Collins v. Greater New York Savings Bank

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Collins v. Greater New York Savings Bank

194 A.D.2d 514, 598 N.Y.S.2d 544, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5418

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 1, 1993

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 194 A.D.2d 514 (Collins v. Greater New York Savings Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Collins v. Greater New York Savings Bank, 194 A.D.2d 514, 598 N.Y.S.2d 544, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5418 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (G. Aronin, J.), entered August 28, 1990, which, upon a jury verdict finding that the defendant was not at fault in the happening of the accident, is in favor of the defendant and against her.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

On January 26, 1990, the day the trial on the liability portion of the plaintiff’s action began, the defendant informed the plaintiff and the court that it intended to call an expert witness at trial. Over the plaintiff’s objection, the court permitted the defendant’s expert to testify. The plaintiff contends that because the defendant had violated CPLR 3101 (d), the trial court erred in permitting the defendant’s expert to testify. We disagree.

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) provides that "[u]pon request, each party shall identify each person whom the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and shall disclose in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify”. The foregoing provision clearly places the burden on the party seeking information to take the initiative in requesting such information (see, 3A Weinstein-KornMiller, NY Civ Prac f[ 3101.52b). The record is devoid of any request by the plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 3101. Thus, the defendant had no duty to supply the plaintiff with its expert’s identity and the subject matter of the expert’s testimony. Moreover, since the plaintiff never made a request pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), she cannot assert that the defendant violated the statute by failing to show "good cause” for retaining an expert at such a late date. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s request to preclude the defendant’s expert testimony.

We have considered the plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Eiber and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (G. Aronin, J.), entered August 28, 1990, which, upon a jury verdict finding that the defendant was not at fault in the happening of the accident, is in favor of the defendant and against her.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

On January 26, 1990, the day the trial on the liability portion of the plaintiff’s action began, the defendant informed the plaintiff and the court that it intended to call an expert witness at trial. Over the plaintiff’s objection, the court permitted the defendant’s expert to testify. The plaintiff contends that because the defendant had violated CPLR 3101 (d), the trial court erred in permitting the defendant’s expert to testify. We disagree.

CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) provides that "[u]pon request, each party shall identify each person whom the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and shall disclose in reasonable detail the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify”. The foregoing provision clearly places the burden on the party seeking information to take the initiative in requesting such information (see, 3A Weinstein-KornMiller, NY Civ Prac f[ 3101.52b). The record is devoid of any request by the plaintiff pursuant to CPLR 3101. Thus, the defendant had no duty to supply the plaintiff with its expert’s identity and the subject matter of the expert’s testimony. Moreover, since the plaintiff never made a request pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), she cannot assert that the defendant violated the statute by failing to show "good cause” for retaining an expert at such a late date. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s request to preclude the defendant’s expert testimony.

We have considered the plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Eiber and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

194 A.D.2d 514, 598 N.Y.S.2d 544, 1993 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5418, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/collins-v-greater-new-york-savings-bank-nyappdiv-1993.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack