Colonial Technologies v. Blau Mktg. Tech., Cv 97 0074703 (Nov. 26, 1997)

1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 11487
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedNovember 26, 1997
DocketNo. CV 97 0074703
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 11487 (Colonial Technologies v. Blau Mktg. Tech., Cv 97 0074703 (Nov. 26, 1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Colonial Technologies v. Blau Mktg. Tech., Cv 97 0074703 (Nov. 26, 1997), 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 11487 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS On October 24, 1997, the plaintiff, Colonial Technologies Corp., filed a ten count amended complaint against the defendants, Blau Marketing Technologies, Inc., Barry Blau, and Worldwide Telecom Partners, Inc. The complaint, which alleges various causes of action sounding in tort and breach of contract, arises from a joint venture agreement between Barry Blau Partners, Inc. and Colonial Data Technologies Corp.

On September 30, 1997, the defendants, Blau Marketing Technologies, Inc. and Barry Blau, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Practice Book § 143, the defendants filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion to dismiss. On October 15, 1997, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. A supplemental memorandum of law in support of the motion to dismiss was filed by the defendants on November 14, 1997.

"A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Upson v.State, 190 Conn. 622, 624, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "It is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised it must be immediately acted upon by the court." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 99, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). "[S]tanding . . . implicates a court's subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any point in judicial proceedings." Stamford Hospital v. Vega, 236 Conn. 646, 656,674 A.2d 821 (1996). "[T]he court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Savage v.Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 264, 571 A.2d 696 (1990). "The motion to dismiss . . . admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone. . . Where, however, the motion is accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the complaint." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barde v.Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 62, 539 A.2d 1000 (1988).

In support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants argue that the named plaintiff, Colonial Technologies, Corp., does not have standing to pursue their complaint. According to the defendants, a company named InteliData Technologies Corp. has CT Page 11489 held itself out as the successor to Colonial Data Technologies Corp., the original signatory to the joint venture with the defendants. The defendants argue that the effect of this succession is that Colonial Data Technologies Corp. no longer exists and therefore may not pursue this lawsuit.

Colonial Technologies Corp. argues that the court should not grant the motion to dismiss. Rather, the plaintiff contends that it does have standing to pursue their claims against the defendants. According to the plaintiff, Colonial Data Technologies Corp. was the name of the company that entered into the joint venture agreement with the defendants. The plaintiff alleges, however, that at the time of entering the agreement Colonial Data Technologies Corp., a Delaware corporation, was a subsidiary of a Massachusetts corporation also named Colonial Data Technologies Corp. Furthermore, the plaintiff contends, in order to avoid confusion between the Massachusetts parent company and the Delaware subsidiary, the Delaware subsidiary by the name of Colonial Data Technologies Corp. changed its name to Colonial Technologies Corp. Finally, the plaintiff claims that the Massachusetts parent company, which retained the name Colonial Data Technologies Corp., merged with another corporation in order to form a company known as InteliData Technologies Corp. As a result of this merger, the plaintiff alleges, Colonial Technologies is now a subsidiary of InteliData Technologies Corp. In effect, the plaintiff argues that the original signatory to the joint venture agreement was a subsidiary that changed its name and is now a subsidiary of a different parent corporation.

The plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of standing and unless the plaintiff has standing, the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Sadloski v.Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 83-85, 634 A.2d 888 (1993). "One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he or she has in an individual, or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. . ." Sadloski v. Manchester, supra, 84.

In order for this court to be able to find that the plaintiff has standing to pursue its lawsuit, the plaintiff must prove that the named plaintiff, Colonial Technologies Corp., is in fact the company which entered the joint venture agreement, Colonial Data Technologies Corp. For it is evident that if Colonial Technologies Corp. is not the signatory to the joint venture CT Page 11490 agreement, it may not bring suit upon the agreement.

According to the plaintiff, this critical finding is established because: (1) Colonial Data Technologies Corp. was a subsidiary of a Massachusetts company of the same name; (2) it then changed its name to Colonial Technologies Corp.; and (3) Colonial Technologies exists as a subsidiary of InteliData Technologies Corp. For proof of these facts, the plaintiff relies on: (1) an affidavit by the Vice President of Colonial Technologies Corp. which states that Colonial Data Technologies was a subsidiary of a Massachusetts company with the same name; (2) a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State of the state of Delaware in which the Secretary of State certifies that the document attached to the letter is a true and correct copy of the certificate of amendment of Colonial Data Technologies Corp. changing its name to Colonial Technologies Corp.; and (3) a copy of the company profile for InteliData Technologies Corp., submitted by the defendant, which indicates InteliData has a subsidiary called Colonial Technologies Corp.

This court may not consider the affidavit of the Vice President of Colonial Technologies Corp. in determining whether Colonial Data Technologies Corp. was a subsidiary of a Massachusetts company with the same name. The defendants have disputed this fact and have alleged that Colonial Data Technologies Corp.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Upson v. State
461 A.2d 991 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1983)
Barde v. Board of Trustees
539 A.2d 1000 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1988)
Savage v. Aronson
571 A.2d 696 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990)
Sadloski v. Town of Manchester
634 A.2d 888 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1993)
Stamford Hospital v. Vega
674 A.2d 821 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1996)
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Peabody, N.E., Inc.
680 A.2d 1321 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 11487, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/colonial-technologies-v-blau-mktg-tech-cv-97-0074703-nov-26-1997-connsuperct-1997.