Collins v. Wells Fargo & Company
This text of Collins v. Wells Fargo & Company (Collins v. Wells Fargo & Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STEVEN RAY COLLINS; SHARON No. 24-5784 LAVETTE COLLINS, D.C. No. 2:23-cv-02676-DAD-CSK Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 16, 2026**
Before: SILVERMAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ Circuit Judges.
Steven Ray Collins and Sharon Lavette Collins appeal pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging claims under the Fair
Housing Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) based on res judicata.
Holcombe v. Hosmer, 477 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the Collinses’ action as barred by res
judicata. See id. (federal courts apply state law to determine the preclusive effect
of a prior state court judgment); DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber, 352 P.3d 378, 386
& 382 n.1 (Cal. 2015) (explaining that under California law, res judicata bars a
subsequent action that “involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the
same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit,” and that
“conduct that violates a single primary right gives rise to only one cause of
action”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion to
dismiss without holding oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“court[s] may
provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings”);
Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1023 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the
district court did not violate plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights by ruling on a
motion to dismiss without an oral hearing where they had an opportunity to present
arguments in writing); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865,
867 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth the standard of review).
To the extent that the Collinses contend that the district court improperly
considered matters beyond the pleadings in granting the motion to dismiss, the
2 24-5784 record does not support this contention. See Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp.,
669 F.3d 1005, 1016 n.9 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “a court may take judicial
notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
3 24-5784
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