Collins v. Jones

54 S.W.2d 400, 186 Ark. 442, 1932 Ark. LEXIS 370
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 7, 1932
Docket4-2871
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 54 S.W.2d 400 (Collins v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Collins v. Jones, 54 S.W.2d 400, 186 Ark. 442, 1932 Ark. LEXIS 370 (Ark. 1932).

Opinion

Smith, J.

In the judgment from which this appeal comes appellee, Jones, was declared to have been legally nominated, at the Democratic primary election held in Franklin County on August 9,1932, for the office of county treasurer, and appellee, Watson, was declared to he the nominee of the Democratic party at the same election for the office of county judge. Contests' for the nominations for these offices were consolidated and tried together.

The decision of the contests turned upon the validity of certain assessments and payments of poll taxes. The court declared his view of the law upon the subject, and appointed canvassers to tabulate and certify the vote in accordance with this view. The effect of this ruling was to throw out enough votes to leave contestants with a majority of the votes which the court found had been Legally cast.

The legality of the votes which were thrown out as liaving been illegally cast depends upon the construction to be given our election and revenue laws relating to the assessment and payment of poll taxes, and we proceed to discuss such parts of these statutes as are here involved.

The General Assembly, at its 1909 session, passed act 320, entitled, “An act to enforce the provisions of Amendment No. 9 of the Constitution of Arkansas.” Acts 1909, page 942. The amendment, referred to as Amendment No. 9, was the amendment requiring the payment of a poll tax to qualify one to vote. This act of 1909 has been amended in particulars not important here to consider. But § 1 of this act of 1909 appears as § 3738, Crawford & Moses’ Digest, and it was decided in the case of Tucker v. Meroney, 182 Ark. 681, 32 S. W. (2d) 631, that the section is unrepealed and is existing law. Of that section, more presently.

This Amendment No. 9 was superseded by an amendment known as the Equal Suffrage Amendment, adopted at the 1920 General Election, which appears at page xxviii of 184 Ark. as Amendment No. 8. The declared purpose of this last amendment was “to confer suffrage equally upon both men and women, without regard to sex.”

In the case of Taaffe v. Sanderson, 173 Ark. 970, 294 S. W. 74, it became necessary to decide whether a female must pay poll tax to be eligible to vote, and it was there held that she was subject to the Poll Tax Amendment. This conclusion was held to fall within the principle that, when a privilege is extended to one class of citizens, upon certain conditions, and subsequently thereto a like privilege is conferred upon another class, the conditions attached to the exercise of such privilege by the former class necessarily attach, in like manner, to the subsequent class. The laws of this State in relation to the assessment and payment of poll taxes may therefore he said to apply alike to men and women.

It is not only settled that the law applies alike to both men and women in regard to the assessment and payment of poll taxes as a qualification to vote, bnt it has also been several times decided that neither a man nor a woman can become an elector without being assessed as required by law (unless they have come of age since the assessment was due), although he or she possesses a poll tax issued by the collector of taxes.

The case of Cain v.CarlLee, 168 Ark 64, 269 S. W. 57, (which was decided February 23', 1925) involved the eligibility of certain persons who possessed poll tax receipts and who had voted thereon, but whose poll taxes had not been assessed in the manner required by law. We there held that the assessment of the voter in the manner required by law was essential to qualify the voter, and that the payment of a poll tax alone did not suffice. We there said, after reciting the provisions of § 3738, Crawford & Moses’ Digest, that there were two reasons why this was true, the first being to protect the public revenue, and the second to prevent frauds in elections. See also Craig v. Sims, 160 Ark. 269, 255 S. W. 1.

In the case of Taaffe v. Sanderson, supra, where it was first held that women were subject to the Poll Tax Amendment, the facts were that certain women were assessed only by having the word “Mrs.” written after the names of their husbands on the tax books. We there held, after reciting the provisions of § 3738, Crawford & Moses’ Digest, in regard to assessment of persons whose names had been omitted from the original assessment rolls, that this method of issuing poll tax receipts did not conform to the requirements of the law, and did not qualify the holders of such receipts to vote. In so deciding, we cited both the CarlLee and the Craig cases, supra, as having held that the collector can issue a valid poll tax receipt only to a person whose name has been placed upon the tax book in the manner provided by law.

The view was expressed in the dissenting opinion in the case of Taaffe v. Sanderson, supra, that the women were qualified electors, not because they had been properly assessed for the payment of a poll tax, hut because they were not required to pay a poll tax at all.

It having therefore been definitely decided that an assessment made in the manner provided by law. must precede the issuance of a poll tax receipt, it becomes necessary to inquire how this assessment is made.

Act 172 of the Acts of 1929 is a comprehensive act of forty sections, dealing with assessments of both real estate and personal property as well as the assessment of poll taxes.

Section 3 of this act requires the assessor to appraise and assess all the personal property of his county between the first Monday in January and the third Monday in August of each year.

Section 7 of this act requires the assessor to maintain an office at the county seat of the county between the first Monday in January and the 10th day of April of each year to assess property and for the purpose of assessing such persons as are liable to pay the per capita or poll tax. It is further provided by this section that * * all male residents of the county who shall have attained the age of 21 years, and all female inhabitants who shall have attained the age of 21 years, and who wish to exercise their franchise to vote, shall, at such time and place, report to the assessor, in person or by agent, for per capita or poll tax assessment.”

It thus appears that it is the duty of the assessor to assess the poll tax of all male inhabitants over 21 years of age in any event, and all females over that age “who wish to exercise their franchise to vote,” but either-a man or a woman may assess in person or by agent.

This section of the act contains provisions — which we do not review — requiring the assessor, or his deputy, “to attend at places of holding elections” in the various townships, etc., for the purpose of assessing real, personal and poll taxes.

Section 8 of the act 172 requires the State Tax Commission to prepare and furnish to the county clerks of the State copies for all lists, blanks and records to he used in the assessment, extension and collection of taxes (except the blanks for poll tax receipts, which are prepared and furnished by the Auditor of State), and this section also provides that “no lists, blanks or records shall be used by any official in the assessment, extension or collection of taxes except as shall have had the approval of said commissi on.”

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Bluebook (online)
54 S.W.2d 400, 186 Ark. 442, 1932 Ark. LEXIS 370, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collins-v-jones-ark-1932.