College Health II GP, Inc. v. Essam Fahad Zahid

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-2131
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 29, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D24-2131 Lower Tribunal No. 22-3514-CA-01 ________________

College Health II GP, Inc., Appellant,

vs.

Essam Fahad Zahid, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mavel Ruiz, Judge.

Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., and Robert J. Hauser (West Palm Beach); Coffey Burlington, P.L., and Robert K. Burlington and Daniel F. Blonsky; Dorta Law, and Gonzalo Dorta; Burstyn Law, and Sean A. Burstyn, for appellant.

Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP, and Raquel M. Fernandez, Adrian K. Felix, and Patricia M. Patino, for appellees.

Before SCALES, C.J., and LINDSEY and BOKOR, JJ. PER CURIAM.

Appellant College Health II GP, Inc. (“Seller”), the plaintiff/counter-

defendant below, appeals from a September 30, 2024 final judgment in favor

of the defendants/counter-plaintiffs below, appellees Essam Fahad Zahid

and Lea Melodie Marin (“Buyers”). Finding no reversible error, we affirm the

challenged judgment.

This litigation arises out of the failed closing of a transaction governed

by a real estate purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”) between the parties.

After conducting a two-day bench trial, the lower court, in a fourteen-page,

elaborated final judgment, concluded that, because Seller had breached the

PSA by failing to provide marketable title at closing, Buyers were entitled to

the return of their deposit.

In this appeal, Seller primarily challenges the trial court’s interlocutory

order denying its motion for summary judgment, in which Seller argued that

Buyers had breached the PSA by interfering with Seller’s ability to provide

marketable title at closing. According to Seller, the trial court should not have

conducted a bench trial below because there were no genuine disputes of

material fact to be resolved by the fact finder. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a)

(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

2 judgment as a matter of law.”). We disagree. Viewing the summary judgment

evidence and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to Buyers, the

record reveals genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Buyers’

actions breached the PSA. See Devolro Inc. v. Kungeibayev, 407 So. 3d

1252, 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (observing that, even after Florida’s adoption

of the federal summary judgment standard, “summary judgment is not a

substitute for the trial of disputed fact issues” (quoting In re Amends. to

Fla. Rule Civ. Proc. 1.510, 309 So. 3d 192, 194 (Fla. 2020))). The trial court,

therefore, properly denied Seller’s motion for summary judgment and

proceeded to trial. Id. at 1256.

Seller’s alternate argument – that the trial court’s factual findings are

not supported by competent, substantial evidence – is without merit. See

Q.G.S. Dev., Inc. v. Nat’l Lining Sys., Inc., 386 So. 3d 596, 598-99 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2024) (“[T]he scope of our review does not entail examining evidence

that potentially supports a different result. Instead, we must only determine

whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent, substantial

evidence. In this vein, ‘the appellate court should interpret the record and all

reasonable inferences and deductions capable of being drawn therefrom in

the light most favorable to sustain [the trial court’s] conclusions.’” (quoting

3 DeLalio v. Food Palace, Inc., 330 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)

(citation omitted)).

Affirmed.