Collins v. State of Maine

Maine Superior

Collins v. State of Maine

DecidedMay 10, 2013

DocketKENcr-11-28

StatusUnpublished

This text of Collins v. State of Maine (Collins v. State of Maine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Collins v. State of Maine, (Me. Super. Ct. 2013).

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Opinion

/ _) 0 ST ATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. Docket No. l 1-CR-028

KEVIN COLLINS,

Petitioner

DECISION AND ORDER V.

STATE OF MAINE,

Respondent

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Kevin Collins' request for post

conviction relief. In this matter, Petitioner seeks relief from his convictions in the matters

of State v. Kevin Collins (AUGSC-CR-09-6) and State v. Kevin Collins (AUGSC-CR-09

232).

On March 4, 2010, Petitioner plead guilty in AUGSC-CR-09-6 to one count of

Aggravated Trafficking in Scheduled Drugs (Class B), and admitted a count of Criminal

Forfeiture of Property. Petitioner also plead guilty or nolo in AUGSC-CR-06-232 to one

count of Receiving Stolen Property (Class B), seven counts of Burglary (Class B), one

count of Theft (Class B), two counts of Theft (Class C), one count of Theft (Class D), one

count of Theft (Class E), one count of Criminal Mischief (Class D), and one count of

Criminal Conspiracy (Class C). In accordance with the parties' recommendation, the

Court sentenced Petitioner to 15 years to the Department of Corrections.

)

1 At the hearing on the Petition, Petitioner maintained that post-conviction relief is

warranted because he did not receive certain relevant information before entering his

plea, he did not receive all of the pretrial detention credit to which he is entitled, he did

not enter his pleas voluntarily, and he received ineffective assistance from his attorney.

Discussion

A. Credit for Pretrial Detention

Preliminarily, the parties agree that in docket number 09-6, Petitioner is entitled to

397 days of credit for pretrial detention representing the time that he remained

incarcerated at the Kennebec County Jail before he entered his pleas. Because the parties

agree that Petitioner has not received the full 397 days credit, the Court will grant

Petitioner's request, and order that Petitioner shall receive credit for 397 days of pretrial

detention time.

B. Failure to Provide "Brady" Information

Petitioner contends that he was entitled to receive, but did not receive certain

"Brady" information before entering his pleas to certain charges pending in Somerset

County. While Petitioner plead to certain Somerset County matters at the same time he

entered his pleas to the Kennebec County matters, in his Petition, Petitioner did not

request post-conviction relief in the Somerset County matters. In addition, Petitioner

failed to present sufficient evidence to convince the Court that he was deprived of any

exculpatory evidence prior to entering pleas.

C. Voluntariness ofPleas

Petitioner argues that because he was incarcerated at the time, and because of the

number of counts with which he was charged, he felt pressured to enter the pleas and,

J 2 therefore, he did not enter the pleas voluntarily. A plea is voluntary if it is "the product

of a defendant's free choice and not the result of force, threats or promises other than

those in connection with a plea agreement." Wellman v. State, 588 A.2d 1178, 1181 (Me.

1991) (citing, M .R. Crim. P. l l(d)).

The record established that Petitioner entered his plea with the benefit of counsel,

and with the full knowledge of the consequences of his pleas. While the decision to plea

to multiple felony charges is understandably stressful, the Court is not persuaded that

Petitioner was pressured or coerced to enter his pleas. He had several conversations with

his counsel on the morning of the plea, and requested and was granted a meeting with the

District Attorney to discuss the terms of the plea. Based in part on the information that

Petitioner obtained from his counsel and the District Attorney, Petitioner decided to go

forward with the plea. In short, the record establishes that Petitioner entered the pleas

voluntarily.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Whether Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel· requires a two-part

inquiry by the Court. First, the Court must assess "whether there has been serious

incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel amounting to performance ... below

what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney ...." Francis v. State, 2007 ME

148, ! 4 (quoting, McGowan v. State, 2006 ME 16, '111, 894 A.2d 493, 496-97). The

Court then is required to determine "whether the attorney's performance 'likely deprived

the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground or defense' or 'likely affected

the outcome of the [proceeding]." Id.

3 Some of Petitioner's concerns about the quality of his attorney's· representation

are related to his lack of knowledge of the disposition of charges against co-defendants in

the Somerset matters. Although there is some question as to whether he was aware of the

disposition of the Somerset matters involving the co-defendants, even if Petitioner did not

know all of the particulars of the resolution of the co-defendants' charges, the Court is

unconvinced that knowledge of that information would have caused Petitioner to take a

different course in the Kennebec matters. The record evidence suggests that the

recommended sentence in the Kennebec matters was reached independent of the

Somerset matters. The State subsequently agreed to resolve the Somerset matters

through a sentence that would run concurrent to the Kennebec matters.

Petitioner also cites his lack of knowledge at the time of his plea of the status of

the pending motions in the case. The motions were withdrawn or rendered moot by the

pleas. Even if Petitioner had been unaware that the motions were withdrawn or moot,

Petitioner has presented no evidence from which the Court could conclude that had he

known the status of the motions, Petitioner would have chosen a different course of

action. That is, in the event that Petitioner's counsel should have and did not advise him

of the status of the motions, Petitioner has failed to prove that the failure to do so is

grounds for post-conviction relief. Petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial." Laferriere v. State, 697 A.2d 1301, 1305 (Me. 1997)

(quoting, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985)). Finally,

Petitioner's contention that his counsel failed to conduct an adequate pretrial

investigation is unsupported by the record.

4 Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court grants Petitioner's request for post

conviction relief as to the good time credit to which he is entitled. The Court, therefore,

orders that in docket number 09-6, Petitioner shall receive credit for 397 days of pretrial

detention. The Court otherwise denies Petitioner's request for post-conviction relief.

The Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Order into the docket by reference.

Dated: s-f°t 3 c. y •

tice, Maine Superior Court

5 KEVIN COLLINS SUPERIOR COURT vs KENNEBEC, ss. STATE OF MAINE Docket No AUGSC-CR-2011-00028

DOCKET RECORD

PL. DOB: 02/10/1960 PL.

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