M-r. Justice Harlan,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
On behalf of Riley it is contended that the verdict is-a general finding in his favor as to the undivided.-one-third of the several tracts claimed by the, defendants, respectively,-and should be followed by a judgment for him, unless the facts, specially stated, preclude his recovery. In that view we, are
unable to' concur. The finding is, in -form,- ¿'special verdict as to the undivided one-third of--¿he lands in controversy, and •was so treated, in. the court' below, by both'parties. It has all the essential requisites of a special- verdict, which is - one wherein the jury “state -the naked facts-,- as they find them- to be proved, and pray the advice of the-court thereon ; concluding conditionally, that if upon • the whole • matter the court should be of opinion that the plaintiff had a cause of action1, they then- find for the plaintiff; if otherwise,- then for.the defendant.” 3 BL Com., p. 377. The-inquiry, therefore, is •not whether, the facts stated prevent-the court'from entering a judgment :in:favor of -Riley,- in pursuance of a general finding .for him, but whether the facts stated — “this state of facts as 'to the interest of Polly- Wagoner” — affirmatively "establish his right to' any judgment against the present defendants for the recovery of that interest.
■ The main proposition advanced by the plaintiffs in error is that even if Riley, as between himself- and his-.gran tors, acquired that interest by an effectual conveyance, this action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
• ■ ■ The statute, which, it is conceded, governs this' case provides, —
' That no person shall make-an entry on, or bring an action to recover; any land, but within fifteen years next-after the time at which the right to make such-entry, or to bring, such action, shall have first accrued to himself,'or to some person through whom he claims. Va. Code, 1860, tit. 45, c. 149, sect. 1.
That if, at the time the right shall have first accrued, such person was an infant, married woman, or insane,-then such person, or the person claiming through-him, may, notwithstanding the period of fifteen years shall have expired, make an entry on, or bring an action to recover, such land, within ten years next after the time at which the person to whom such-right ’shall have first accrued shall have ceased to be under such disabilityas existed when the -same so accrued, or shall have died; whichever shall first have happened.- Id., sect. 3, ■
A subsequent section makes the foregoing limitations of the right of -entry on, or action for, land subject to these provisos:
that no ..such entry shall - be made :or action- brought, by any person, who, at -the. time ;at which-.his-right-to make.or bring the same shall hav.e. first accrued,-, shall.be,under any such disability,; - or by afiy person claiming through-him,- but-within thirty years next after the time, at- which such right shall.'have first accrued, although the person, under disability at such time, may have remained under, tbe same during the- whole of such, thirty years, or although the term of-- ten years from the period at which he shall- have ceased -to be under any such disability, or have died, shall not have, expired. - And* further, when any person -shall be under .any such ■ disability at .the time- at which his right to make an. entry- or bring an -action shall have first-accrued, and shall depart this-life without having ceased to be under any such disability,' no time to make, an entry, or to bring -an- action, beyond the fifteen years next after the right of such person-shall have first accrued* or. the ten years-next after the period of his death, shall be allowed by reason of any disability of any other person.Sect.-4.
Recurring to .the facts--stated, in the special verdict, it will-be observed that Polly Wagoner .was- under ,the disability,of coverture at the time she inherited the lands in controversy. The interest thus inherited nevertheless passed to Riley by the conveyance of . January, 1868, unless
her
rights had been previously lost through adverse- possession or hostile claim by others. .But whether there was, prior to-that conveyance, any such adverse possessior. or hostile claim, even as' against the husband, is.-not distinctly found.- The special■ verdict, it is true, states' that the husband’s right to recover against the defendants was barred ■ by the Statute of -Limitations. .. That, we think, is a. conclusion of law, rather than a statement of facts-upon which it:.rests. If, however, we give that finding the fullest .effect claimed for.it,; — viz. that the defendants had- held continuous adverse possession of,-or had asserted-a hostile claim to, the lands, long enough to-bar an action- upon the part, of the husband, — we are still not- informed by the special verdiej; as to the time such adverse possession, in fact, commenced, or when such hostile claim was, in fact, first asserted by -. defendants. . It may have existed for only fifteen years prior to
tlie conveyance by Wagoner and wife to Riley. If it continued for that length of time, the husband’s right to the possession of the lands would, under the statute, have been lost. But if adverse possession, or an adverse claim by defendants, for that length of time, be conceded, — and there is no reason why it should be presumed to have continued for a longer period, — it would not follow that the wife’s right of entry was barred. The statute expressly declares that a woman shall not be barred of her right of entry into land, even by a judgment in her husband’s lifetime, by default or collusion; and, further, that “ no conveyance, or other act suffered or done by the husband only, of any land which is the inheritance of the wife, shall be or make any discontinuance thereof, or be" prejudicial to the wife or her heirs, or to any one having right or title to. the same by her death, but they may respectively enter into such land, according to their, right and title therein, as if no such act had been done.” Ya. Code, 1860, c. 133, sect. 2, p. 608.
