Colon v. Special Agent James Connolly

First Circuit

Colon v. Special Agent James Connolly

78 F. App'x 732

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit

DecidedOctober 27, 2003

Docket03-1523

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 78 F. App'x 732 (Colon v. Special Agent James Connolly) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Colon v. Special Agent James Connolly, 78 F. App'x 732 (1st Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Pro se plaintiff-appellant Edwin Colon (“Colon”) appeals from two district court orders granting summary judgment in favor of federal and state officials in his civil rights damages suit. We review summary judgment decisions de novo, examining the record independently and drawing any factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.2003). We have reviewed the parties’ submissions and the record on appeal. We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s 10/30/01 and 1/31/03 reports and recommendations, which the district court accepted on 11/27/01 and 3/19/03, respectively. We add only the following comments.

Colon’s argument that the district court improperly relied on the magistrate’s reports because two of them contradicted each other has no merit. Specifically, Colon asserts that the magistrate’s 8/9/99 report concluded that Colon’s complaint was not vague, whereas the magistrate’s 10/30/01 report concluded that his complaint was vague. A review of these reports reveals that the purported contradiction has been manufactured, for in his 8/9/99 report, the magistrate merely noted Colon’s contention that prior court rulings suggested that his complaint was not vague.

Colon’s next argument that the district court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by adopting the magistrate’s reports without issuing its own opinions also has no merit. While the district court was required to review the magistrate judge’s decisions de novo, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this did not-contrary to Colon’s contention—compel the district court to make separate findings of fact or issue opinions setting forth its own reasoning, see Jonco, LLC v. Ali, Inc., 157 F.3d 33, 35 (1st Cir.1998).

Finally, Colon’s argument that he stated viable damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), has no merit. The lower court correctly held that Colon’s damages claims were not cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) because the present suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of Colon’s underlying sentence. We add that Colon may pursue his damages claims if his conviction and sentence are ever invalidated. Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1994).

The judgment of the district court is summarily affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loe. R. 27(c).

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PER CURIAM.

Pro se plaintiff-appellant Edwin Colon (“Colon”) appeals from two district court orders granting summary judgment in favor of federal and state officials in his civil rights damages suit. We review summary judgment decisions de novo, examining the record independently and drawing any factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rosenberg v. City of Everett, 328 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.2003). We have reviewed the parties’ submissions and the record on appeal. We affirm, substantially for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s 10/30/01 and 1/31/03 reports and recommendations, which the district court accepted on 11/27/01 and 3/19/03, respectively. We add only the following comments.

Colon’s argument that the district court improperly relied on the magistrate’s reports because two of them contradicted each other has no merit. Specifically, Colon asserts that the magistrate’s 8/9/99 report concluded that Colon’s complaint was not vague, whereas the magistrate’s 10/30/01 report concluded that his complaint was vague. A review of these reports reveals that the purported contradiction has been manufactured, for in his 8/9/99 report, the magistrate merely noted Colon’s contention that prior court rulings suggested that his complaint was not vague.

Colon’s next argument that the district court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by adopting the magistrate’s reports without issuing its own opinions also has no merit. While the district court was required to review the magistrate judge’s decisions de novo, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this did not-contrary to Colon’s contention—compel the district court to make separate findings of fact or issue opinions setting forth its own reasoning, see Jonco, LLC v. Ali, Inc., 157 F.3d 33, 35 (1st Cir.1998).

Finally, Colon’s argument that he stated viable damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), has no merit. The lower court correctly held that Colon’s damages claims were not cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) because the present suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of Colon’s underlying sentence. We add that Colon may pursue his damages claims if his conviction and sentence are ever invalidated. Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1994).

The judgment of the district court is summarily affirmed. See 1st Cir. Loe. R. 27(c).

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