state, and the uses for which they are intended, w,ill pollute the stream from which the water supply of Milledgeville is obtained. The burden of - proof is upon the plaintiff in this, as in all cases. If the evidence indicates that a polluting stream, or infectious matter, would assuredly be commingled with the waters of Fishing creek above the intake of the plaintiff’s works, in view of the expert testimony and the scientific authorities quoted the plaintiff would have made a prima facie demonstration, supporting its right to the injunction. In that event the defendant, the prison commission, would be under the necessity of producing evidence to satisfy the court that no injury would ensue to the plaintiff or to the public from such contamination. In other words, some actual or practically certain invasion of the rights of the riparian proprietor or user of the water must appear, before the court will be justified in denying to an adjacent landowner the use, otherwise legitimate, of his property. The citations of authority, accumulated by the assiduity of the plaintiff’s solicitors, were perhaps not needed to inform the court that the distinct and continuous pollution of water by a riparian proprietor is a private, and may be a public, nuisance, which equity may enjoin. That nuisance was early defined. The riparian proprietor may not erect upon the banks of the stream any works which render the water unwholesome or offensive. A glover, we find from the Year Books, was in the time of Henry H. inhibited from constructing a lime pit for calf or sheep skins so near the water as to corrupt it. A tan yard so situated has been thus judicially denounced when it had the effect of rendering the water-unwholesome, whether the riparian proprietor below used it for distillation, or culinary or domestic purposes. Howell v. McCoy, 8 Rawle, 256; opinion of Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, Fed. Cas. No. 14,812, and of Lord Ellenborough in Bealey v. Shaw, 6, East, 208; Ang. Water Courses (3d Ed.) p. 20.

We may well adopt the language of Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson, supra:

“Tbe law bere, as in many other cases, acts with a reasonable reference to public convenience and general good, and is not betrayed into a narrow [803]*803strictness, subversive of common use, nor into extravagant looseness, which would destroy private rights.”

In the precedents brought to the attention of the court by the learned' counsel for the plaintiff, it will be generally found that the injunction has been granted only when the water of the plaintiff has been actually invaded by the contaminating agency. Thus, in the Case of Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., cited from 57 Fed. 1000, decision by District Judge linker, the defendant daily discharged into the stream “large quantities of refuse and decomposable matter, which corrupted its waters so as to discolor the same, and render them unfit for domestic use, and destructive of the fish of tlie river.” So, in the Kentucky case of Herr v. Asylum, 30 S. W. 971, the authorities of this institution, by means of their sewers, discharged into a branch running through the plaintiff’s grounds all maimer of slops, offal, and garbage. The court of appeals of Kentucky enjoined the lunatic asylum. In Barrett v. Association (Ill. Sup.) 42 N. E. 891, a large cemetery was drained directly into a stream from which the plaintiff conducted the operations of his dairy, and also had been in the habit of harvesting ice for sale in Chicago. Nothing could be more injurious to the character of the water, as testified to by experts, or more repulsive to the imagination. What, therefore, would be more objectionable as contamination to the water supply? In tlie case of Village of Dwight v. Hayes (Ill. Sup.) 37 N. E. 218, tlie defendant was emptying into the creek, a few rods above the plaintiff's land, the sewage from a village of 1,500 inhabitants. In the case of Kinnaird v. Oil Co. (Ky.) 13 S. W. 938, the oil of the defendant leaked from tlie casks, saturated the ground, penetrated to the base, of water, and contaminated the spring. In view of the well-known character of kerosene oil, its presence in ihe spring was doubtless easily percept ible.

Indeed, it has been very clearly staled in Gould on Waters (section 220, p. 390):

“Proprietors upon streams may cast sewage and waste material therein, if they do not thereby cause material injury to public or prívale rights. The natural right of one proprietor to have the stream desceñid to him in its pure state must yield in a reasonable degree to the equal right of the upper proprietors, whose use of the stream for mill and manufacturing purposes, for irrigation, and domestic purposes will tend to make the water" more or less impure, especially when the population becomes dense. So, it is of public importance that the proprietors of useful manufactories should be held responsible only for appreciable injury caused by their works, and not for slight inconveniences or occasional annoyances. When an injunction is sought" to stop large and expensive works which cause a stream to be polluted, it must clearly appear that the legal remedy is inadequate, and that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury from the continuance of the pollution.”

If that Is true with regard to private institutions, a fortiori is it true with regard to a great institution of the state, necessary for the well-being of tlie community, essential to tlie exercise of the police power, and at the same time for the humane treatment of convicts. The reason for the distinction thus made by the courts seems to be as practical as just. A disease germ, or a cluster of such germs, may possibly find lodgment in the water supply of a city from ordinary farm work on the stream above. For this reason, is the owner up the stream to be [804]*804denied the right to cultivate or to fertilize his lands? Must he exclude from his acres the cattle yard, the pasture, or the sheepfold? Disease, often resulting in death, originates at human habitations. For this reason, will cottages, villages, or towns be forever éxcluded from the area of water supply of downstream communities? The exigencies of modern civilization, and -the increasing density of population, forbid this. It would doubtless be well for all of our municipalities if they could be supplied with streams as pure as those which fldw through granitic aqueducts constructed by Pisistratus 2,500 years ago, and which yet bear refreshment from Pentelicus and Hymettus to classic Athens, or such as flow down to the “Eternal City” from the springs of Cseruleus and Curtius, and from Lake Sabatinus, over marvelous structures built in the time of Claudius, Caligula, and Trajan, or which come down from the Balkans, replenish the fountains of the Seraglio, and revive the sinking subjects of Abdul at Constantinople, after they have swept through curving aqueducts designed by the genius of Justinian’s architects, or those which flow to Glasgow, along channels cut through the adamant from the romantic shores of Loch Katrine, made immortal by the “Lady of the Lake.” We can no longer, however, attain the ideal in the purity of our water supply, and courts must be guided by contemporary conditions.

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Related

Village of Dwight v. Hayes
37 N.E. 218 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1894)
Herr v. Central Kentucky Lunatic Asylum
30 S.W. 971 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1895)
Tyler v. Wilkinson
24 F. Cas. 472 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island, 1827)
Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co.
57 F. 1000 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, 1893)

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Bluebook (online)
92 F. 801, 1899 U.S. App. LEXIS 2990, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/columbia-ave-saving-fund-safe-deposit-title-trust-co-of-philadelphia-circtdga-1899.