F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 7 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JEFFREY S. COLLIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3000 (D.C. 98-3221-GTV) MICHAEL A. NELSON, Warden, El (District of Kansas) Dorado Correctional Facility,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey S. Collier, a prisoner incarcerated in a Kansas correctional facility
proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He challenged
the Kansas Department of Corrections’s (KDOC’s) inmate mail policy (as
amended in January and April 1998) on two grounds, arguing: (1) the policy
conflicted with a prior state court decision; and (2) the policy violated his
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. constitutional right of access to the courts. The district court dismissed Mr.
Collier’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). See Rec., doc. 12, at 1 (Order filed Dec. 17, 1998).
The policy challenged by Mr. Collier provides that inmates are responsible
for paying for postage on all domestic mailings unless they are indigent. Indigent
inmates are provided with postage for not more than four first class, one ounce
domestic letters per month.
However, the policy also states:
All postage for legal and official mail shall be paid by the inmate regardless of indigent status. Credit for the mailing of legal and official mail shall be given to inmates who do not have sufficient funds in their inmate account. Such credit shall be deducted from the inmate’s funds when available.
....
Credit for this postage shall not exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00) at any given time without advance approval of the Warden or designee.
See Rec., doc. 1 (Attach.) (Interdepartmental Memorandum, KDOC)
We review the district court’s dismissal de novo. 1 See Mascheroni v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 28 F.3d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994). “A pro
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2 se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). We uphold a dismissal “only when it appears that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle
him to relief, accepting the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Yoder v.
Honeywell, Inc. , 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1997).
Applying that standard, we conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Mr. Collier’s claim that the KDOC’s inmate mail policy violated the
order of a Kansas state court. In order to allege a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must assert the deprivation, under color of law, of a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by federal law. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970). Here, Mr. Collier has not alleged the denial of such a right, privilege, or
immunity. Instead, he merely argues that the inmate mail policy violated the
terms of the state court order. We agree with the district court that “any relief for
the alleged violation of the state court order lies in the state and appellate courts
and not in federal court.” Rec., doc. 12, at 3 & n.2 (citing District of Columbia
Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)).
Mr. Collier’s claim that the Department of Corrections’ policy violated his
right of access to the courts is based on Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
3 There, the Supreme Court declared that [i]t is indisputable that indigent inmates
must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents . .
. and with stamps to mail them.” Id. at 824-25. In Twyman v. Crisp , 584 F.2d
352, 359 (10th Cir. 1978), we concluded that this statement in Bounds should not
be read to provide prisoners “with an unlimited right to free postage in
connection with the right of access to the courts.” We explained that
“[r]easonable regulations are necessary to balance the rights of prisoners with
budgetary considerations.” Id. Other circuits have agreed that prison officials
may place reasonable restrictions on the provision of free postage. See, e.g. ,
Blaise v. Fenn , 48 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that a state penitentiary
“does not offer unlimited postage without a showing of special circumstances to
the deputy warden, and is not required to do so by Bounds ”); Chandler v.
Coughlin , 763 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding, “a state is entitled to
adopt reasonable postage regulations in light of, for example, prison budgetary
considerations”).
In Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1996), the Supreme Court
established an important limitation on claims of denial of access to the courts . It
held that the plaintiff prisoner must show that prison officials’ policies and
practices have caused an actual injury:
Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant
4 actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy of the prison infirmary. Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone, and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have known.
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 7 2000 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
JEFFREY S. COLLIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-3000 (D.C. 98-3221-GTV) MICHAEL A. NELSON, Warden, El (District of Kansas) Dorado Correctional Facility,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey S. Collier, a prisoner incarcerated in a Kansas correctional facility
proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He challenged
the Kansas Department of Corrections’s (KDOC’s) inmate mail policy (as
amended in January and April 1998) on two grounds, arguing: (1) the policy
conflicted with a prior state court decision; and (2) the policy violated his
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. constitutional right of access to the courts. The district court dismissed Mr.
Collier’s complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). See Rec., doc. 12, at 1 (Order filed Dec. 17, 1998).
The policy challenged by Mr. Collier provides that inmates are responsible
for paying for postage on all domestic mailings unless they are indigent. Indigent
inmates are provided with postage for not more than four first class, one ounce
domestic letters per month.
