Colon v. Sorensen

668 F. Supp. 1319, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 478, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10762, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,646
CourtDistrict Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedMarch 2, 1987
DocketCV86-L-175
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 668 F. Supp. 1319 (Colon v. Sorensen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Colon v. Sorensen, 668 F. Supp. 1319, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 478, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10762, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,646 (D. Neb. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

URBOM, District Judge.

Floyd Colon, who is hispanic, applied for promotion to the position of Job Service Field Manager in February, 1985. A white anglo male, Bill Weekly, was promoted, and Colon filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. He initiated this Title VII suit after receiving notice from the United States Department of Justice of his right to sue. Colon’s complaint also alleges violation of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 48-1101 to -1126 (Reissue 1984).

The defendants, at all times relevant to this case, were employees of the Nebraska Department of Labor. Ronald Sorensen was the Commissioner of Labor who ultimately approved the promotion of Weekly. Don Haase, who was the Director of Job Services, assisted by Wayne Schroeder, who was the Job Service Staff Operations Chief, interviewed the candidates for Job Service Field Manager. Haase recommended to Sorensen that Weekly be offered the position, and Sorensen approved the recommendation. Schroeder died December 5, 1986, and is dismissed from this suit.

Trial was held without a jury on February 2 and 3, 1987. Colon neither pleaded nor proved compliance with the requirements of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act, so I find for defendants as to the pendant state law claim.

I. INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII

“The language of Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). “It is clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are already proportionately represented in the work force.” Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2951, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978).

Once a Title VII plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. The plaintiff then has an opportunity to prove that the defendant’s reasons are pretextual, a mere cover for intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 801-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1823-26.

The Supreme Court, discussing the elements of a prima facie Title VII case as set out in McDonnell Douglas, said that it had held that a plaintiff could make out a prima facie claim by showing

“(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications____”
*1321 This, of course, was not intended to be an inflexible rule, as the Court went on to note that “[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification ... of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”

Furnco, 438 U.S. at 575-76, 98 S.Ct. at 2949.

The defendants continue to argue that Colon did not establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Although the question is now academic, given that I denied their motion to dismiss at the close of the plaintiffs case, see United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-16, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481-82, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983) (merging of the prima facie case into the ultimate burden of proving discriminatory motive), it might be helpful to clarify the standard for establishing a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in promotion cases.

Citing a Fourth Circuit case, Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142, 147 (4th Cir.1986), the defendants assert that Colon failed to establish the fourth McDonnell Douglas element because the job immediately was filled by hiring one of the several contemporaneous applicants. Not only does the Holmes case rigidly apply the flexible elements of McDonnell Douglas to promotion facts, see Furnco 438 U.S. at 576, 98 S.Ct. at 2949, but it is not the law in this circuit.

The fourth McDonnell Douglas factor might well be modified in promotion cases to require a plaintiff to show that “other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of a protected group were promoted at the time the plaintiffs request for promotion was denied,” ... but appellee’s argument that more is required is in error.

Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir.1983). Accord Washington v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 610 F.Supp. 1120, 1126 (E.D.Mo.1985); Holmes, 794 F.2d at 149 (Winter, C.J., dissenting).

Colon's case-in-chief established that: (1) he is hispanic; (2) he was qualified for the position of Job Service Field Manager; (3) he was not promoted; and, (4) a white anglo male was promoted. The defendants produced “evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for ... legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason^].” Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Thus, the crucial question in the present case is whether “the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a ... discriminatory decision.” McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. at 1826 (1973).

“The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. Colon may prove that the defendants’ reasons for the promotion decision were pretextual “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.

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Bluebook (online)
668 F. Supp. 1319, 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 478, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10762, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,646, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/colon-v-sorensen-ned-1987.