If the special verdict had stated that defendants, and those under whom they claim, had adversely held and claimed the land for a period sufficiently long, anterior to January, 1868-, to show that the wife, notwithstanding the disability of coverture, had been barred of her right of action, then the law would be with the defendants. But no such facts are found. The verdict is, as we have seen, wholly silent as to when their adverse possession or claim commenced ; and the court is asked to adjudge, as matter of daw, that she was barred, simply because, at the date of the conveyance to Rile}', her husband’s right to recover was cut off by limitation. By the express words of the statute she had ten years after the disability of coverture was removed in which to assert her right of entry, provided thirty years from the date when her right first accrued had not expired. Notwithstanding, therefore, her husband’s right of possession may have been’ barred when the deed to Riley was made, that conveyance, in the absence of evidence that she was barred, must be held to have passed whatever interest' she then had in the lands.
Further, if it be conceded, as perhaps it must be,
that the
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M-r. Justice Harlan,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
On behalf of Riley it is contended that the verdict is-a general finding in his favor as to the undivided.-one-third of the several tracts claimed by the, defendants, respectively,-and should be followed by a judgment for him, unless the facts, specially stated, preclude his recovery. In that view we, are
unable to' concur. The finding is, in -form,- ¿'special verdict as to the undivided one-third of--¿he lands in controversy, and •was so treated, in. the court' below, by both'parties. It has all the essential requisites of a special- verdict, which is - one wherein the jury “state -the naked facts-,- as they find them- to be proved, and pray the advice of the-court thereon ; concluding conditionally, that if upon • the whole • matter the court should be of opinion that the plaintiff had a cause of action1, they then- find for the plaintiff; if otherwise,- then for.the defendant.” 3 BL Com., p. 377. The-inquiry, therefore, is •not whether, the facts stated prevent-the court'from entering a judgment :in:favor of -Riley,- in pursuance of a general finding .for him, but whether the facts stated — “this state of facts as 'to the interest of Polly- Wagoner” — affirmatively "establish his right to' any judgment against the present defendants for the recovery of that interest.
■ The main proposition advanced by the plaintiffs in error is that even if Riley, as between himself- and his-.gran tors, acquired that interest by an effectual conveyance, this action was barred by the Statute of Limitations.
• ■ ■ The statute, which, it is conceded, governs this' case provides, —
' That no person shall make-an entry on, or bring an action to recover; any land, but within fifteen years next-after the time at which the right to make such-entry, or to bring, such action, shall have first accrued to himself,'or to some person through whom he claims. Va. Code, 1860, tit. 45, c. 149, sect. 1.
That if, at the time the right shall have first accrued, such person was an infant, married woman, or insane,-then such person, or the person claiming through-him, may, notwithstanding the period of fifteen years shall have expired, make an entry on, or bring an action to recover, such land, within ten years next after the time at which the person to whom such-right ’shall have first accrued shall have ceased to be under such disabilityas existed when the -same so accrued, or shall have died; whichever shall first have happened.- Id., sect. 3, ■
A subsequent section makes the foregoing limitations of the right of -entry on, or action for, land subject to these provisos:
that no ..such entry shall - be made :or action- brought, by any person, who, at -the. time ;at which-.his-right-to make.or bring the same shall hav.e. first accrued,-, shall.be,under any such disability,; - or by afiy person claiming through-him,- but-within thirty years next after the time, at- which such right shall.'have first accrued, although the person, under disability at such time, may have remained under, tbe same during the- whole of such, thirty years, or although the term of-- ten years from the period at which he shall- have ceased -to be under any such disability, or have died, shall not have, expired. - And* further, when any person -shall be under .any such ■ disability at .the time- at which his right to make an. entry- or bring an -action shall have first-accrued, and shall depart this-life without having ceased to be under any such disability,' no time to make, an entry, or to bring -an- action, beyond the fifteen years next after the right of such person-shall have first accrued* or. the ten years-next after the period of his death, shall be allowed by reason of any disability of any other person.Sect.-4.
Recurring to .the facts--stated, in the special verdict, it will-be observed that Polly Wagoner .was- under ,the disability,of coverture at the time she inherited the lands in controversy. The interest thus inherited nevertheless passed to Riley by the conveyance of . January, 1868, unless
her
rights had been previously lost through adverse- possession or hostile claim by others. .But whether there was, prior to-that conveyance, any such adverse possessior. or hostile claim, even as' against the husband, is.-not distinctly found.- The special■ verdict, it is true, states' that the husband’s right to recover against the defendants was barred ■ by the Statute of -Limitations. .. That, we think, is a. conclusion of law, rather than a statement of facts-upon which it:.rests. If, however, we give that finding the fullest .effect claimed for.it,; — viz. that the defendants had- held continuous adverse possession of,-or had asserted-a hostile claim to, the lands, long enough to-bar an action- upon the part, of the husband, — we are still not- informed by the special verdiej; as to the time such adverse possession, in fact, commenced, or when such hostile claim was, in fact, first asserted by -. defendants. . It may have existed for only fifteen years prior to
tlie conveyance by Wagoner and wife to Riley. If it continued for that length of time, the husband’s right to the possession of the lands would, under the statute, have been lost. But if adverse possession, or an adverse claim by defendants, for that length of time, be conceded, — and there is no reason why it should be presumed to have continued for a longer period, — it would not follow that the wife’s right of entry was barred. The statute expressly declares that a woman shall not be barred of her right of entry into land, even by a judgment in her husband’s lifetime, by default or collusion; and, further, that “ no conveyance, or other act suffered or done by the husband only, of any land which is the inheritance of the wife, shall be or make any discontinuance thereof, or be" prejudicial to the wife or her heirs, or to any one having right or title to. the same by her death, but they may respectively enter into such land, according to their, right and title therein, as if no such act had been done.” Ya. Code, 1860, c. 133, sect. 2, p. 608.
If the special verdict had stated that defendants, and those under whom they claim, had adversely held and claimed the land for a period sufficiently long, anterior to January, 1868-, to show that the wife, notwithstanding the disability of coverture, had been barred of her right of action, then the law would be with the defendants. But no such facts are found. The verdict is, as we have seen, wholly silent as to when their adverse possession or claim commenced ; and the court is asked to adjudge, as matter of daw, that she was barred, simply because, at the date of the conveyance to Rile}', her husband’s right to recover was cut off by limitation. By the express words of the statute she had ten years after the disability of coverture was removed in which to assert her right of entry, provided thirty years from the date when her right first accrued had not expired. Notwithstanding, therefore, her husband’s right of possession may have been’ barred when the deed to Riley was made, that conveyance, in the absence of evidence that she was barred, must be held to have passed whatever interest' she then had in the lands.
Further, if it be conceded, as perhaps it must be,
that the
husband and wife — the former being barred — could not
have brought a joint action to recover the lands, and that during the life of the husband Riley could not have asserted his rights, as against the defendants, it would not follow that he ■ got nothing by the conveyance. He certainly did acquire thewife’s interest; and, when her disability was removed, he could enter upon the land, or bring an action for its recovery, precisely as slie could have done, upon the death of the husband, had she not joined in the conveyance. This is clear from’ a comparison of the Limitation Act of Virginia, passed Feb. 25, 1819, with the provision of the code of 18 jO. The former, while prescribing twenty years as the time within which an action for the recovery of land must be brought, gave to infants',
feme
coverts, and others under disability, and to their heirs,- ten years after such disability was removed, in which to sue, notwithstanding twenty years may have passed after the right to sue accrued. ■ Va. Rev. Code, 1819, vol. i. p. 488. On the other hand, the code of 1860, as we have séen, saved the rights of those who claimed through the person to whom the right of entry or action accrued. Riley, undoubtedly, claimed- through the wife, and could sue by virtue of his ownership of her interest, because she could have sued, had no conveyance been made.