However, the policy also states:
All postage for legal and official mail shall be paid by the inmate regardless of indigent status. Credit for the mailing of legal and official mail shall be given to inmates who do not have sufficient funds in their inmate account. Such credit shall be deducted from the inmate’s funds when available.
....
Credit for this postage shall not exceed twenty-five dollars ($25.00) at any given time without advance approval of the Warden or designee.
See Rec., doc. 1 (Attach.) (Interdepartmental Memorandum, KDOC)
We review the district court’s dismissal de novo. 1 See Mascheroni v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 28 F.3d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994). “A pro
1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2 se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). We uphold a dismissal “only when it appears that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle
him to relief, accepting the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and
construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Yoder v.
Honeywell, Inc. , 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1997).
Applying that standard, we conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Mr. Collier’s claim that the KDOC’s inmate mail policy violated the
order of a Kansas state court. In order to allege a valid § 1983 claim, a plaintiff
must assert the deprivation, under color of law, of a right, privilege, or immunity
secured by federal law. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 150
(1970). Here, Mr. Collier has not alleged the denial of such a right, privilege, or
immunity. Instead, he merely argues that the inmate mail policy violated the
terms of the state court order. We agree with the district court that “any relief for
the alleged violation of the state court order lies in the state and appellate courts
and not in federal court.” Rec., doc. 12, at 3 & n.2 (citing District of Columbia
Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)).
Mr. Collier’s claim that the Department of Corrections’ policy violated his
right of access to the courts is based on Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
3 There, the Supreme Court declared that [i]t is indisputable that indigent inmates
must be provided at state expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents . .
. and with stamps to mail them.” Id. at 824-25. In Twyman v. Crisp , 584 F.2d
352, 359 (10th Cir. 1978), we concluded that this statement in Bounds should not
be read to provide prisoners “with an unlimited right to free postage in
connection with the right of access to the courts.” We explained that
“[r]easonable regulations are necessary to balance the rights of prisoners with
budgetary considerations.” Id. Other circuits have agreed that prison officials
may place reasonable restrictions on the provision of free postage. See, e.g. ,
Blaise v. Fenn , 48 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that a state penitentiary
“does not offer unlimited postage without a showing of special circumstances to
the deputy warden, and is not required to do so by Bounds ”); Chandler v.
Coughlin , 763 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding, “a state is entitled to
adopt reasonable postage regulations in light of, for example, prison budgetary
considerations”).
In Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1996), the Supreme Court
established an important limitation on claims of denial of access to the courts . It
held that the plaintiff prisoner must show that prison officials’ policies and
practices have caused an actual injury:
Because Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant
4 actual injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense. That would be the precise analog of the healthy inmate claiming constitutional violation because of the inadequacy of the prison infirmary. Insofar as the right vindicated by Bounds is concerned, meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone, and the inmate therefore must go one step further and demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a complaint.
Id. at 351 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Importantly, this actual injury requirement is not satisfied by the
impairment of any legal claim. Id. at 354. Instead, “the tools [that Bounds ]
requires to be provided are those that inmates need in order to attack their
sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of
their confinement.” Id. at 355. As the Court explained in Lewis , restrictions on
the filing of other kinds of cases do not violate prisoners’ constitutional right of
access to the courts. Id. (noting “[i]mpairment of any other litigating capacity is
simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of
conviction and incarceration”).
Here, Mr. Collier has not asserted that he suffered any actual injury under
the challenged prison mail policy. Even in his initial motion for a preliminary
5 injunction, Mr. Collier asserted only that “the $25.00 limit is fast reaching its
limit,” and that “once I reach said limit I must have each legal letter approved
prior to mailing.” Rec., doc. 3, at 1. He has not asserted that because of this
limit, he has been unable to file any necessary legal document, or that the limit
has had any other effect on his ability to pursue any legal claim. Although there
may well be instances in which $25.00 of postage is insufficient to pursue a legal
claim, there is no indication in this record that this limit has infringed Mr.
Collier’s constitutional right of access to the courts. We, therefore, agree with
the district court that Mr. Collier’s allegations fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry Circuit Judge