COLON v. BERRYHILL

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 26, 2019
Docket5:18-cv-04781
StatusUnknown

This text of COLON v. BERRYHILL (COLON v. BERRYHILL) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
COLON v. BERRYHILL, (E.D. Pa. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIGUEL COLON : CIVIL ACTION : v. : : ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of : NO. 18-4781 Social Security1 :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELIZABETH T. HEY, U.S.M.J. September 26, 2019

Miguel Colon (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the Commissioner’s decision denying his claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denying benefits is not supported by substantial evidence and will remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff protectively filed for DIB and SSI on February 19, 2015, claiming that he became disabled on December 12, 2012, due to depression, fibromyalgia, left shoulder rotator cuff tear, tendonitis, impingement, cervical degenerative disc disease (“DDD”) with radiculopathy, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome (“CTS”), diabetes mellitus, asthma, sleep disturbance, bilateral hip paresthesia, and bicep muscle tear. Tr. at 115, 116, 218,

1Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) on June 17, 2019, and should be substituted for the former Acting Commissioner, Nancy Berryhill, as the defendant in this action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 225, 250.2 The applications were denied initially, id. 121-25, 126-30, and Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before an ALJ, id. at 131, which took place on March

23, 2017. Id. at 35-88. On August 8, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 19-30. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on September 14, 2018, id. at 1-3, making the ALJ’s August 8, 2017 decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1472. Plaintiff commenced this action in federal court on November 5, 2018. Doc. 1. The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for review. Docs. 15, 17-18.3

II. LEGAL STANDARD To prove disability, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for . . . not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). The Commissioner employs a five-step process,

evaluating: 1. Whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantially gainful activity;

2. If not, whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

2Plaintiff filed a prior application for DIB in January 2012. Tr. at 90, 239. That application was denied initially and by an ALJ, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Id. at 90. He did not seek judicial review.

3The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See Standing Order, In RE: Direct Assignment of Social Security Appeal Cases to Magistrate Judges (Pilot Program) (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2018); Doc. 7. 3. If so, whether based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in the listing of impairments (“Listings”), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, which results in a presumption of disability;

4. If the impairment does not meet or equal the criteria for a listed impairment, whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past work; and

5. If the claimant cannot perform his past work, then the final step is to determine whether there is other work in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to establish that the claimant is capable of performing other jobs in the local and national economies, in light of his age, education, work experience, and RFC. See Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2007). The court’s role on judicial review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). Therefore, the issue in this case is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s conclusions that Plaintiff is not disabled and is capable of performing jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” and must be “more than a mere scintilla.” Zirnsak, 777 F.2d at 610 (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)). The court has plenary review of legal issues. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431.

III. DISCUSSION A. ALJ’s Findings and Plaintiff’s Claims The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from several severe impairments at the second step of the sequential evaluation; cervical and lumbar DDD, bilateral hip degenerative joint disease, CTS, left shoulder rotator cuff tear, depression, and post- traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Tr. at 21. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have

an impairment or combination of impairments that met the Listings, id. at 22, and that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work with the abilities to sit for six hours, stand for four hours, and walk for four hours during the workday; frequently operate bilateral foot controls; occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, and reach with his non-dominant upper left extremity; never kneel, crawl, or climb ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds; avoid all exposure to unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts; with a limitation to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks involving no more than occasional interaction with the public and no more than few workplace changes; with no ability to work at a production rate pace or meet strict quota requirements, but able to meet all end-of-day goals. Id. at 23. At the fourth step of the evaluation, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a maintenance supervisor or a store laborer. Id. at 28. However, at the fifth step, the ALJ found, based on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), that Plaintiff could perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, including jobs as an agricultural produce sorter and conveyor line bakery worker. Id. at 29.

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COLON v. BERRYHILL, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/colon-v-berryhill-paed-2019.