But it is argued that the special verdict must contain all the facts from which the law is to arise; that whatever is not found therein is, for the purposes of a decision, to be. considered as not existing ; that it must present, in substance, the whole matter upon which the court is asked to determine the legal rights of the parties, and cannot, therefore, be aided by intendment or by extrinsic facts, although such facts may appear elsewhere in the record. It is not necessary, in the view we take of this case, to controvert any of these propositions. They undoubtedly embody a correct statement, as far as it goes, of the law in reference to special verdicts. But we do not perceive that their application in this case would lead to any result different from the one already indicated. We have taken the special verdict as presenting the whole case as to Polly Wagoner’s interest in the lands. It shows that Swetzer, under whom both sides claim, was,- at his death, the owner of - the land ; that upon his death an undivided third thereof was
inherited by his daughter Polly; and that her interest was conveyed; in 1868, to Riley, by the joint deed of herself- and husband. No fact is stated justifying the conclusion that her interest in the land had been lost, prior to the conveyance,' either by adverse possession or by adverse claim.' If such fact-existed it was the duty of the defendants, who relied upon limitation, to have established it by proof, and caused it to be. stated in the special verdict. The record contains no bill of exceptions, and were we at liberty to look beyond the special verdict, we should find in the record no evidence whatever upon that point. We cannot presume that any such evidence was offered. It was not for Riley to prove that Mrs. Wagoner's right had not been lost by adverse possession or adverse claim by others. That was matter of ■ defence. Counsel for the plaintiffs in error have proceeded, in their argument, upon the assumption that the special verdict sets forth facts showing, that her right was barred, at the time of the conveyance to - Riley, or at' the commencement of the action. But evidently it shows nothing more than' that the husband was barred, as to-
his
light of possession.
Another proposition advanced by counsel for plaintiffs in error deserves notice. It is, that the special verdict does not show that they were, at the institution of the suit, in possession of, or claimed title to, the interest of Polly Wagoner, in the lands in dispute.
By the.code of Virginia of 1860 it is declared that “ if the jury be of opinion [in actions of ejectment] for the plaintiffs, or any of them, the verdict shall be for the plaintiffs, or such of them as appear to have right to the possession of the premises, or any part thereof, and against such of the defendants as were in possession thereof,
or
claimed title thereto, at the commencement of the action.” p. 612. • There was a similar provision in the code of 1849, p. 561. The verdict in this ease is in substantial conformity with this statutory requirement. The issue to be tried was whether the defendants unlawfully withheld from the plaintiff the premises described in the declaration. ' The verdict finds for the defendants as to the undivided two-thirds of the land in dispute. .If that be not, in. legal effect, a finding that defendants were in possession of the
entire land, there’is ,a finding-that' defendants, respectively, claimed title to the several-tracts in'controversy.-. The verdict describes by metes and bounds each--tract embraced in the suit, giving the name-of each defendant by -whom it is -claimed, and finding for defendants as to two-thirds, undivided, -of. the ■ re-, spective-tracts. It then, proceeds, to find -as ■“ to the remaining one-third of the lands hereinbefore excepted,- and claimed by said defendants.”- Although-the verdict does not -state, in terms, that the defendants were in possession, it does'state, that they claimed the' lands in dispute. And that seems to be sufficient under the local law. -.'.In’' reference to the case of
Southgate
v.
Walker (2
W. Va, 427), it'is-sufficient to say that it related to an action of ejectment commenced- in 1848, before the adoption of the above-recited -provision. . We are referred to no decision of the State’ eourt in conflict with the construction- we have given- to that provision.'
We deem it ■ unnecessary to • comment upon any other -objections urged against the special verdict. There is no error in the judgment, and it is
Affirmed.