Collison-Harrington v. Harrington

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Collison-Harrington v. Harrington

279 A.D.2d 444, 719 N.Y.S.2d 595, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 123

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 8, 2001

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 279 A.D.2d 444 (Collison-Harrington v. Harrington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Collison-Harrington v. Harrington, 279 A.D.2d 444, 719 N.Y.S.2d 595, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 123 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to rescind a separation agreement, the defendant husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), entered February 18, 2000, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

Judicial review of separation agreements is to be exercised sparingly, with a goal of encouraging parties to settle their differences on their own (see, Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63). A party seeking to set aside a separation agreement which is fair on its face must prove fraud, duress, overreaching, or that the agreement is unconscionable (see, Christian v Christian, supra; Wilson v Neppell, 253 AD2d 493; Abrams v Abrams, 240 AD2d 445). The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is not entitled to set aside the separation agreement (see, Cohen v Cerier, 243 AD2d 670; Giurdanella v Giurdanella, 226 AD2d 342; Gaines v Gaines, 218 AD2d 683; Middleton v Middleton, 174 AD2d 655; Greenfield v Greenfield, 147 AD2d 440; Anonymous v Anonymous, 137 AD2d 739; Most v Monti, 91 AD2d 606). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of any triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Ritter, J. P., S. Miller, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.

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In an action to rescind a separation agreement, the defendant husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), entered February 18, 2000, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.

Judicial review of separation agreements is to be exercised sparingly, with a goal of encouraging parties to settle their differences on their own (see, Christian v Christian, 42 NY2d 63). A party seeking to set aside a separation agreement which is fair on its face must prove fraud, duress, overreaching, or that the agreement is unconscionable (see, Christian v Christian, supra; Wilson v Neppell, 253 AD2d 493; Abrams v Abrams, 240 AD2d 445). The defendant made a prima facie showing that the plaintiff is not entitled to set aside the separation agreement (see, Cohen v Cerier, 243 AD2d 670; Giurdanella v Giurdanella, 226 AD2d 342; Gaines v Gaines, 218 AD2d 683; Middleton v Middleton, 174 AD2d 655; Greenfield v Greenfield, 147 AD2d 440; Anonymous v Anonymous, 137 AD2d 739; Most v Monti, 91 AD2d 606). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of any triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Ritter, J. P., S. Miller, Friedmann and Smith, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

279 A.D.2d 444, 719 N.Y.S.2d 595, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collison-harrington-v-harrington-nyappdiv-2001.

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