Collins v. Permanente Metals Corporation

42 So. 2d 324, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 621
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 4, 1949
DocketNo. 3148.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 42 So. 2d 324 (Collins v. Permanente Metals Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Collins v. Permanente Metals Corporation, 42 So. 2d 324, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 621 (La. Ct. App. 1949).

Opinion

The plaintiff, Willie Collins, during the month of March, 1948 was employed as a common laborer by the defendant, Permanente Metals Corporation, and alleged that while so employed on April 1, 1948 he suffered an accident which rendered him totally and permanently disabled to do work of any reasonable character as a result of his accident and injury; plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred at about ten o'clock a.m. on the first day of April, 1948 when he lifted the handles of a wheelbarrow loaded with dirt, and in so doing, strained his right side causing what he later discovered to be a right inguinal hernia. He prayed for judgment against defendant and its insurer, Fireman's Fund Indemnity Company, awarding him compensation at the rate of $26.06 per week for a period of 400 weeks from April 1, 1948, with the usual interest from due date until paid and for medical expenses not to exceed $500, and all costs.

Plaintiff asked that his rate of compensation be fixed in accordance with Act 175 of 1948 although the alleged accident and injury occurred prior to the effective date of this act. He stated in his brief that the proper compensation would be $20 per week from April 1, 1948, the date of the alleged accident, to July 28, 1948, the effective date of Act 175 of 1948, and thereafter at the rate of $26.06 for a period not exceeding 400 weeks.

The defendant denied all material allegations of plaintiff's petition. In the alternative, the defendants plead unconstitutionality of Act 175 of 1948, should the Court conclude that it is applicable to the alleged accident.

The case was duly tried by the District Court, and it rendered judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, dismissing his suit at plaintiff's cost. The District Judge in his reason stated that although he recognized that in some cases the testimony of the plaintiff alone, to the effect that he sustained an accident during the course of his employment, would suffice, provided there were sufficient corroborating circumstances to justify the *Page 325 conclusion that in fact an accident did occur, in his opinion, such corroborating circumstances did not appear in this case and for him to say that the plaintiff suffered an accident as alleged would be merely a guess. The main question in this case is whether the plaintiff has proven that he suffered an accident while in the employ of the defendant which caused the alleged hernia.

The testimony reveals that the plaintiff was first employed during March, 1948 by the defendant and that he took a preemployment physical examination given by Dr. Charles McVea, who at that time found the plaintiff fit for employment with no disabling physical findings. Dr. McVea specifically stated that he had no hernia at that time. The plaintiff on April 1st, together with a co-laborer, Willie Parker, was given the assignment of moving some dirt from the front of what was known as the Administration Building, as the defendant company was beautifying its grounds and wished to clean out its flower beds by raking rocks therefrom and thereafter to move some dirt into a hole in the parking lot. The plaintiff and Willie Parker were each furnished with a shovel and a wheelbarrow. Plaintiff said that he raised the handles of a wheelbarrow full of dirt about ten o'clock a.m. and he "felt my right side strain during the time I was rolling the wheelbarrow, I felt my right side strain but I didn't take it serious. I stopped for about ten minutes and then I went back to work." He stated that he did not have any pain at the time, only felt kind of sick. He did not report the occurrence to the company officials or anyone at the plant but he states that he told his mother about it when he went home that afternoon at approximately four o'clock. He came back to the defendant company's plant on April 2nd and voluntarily quit work, not because of any injury but because he was dissatisfied with the work time given him for he thought that the company owed him for more hours than he was paid. He was unemployed after April 2, 1948 but during the last part of May, 1948 he applied for another job with the Dixie Electric Company and was required to submit to a preemployment physical examination which was made on May 25, 1948 by Dr. James R. Godfrey of Baton Rouge, who discovered that the plaintiff had a small right inguinal hernia and was, therefore, rejected for employment. He immediately contacted his present counsel and upon a refusal of his demands for compensation, the present suit was instituted.

It is shown that on April 1st the plaintiff had his duties outlined to him by a Mr. B. V. Bannister, Jr., who was the Safety Supervisor of the defendant company, and that the plaintiff had reported to him at around seven thirty a.m. and after the shovels and wheelbarrows had been obtained, which was approximately eight o'clock, Bannister showed the plaintiff and his fellow laborer, Willie Parker, what he wanted them to do and they began to rake rocks from the rose beds; that about eight thirty or a quarter of nine Collins left his work and went to Bannister with a complaint that he was two days short in his pay check. Bannister said that he discussed the matter with him and then sent him to a Mr. Mervin Lowden, who is the paymaster for the company, and that he did not see Collins again until about a quarter of twelve when he reported back to him for work, and the plaintiff told him at that time that he had been down to Mr. C. F. Woods' office, who occupied the position of Clerk and Production, and also to Mr. Vernon Huddleston, who was dock superintendent, and to the paymaster, Mr. Lowden, in an effort to check on his time which he claimed was short. Bannister said that the employees had thirty minutes for lunch and that Collins worked on the flower beds that afternoon until sometime shortly after three p.m., when he came in to resign as he felt he had been "shorted" two day's pay, but that as it was too late in the afternoon to get a termination, according to the rules of the company, Bannister asked the plaintiff to come back the next morning in order to fix up his termination. Bannister stated that he recalled all of these incidents so well because on that day Collins was working directly for him on *Page 326 this particular project which he was superintending and that Parker and Collins did not move any of the dirt; in fact, they just got the rocks out of the flower beds. He is positive that Collins never loaded a wheelbarrow with any dirt that day, nor did he load any rocks. It is his positive testimony that he had the dirt moved the next day. Bannister checked the job twice during the afternoon and was positive that there was no dirt hauled as he had to have two men move it the next day. The defendant also offered the testimony of Mervin W. Lowden who was employed in the payroll department, Mr. C. F. Woods who was employed in the Production Superintendent's office, and also Vernon Huddleston, dock foreman, all of whom testified that the plaintiff came to see them on the date of his alleged accident, in an attempt to straighten out his complaint about his time being short. Lowden said that he last saw the plaintiff between 9:15 and 9:30 a.m. Woods testified that he came to his office between 9:00 and 9:15; that he sent him to the payroll office and that he returned fifteen or twenty minutes, possibly half an hour, later, which would be at approximately 9:30. He sent him to see Mr. Huddleston, the dock superintendent, and plaintiff, after seeing the dock superintendent, returned to his office between 10:30 and quarter of eleven o'clock. Taking the defendant's testimony, from a quarter of eleven to a quarter of twelve the plaintiff's actions were unaccounted for, as he reported for work at approximately a quarter of twelve.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
42 So. 2d 324, 1949 La. App. LEXIS 621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collins-v-permanente-metals-corporation-lactapp-1949.