COLLINS v. ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP

CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedApril 28, 2023
Docket2:18-cv-04482
StatusUnknown

This text of COLLINS v. ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP (COLLINS v. ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
COLLINS v. ASTRAZENECA PHARMACEUTICALS LP, (D.N.J. 2023).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

IN RE: PROTON-PUMP INHIBITOR PRODUCTS 2:17-MD-2789 (CCC)(LDW) LIABILITY LITIGATION (MDL 2789)

This Document Relates to: OPINION AND ORDER All cases listed in Exhibit A

CECCHI, District Judge. I. Introduction This matter comes before the Court upon Case Management Order (“CMO”) No. 60, ECF No. 709, entered on November 19, 2021, which identified 962 cases in which Pfizer, Inc.1 (“Pfizer”) alleged that service of the summons and complaint had not been effected and in which no proof of service appeared on the docket of the case. CMO No. 60 ordered the plaintiffs in those cases within thirty days to (1) establish that service was effected on Pfizer as required by Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 by filing proof of service, (2) voluntarily dismiss Pfizer, or (3) show cause why Pfizer should not be dismissed within thirty days of entry of the Order. CMO No. 60, at 2, ECF No. 709. CMO No. 60 ordered Plaintiffs to file their responses on the dockets of the individual cases, and permitted Pfizer to oppose within thirty days of each plaintiff’s response.3 Plaintiffs were specifically advised that “[f]ailure to comply with the terms of this Order will result in the dismissal of the case as to Pfizer.” CMO No. 60, at 2.

1 Sometimes identified as Pfiser, Inc. 2 All references to Rules herein are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 At the request of the parties, the deadline for plaintiffs to file responses to CMO No. 60 was extended to March 31, 2022, and then June 30, 2022. See CMO No. 67, at § I.D, ECF No. 747; CMO No. 70, at ¶ B, ECF No. 769. The deadline for Pfizer to oppose each plaintiff’s response was extended to May 15, 2022, then August 16, 2022, and then to October 17, 2022. See CMO No. 67, at § I.D, ECF No. 747; CMO No. 70, at ¶ B, ECF No. 769; CMO No. 78, at ¶ A, ECF No. 841. II. Legal Standard Rule 4 governs the requirements regarding serving a summons. In particular, Rule 4(m) requires that “[i]f a defendant is not served 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court – on motion or on its own after notice to plaintiff – must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows

good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In the Third Circuit, establishing good cause requires a “demonstration of good faith on the part of a party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance with the time specified in the rules.” MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995).4 In the absence of a showing of good cause for failure timely to effect service, the Court has discretion either to dismiss a case or permit an extension. Id. at 1098 (citing Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d Cir. 1995)). It is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate good cause for such failure to effectuate timely service or to persuade the Court to exercise its discretion and not dismiss Pfizer from their cases. Spence v.

Lahood, No. 11-3972, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80015, at *15 (D.N.J. June 8, 2012) (citing McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1998)). III. Discussion As stated above, CMO No. 60 ordered the identified plaintiffs within thirty days to either establish that service was properly effectuated pursuant to Rule 4(m), voluntarily dismiss Pfizer,

4 Plaintiffs note that the version of Rule 4 quoted in MCI Telecomms is no longer applicable after an amendment in 1993. The amendment removed “good cause” as an absolute prerequisite for an extension of service. However, as explained above, the good cause standard still exists in Rule 4(m). The amendment merely allows courts, in the absence of good cause, to exercise their discretion to allow an extension if the circumstances warrant. Notably, the Court’s Opinion and Order here is based on the current version of Rule 4(m). or show cause why Pfizer should not be dismissed. CMO No. 60 did not provide these plaintiffs with an extension of time to serve the Complaint, instead, it directed Plaintiffs to prove that service had in fact been effectuated or to “show cause why Pfizer should not be dismissed.” The 640 plaintiffs in the cases identified on Exhibit A herein (“Plaintiffs”) have failed to satisfy the requirements of CMO No. 60. Plaintiffs do not claim to have timely served Pfizer and

fail to show cause why these cases should proceed despite their lack of compliance with Rule 4(m). See CMO No. 7, at § II.D (“Absent agreement of the parties or subsequent Order of the Court, service of process shall be effectuated as required under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Pfizer did not agree to any modifications to service procedures from those set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pfizer did not agree to accept service via e-mail, nor did it agree to receive waivers of service via e-mail. Cf. CMO No. 7, at § II.D, ECF No. 112; CMO No. 27, at § I.D, ECF No. 260; CMO No. 32, ECF No. 396; CMO No. 79, ECF No. 842. Of the 640 cases at issue here, Plaintiffs and Pfizer agree that Pfizer had not been served at all in 61 of them. In the other 579 cases, Plaintiffs concede that Pfizer was served only after CMO

No. 60 was entered. Of the 579 cases where one or both of the parties assert that Pfizer was served after CMO No. 60 (and utilizing the earlier purported date of service in the event that the parties did not agree on the date of service), service was made between one to two years after the ninety- day period in Rule 4(m) in 41 cases; between two to three years after the ninety-day period in 80 cases; and between three to just over four years after the ninety-day period in 458 cases. No Plaintiff here has dismissed Pfizer from their case. Accordingly, due to untimely service and lack of good cause shown, it is appropriate that Pfizer be dismissed from the cases identified in Exhibit A. a. Plaintiffs Do Not Demonstrate Good Cause Mandating an Extension of Time to Serve Plaintiffs’ responses to CMO No. 60 do not demonstrate good cause excusing their lack of timely service pursuant to Rule 4(m). Good cause requires “a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement . . . and some reasonable basis for noncompliance with the time specified in the rules.” MCI Telecomms. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1097. To determine whether good cause exists, the Court considers “(1) reasonableness of plaintiff’s efforts to serve (2) prejudice to the defendant by lack of timely service and (3) whether plaintiff moved for an enlargement of time to serve.” Id. The primary focus must always be on “the plaintiff’s reasons for not complying with the time limit in the first place.” Id. Yet here, Plaintiffs have not even attempted to show good cause for their failure to timely serve or addressed the reasons for

untimeliness. See, e.g., Pl. Allen Pyne’s Resp.

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